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Abstract 
 
This dissertation analyzes the impact of information and communication technology 
(ICT) and new media on the production of Islamic knowledge and the construction of 
Muslim identity in Muslim communities in the Arab world and Western Europe.  Today 
we witness an unprecedented proliferation of ICT and new media in the Arab and 
Muslim world as well as growing interdependency of various media outlets.  This 
process includes media that morph into each other, messages that migrate across 
boundaries, and social networks that utilize multiple technologies.  The unanticipated 
assemblages formed by these media contribute simultaneously to preserving traditional 
cultural norms and religious values while unsettling the existing arrangements and 
promoting new organizational forms; appealing to a local audience while addressing 
transnational communities; and asserting conformity with established religious 
institutions while fueling fragmentation of authority and individualization of faith.  
Therefore, this dissertation aims to transcend the media-centric logic and to analyze the 
impact of ICT and new media in the light of the above-mentioned interdependency and 
hybridization within broader social, cultural and linguistic context.  By doing so, it 
particularly focuses on two separate, yet simultaneously entangled, phenomena.  First, it 
discusses fatwas and other normative content issued and/or disseminated by various 
Islamic websites for the Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim majority countries, 
particularly in Western Europe.  Second, it analyzes Islamic video games and video 
clips produced in the Arab world and beyond and discusses the ways in which these 
new media articulate Muslim identity and communicate Islamic ethical and moral 
values to the youth.  On an overarching level, this dissertation deals with the production 
of knowledge and construction of identity in the increasingly networked and 
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interconnected communities; the emerging potential of new digital media for 
dissemination of moral and religious values; and the ways public authorities operate 
within the religion-technology interaction. 
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Abstrakt 
 
Předložená disertační práce analyzuje vliv informačních a komunikačních technologií a 
nových médií na vytváření islámských norem a konstrukci muslimské identity v 
muslimských komunitách v arabském světě a zemích Západní Evropy. V současné době 
dochází k bezprecedentnímu rozšiřování informačních a komunikačních technologií a 
nových médií v arabském a islámském světě, stejně tak jako k rostoucí provázanosti a 
vzájemné závislosti jednotlivých platforem digitálních médií. Tento proces zahrnuje 
média, která metamorfují jedno v druhé, sdělení, která se šíří bez ohledu na státní 
hranice, a sociální sítě, využívající celou škálu odlišných technologií. Nepředvídatelné 
kombinace těchto médií a technologií pak přispívají na jedné straně k posilování 
tradičních kulturních norem a náboženských hodnot a na druhé straně k rozrušování 
existujících struktur a vzniku nových modelů organizace; na jedné straně oslovují 
lokální publikum, zatímco na druhé straně posilují globální komunity; vynucují 
konformitu s etablovanými náboženskými institucemi, a zároveň usnadňují fragmentaci 
náboženské autority a individualizaci víry. Předložená disertační práce si klade za cíl 
překročit logiku sevřenou úzkými mediálními kategoriemi a analyzovat vliv 
informačních a komunikačních technologií a nových médií ve světle výše zmíněné 
vzájemné provázanosti a hybridizace v rámci širšího sociálního, kulturního a 
lingvistického kontextu arabského a islámského světa. Za tím účelem se práce zaměřuje 
na dva odlišné, přesto však vzájemně provázané fenomény. Za prvé pojednává o 
fatwách a dalších normativních materiálech vydávaných nebo rozšiřovaných na 
internetu pro potřeby muslimských menšin žijících mimo hranice islámského světa, 
zejména v zemích Západní Evropy. Za druhé analyzuje videoklipy a počítačové hry 
vytvořené převážně v arabském světě a zkoumá způsoby, jakými tato nová média 
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artikulují muslimskou identitu a předávají islámské etické a morální hodnoty mladé 
generaci. V obecné rovině pak předložená disertační práce pojednává o vytváření 
normativního diskurzu a formování identity ve stále více propojených komunitách; 
vzrůstajícím potenciálu nových médií pro rozšiřování morálních a náboženských 
hodnot; a způsobech, jakými veřejné autority reagují na vzrůstající interakcí 
náboženství a nových technologií. 
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1   Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the impact of information and communication technology 
(ICT) and new digital media on the production of Islamic knowledge and the 
construction of Muslim identity in Muslim communities in the Arab world and Western 
Europe.  Today we witness an unprecedented proliferation of ICT and new media in the 
Arab and Muslim world as well as growing interdependency of various media outlets.  
This process includes media that morph into each other, messages that migrate across 
boundaries, and social networks that utilize multiple technologies.  The unanticipated 
assemblages formed by these media contribute simultaneously to preserving traditional 
cultural norms and religious values while unsettling the existing arrangements and 
promoting new organizational forms; appealing to a local audience while addressing 
transnational communities; and asserting conformity with established religious 
institutions while fueling fragmentation of authority and individualization of faith.   
 
Therefore, this dissertation aims to transcend the media-centric logic and to analyze the 
impact of ICT and new media in the light of the above-mentioned interdependency and 
hybridization within broader social, cultural and linguistic context.  By doing so, it 
particularly focuses on two separate, yet simultaneously entangled, phenomena.  First, it 
discusses fatwas and other normative content issued and/or disseminated by various 
Islamic websites for the Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim majority setting, 
particularly within the European legal systems.  Second, it analyzes Islamic video 
games and video clips produced in the Arab world and beyond and discusses the ways 
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in which these new media forms articulate Muslim identity and communicate Islamic 
ethical and moral values to the youth.  On an overarching level, this dissertation deals 
with the production of knowledge and construction of identity in the increasingly 
networked and interconnected communities; the emerging potential of new digital 
media for dissemination of moral and religious values; and the ways public authorities 
operate within the religion-technology interaction. 
 
The discursive development and inner struggle over authority between competing 
interpretations of Islam and Islamic law, encompassing broader issues of identity among 
members of Muslim minorities, constitutes a key issue in social, economical, and 
political reality of contemporary Middle East, Europe, and United States.  Today we are 
in crucial need of a critical understanding of the production of Islamic knowledge and 
construction of interpretive authority within transnational Muslim social networks.  
Despite a commonly shared concern that the Internet and ICT play a significant role in 
decision-making processes within Muslim communities and heavily influence the 
shaping of Muslim identities, the number of complex, well researched, and case-based 
studies on how this is done remains relatively low and their results seem to be to a large 
extent ambiguous. 
 
The methodological approach used in this dissertation is an agglomeration of various 
research ventures coming from a variety of disciplines including information science, 
communication studies, cultural studies, Islamic studies, legal studies, new media 
studies, and computer science.  Given the multifaceted nature of the hybridized media 
outlets analyzed in this thesis, the particular methodological and theoretical frameworks 
are discussed in detail in individual sections where they belong.  Nevertheless, the 
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overarching theoretical and methodological background of this thesis lies in the domain 
of information science and communication studies.  According to Cejpek (2005, p. 178) 
 
The subject of information science in the narrower sense is the mediation 
of knowledge, experience, and stories (potential information) recorded 
through systems of signs and systematically ordered in collections of 
documents and globally dispersed electronic resources.  The information 
science also deals with the consequences such mediation of potential 
information has for human beings and society. 
 
In the last few years, there is a growing interest of researchers, coming from 
information science and communication studies background, in the Arab and Muslim 
world, particularly regarding the patterns of use of the Internet among the youth and the 
democratization potential of information and communication technologies.  For 
example, Rasha A. Abdulla from the American University in Cairo has published a 
pioneering book in 2007 called The Internet in the Arab World: Egypt and beyond, 
which provides essential information and knowledge about the development of the 
Internet in the Arab world as well as a comprehensive presentation of the uses and 
effects of this new medium on the region (Abdulla 2007).  Regarding the Muslim world, 
Mohammed el-Nawawy and Sahar Khamis from the departments of communication at 
the Queens University of Charlotte, and the University of Maryland respectively, have 
published a book in 2009 called Islam dot com: Contemporary Islamic Discourses in 
Cyberspace, which provides an insight into the expanding Islamic discourse and 
changing notions of Islamic identity as it appears on three of the most popular Islamic 
websites (El-Nawawy & Khamis 2009).  Finally, Phillip N. Howard from the 
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Department of Communication at the University of Washington, has published a 
comprehensive study in 2010 called The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam, which presents a challenging 
and original analysis of the cultural and political dynamics of the Muslim world through 
the lens of the interaction between communication technology and politics (Howard 
2010).  These recent books clearly indicate an emerging field of study within the 
inherent domain of information science and communication studies, i.e. the interactions 
between information and communication technology and individual users, authorities, 
and institutions in the Arab and Muslim world and broader political and social aspects 
of such interactions. 
 
At the same time, there is also a growing interest of researches from information science 
and communication studies in the possible interactions between systems of organized 
religion and information and communication technology.  For example, the Information, 
Communication & Society Journal is currently (i.e. November 2010) preparing for print 
a special issue called Religion and the Internet: The Online-Offline Connection focusing 
among other on the interactions between online communities and offline religious 
institutions and responses of offline religious authorities to religious manifestations and 
practices online from their community or tradition.  Recently, the Center for the Study 
of Information and Religion (CSIR) has been established in Kent State’s School of 
Library and Information Science.  At CSIR, an interdisciplinary approach is being used 
to facilitate research that is focused on the various institutions and agents of religion and 
their effect on social knowledge through the use, dissemination, and diffusion of 
information. The goals of the CSIR are: first, to investigate the importance of 
information in the religious world; second, to understand the relationship between the 
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information-seeking behavior of clergy and the body of knowledge that exists to serve 
their information needs; and third, to advance our understanding of the role of 
information in religious practice.  CSIR currently accepts abstracts for consideration for 
the first annual Conference on Information and Religion, scheduled for May 2011 at 
Kent State University. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the recent grow of interest of information science and 
communication studies in the topics of religion, Islam, and the Arab world, it has to be 
emphasized that similar research, albeit from different methodological positions, has 
been going on for at least a decade and its results have to be taken into account.  The 
most salient and groundbreaking research came unsurprisingly from the field of Middle 
Eastern and/or Islamic studies, oftentimes incorporating research originating in the 
domains of anthropology and cultural studies.  As early as in 1999, Dale F. Eickelman 
and Jon W. Anderson have edited a pioneering anthology called New Media in the 
Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, which provides a fascinating account on 
the role new media play in Muslim society and diaspora, particularly dealing with the 
potential of new media for the redefinition of public sphere and the emergence of new 
Islam’s interpreters (Eickelman & Anderson 1999).  Similarly important is the work of 
Gary R. Bunt from the University of Lampeter, who published several key books on 
Islam, the Internet, and new media, namely Virtually Islamic in 2000, Islam in the 
Digital Age: E-jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments in 2003, and 
iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam in 2009 (Bunt 2000, 2003, 2009).   
 
There are literally hundreds of other researches who provide valuable insights into the 
particular aspects of the emergence and growth of the Internet and new media in the 
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Muslim and Arab world, and their research is properly discussed below in the particular 
chapters.  The aim of this introductory literature review is twofold. First, to reaffirm the 
clear link between the study of the Internet and new media in the Muslim and Arab 
world and the contemporary information science and communication studies; and, 
second, to emphasize the inherently multidisciplinary character of this thesis and the 
correspondingly varied selection of research ventures and methodologies, stemming 
from the multifaceted character of the topic itself. 
 
Before discussing the development of the Internet and new media in the Muslim and 
Arab world, I must first shed light on four important conceptual notions.  The first is 
obviously the term “Islam.”  Essentially, in this thesis I strive to avoid presenting Islam 
as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.  Instead, I aim to 
perceive Islam as diverse and multifaceted phenomenon, with international differences, 
debates, and development.  As many authors (Said 1978, 1997; Shaheen 2000; Poole 
2006; Wingfield & Karaman 2001; Pintak 2006; Karim 2006) have demonstrated, the 
representations of Islam appearing in European and American news media oftentimes 
exploit stereotypes and clichés, constructing schematized and flattened notion of 
“Islam.” At the same time, this notion of Islam is often framed as threatening, 
supportive of terrorism (Larsson 2007), or engaged in “a clash of civilizations” 
(Huntington 1996).  In this respect, Said (1997, p. l) even argues that  
 
In no really significant way is there a direct correspondence between the 
“Islam” in common Western usage and the enormously varied life that 
 21 
goes on within the world of Islam, with its more than 800,000,000 people,1 
its millions of square miles of territory principally in Africa and Asia, its 
dozens of societies, states, histories, geographies, cultures. […]  During 
the past few years, especially since events in Iran caught European and 
American attention so strongly,2 the media have therefore covered Islam: 
they have portrayed it, characterized it, analyzed it, given instant courses 
on it, and consequently they have made it “known.”  But, as I have 
implied, this coverage – and with it the work of academic experts on 
Islam, geopolitical strategists who speak of “the crescent of crisis,” 
cultural thinkers who deplore “the decline of the West” – is misleadingly 
full.  It has given consumers of news the sense that they have understood 
Islam without at the same time intimating to them that a great deal in this 
energetic coverage is based on far from objective material. […]  Aside 
from the fact, that neither Christianity or Judaism, both of them going 
through quite remarkable revivals (or “returns”), is treated in so emotional 
way, there is an unquestioned assumption that Islam can be characterized 
limitlessly by means of handful of recklessly general and repeatedly 
deployed clichés.  
 
By the same token, Küng (2007, p. 19) argues that the common failing of representation 
of Islam is the attachment to a monolithic and unhistorical image and presupposition 
                                                 
1 Said wrote the first version of his text in 1981; the current estimations of Muslim population reach 1.57 
billion (PewResearchCenter 2009). 
2 Said is referring to the Islamic Revolution which took place in Iran in 1979.  Nevertheless, most of his 
observations remain valid today, given the recent development of the “War on Terror” and the campaigns 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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that Islam has always been, and is, everywhere the same.  In other words, “However 
different Wahhabi Saudis, Iranian Shiite mullahs, Egyptian Islamic Brethren, 
Palestinian Hamas fighters, Pakistani Sufis, or American Black Muslims may be, it is 
thought that there is an eternal unchanging essence of Islam, radically different from 
everything Western” (ibid.).   
 
Nevertheless, Küng (2007, p. 20) simultaneously asserts that for all the historic currents 
and counter-currents, in the various constantly shifting historical images and lived-out 
realizations of Islam there is an abiding element; its basic components and basic 
perspectives stem from an origin that is by no means random but is given with a quite 
specific historical personality, a holy scripture.  Yet, against all rigid “essentialism,” he 
immediately adds that this abiding essence shows itself only in what is changing; that 
there is an identity, but only in variables; a continuum, but only in the event; a 
constancy, but only in changing manifestations.  By the same way, I treat Islam in my 
thesis as a dynamic, rather than rigid and static system; and the production of Islamic 
knowledge and the construction of Muslim identity as open ended process involving 
variety of actors.  By doing so, I analyze the various manifestations of Islam mentioned 
in this thesis in the broader context where they transpire; clearly linking them to the 
respective institutions, authorities, and individuals who articulate or promote them.     
 
Correspondingly, the second notion which needs clarification is the umbrella term 
“Muslim world.”  As Howard (2010, p. 20) notes, today there are 75 countries with 
significant Muslim communities; 48 countries where Muslims are in the majority and at 
least 50 percent of the population is Muslim; 27 countries where Muslims are an 
important minority and at least 10 percent of the population is Muslim.  While Muslims 
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are found on all five inhabited continents, more than 60% of the global Muslim 
population is in Asia and about 20% is in the Middle East and North Africa.  However, 
the Middle East-North Africa region has the highest percentage of Muslim-majority 
countries.  Indeed, more than half of the 20 countries and territories in that region have 
populations that are approximately 95% Muslim or greater (PewResearchCenter 2009).  
As has been mentioned above, the diversity of experience in Islamic countries is as 
striking as the similarities.  There is enormous diversity in the economic, political, and 
cultural institutions of Muslim countries; not to mention the various interpretations of 
Islam.  In this respect, Howard (2010, p. 23) even argues that there is not much 
evidence that the “Muslim world” is a meaningful political category.  In fact, it is a term 
of generalization, about as useful as the “Western world” or “the West.”  These terms 
are similarly subjective in nature, depending on whether cultural, economic, religious or 
political criteria are employed.  In his influential, yet not generally accepted thesis, 
Huntington (1996) argues that the definition of “the West” is primarily based on 
religion, as the countries of Western and Central Europe, and subsequently United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Latin America, were historically 
influenced by the two forms of Western Christianity, namely Catholicism and 
Protestantism.  Conversely, other uses of the term “Western world” refer to the societies 
of Europe and their genealogical, colonial, and philosophical descendants, typically also 
including those countries whose ethnic identity and dominant culture derive from 
European culture; not necessarily connecting the term with Christianity. Finally, 
depending on context, the term “Western world” may be restricted solely to the 
Americas and Western Europe. 
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Therefore, in this thesis I use the terms “Muslim world” and “Western world” only as 
operational terms, not as political categories; acknowledging their porous and 
multifaceted nature.  Moreover, particularly the term “the West” (al-gharb) oftentimes 
appears in the analyzed fatwas and interviews; usually without the petitioner, mufti, or 
interviewee providing his or her definition of the term.   
 
Finally, the last term which has to be clarified is the “Arab world.”  Essentially, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I define Arab world as an umbrella term for countries that belong 
to the Arab League of Nations and whose official language is Arabic (see also Abdulla 
2007).3  As is the case with the above mentioned umbrella terms, by no means this 
indicates that the Arab world constitutes a monolithic bloc.  Despite the fact that most 
Arab countries share the same language, culture, religion, and history, there are core 
differences among Arab audiences regarding political and cultural ideologies (Amin 
2007, p. x).  It’s also important to emphasize that although the majority of Arabs are 
Muslims, the population in the Arab world encompasses also a variety of other 
religions, including Christians, Druze, Baha’is, and others.   
 
Yet, at the same time, as Zayani (2008) argues, there is an overlap between the notions 
of Arab and Muslim public spheres.  The research on the role of new media and the 
Internet in the Arab world oftentimes entangles with broader research concerning the 
Muslim world in general.  In many cases research conducted within the framework of 
Islamic studies deals directly with issues related to the Arab media landscape.  
Conversely, many new Arab media play an important role in the production of global 
                                                 
3 These countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
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Islamic knowledge, transcending national, regional, and language boundaries.  This is 
particularly relevant to the situation of Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim 
countries, where the Internet and new media have become an important adjunct to 
traditional means of communicating about Islam and facilitate “a new form of Islamic 
discourse” (Bunt 2006, p. 13).  Many prominent Islamic websites are maintained and/or 
operate from Arab countries (e.g. IslamOnline, Fatwa-Online, etc.), so besides being 
part of the “emerging Muslim public sphere” (Eickelman & Anderson 2003, p. 1), they 
also form an inseparable part of the Arab media landscape (Khamis & Šisler 2010). 
 
This dissertation stems from fundamental research conducted at Charles University in 
Prague in 2005 – 2010, the American University in Cairo in 2007 – 2008, and at the 
Northwestern University in Chicago in 2008 – 2009.  Its findings are the result of both 
qualitative and content analysis of research materials including websites, blogs, video 
clips and video games, as well as interviews with major media producers.  Most of the 
research materials and interviews have been collected through my fieldwork in 
Damascus, Syria (2005), Beirut, Lebanon (2005) and Cairo, Egypt (2006, 2007-2008).  
Therefore, the focus of this thesis is primarily on the Muslim communities in the Arab 
world and on Muslim minorities in Western Europe (in most cases connected with the 
Arab world).  Similarly, the Islamic materials and media used in this thesis originated 
primarily in the Arab world, mainly in the three above mentioned countries.  
Nevertheless, most of these media have a broader, in some cases even global audience; 
and some of the materials analyzed in this thesis originated outside of the boundaries of 
the Arab world.  This reflects the above-mentioned hybridization of the Islamic 
discourse and the migration of messages across geographical boundaries; as well as the 
simultaneous overlaps of local and global notions of Muslim identity.  The information 
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about the authors, including countries of origin and residence, of all examples and 
research materials used in this thesis are clearly indicated whenever possible.  By no 
means this dissertation aspires to cover all the possible interactions between 
multifaceted Muslim communities, new media, and the Internet; rather, it focuses on 
two separated, yet interlinked phenomena that are becoming increasingly relevant – the 
production of Islamic jurisprudence on the Internet for Muslim minorities in Western 
Europe and the construction of Muslim identity in new media in the Arab world.  These 
two phenomena and corresponding Muslim communities have been chosen for various 
reasons. First, the issue of dispensing religious and legal opinions defining how to 
behave in compliance with Islamic laws while living as a minority within European 
legal frameworks is of growing importance in the fabric of key social, political and 
economic issues of the contemporary unified Europe.  As this thesis argues, the Internet 
and new media play an increasingly important role in the construction of Muslim 
identity and production of Islamic knowledge in contemporary European Muslim 
minorities, particularly among the youth.  Therefore, today we are in a crucial need of 
understanding the differentiated and oftentimes contrasting notions of Islam and 
Muslim identity as promoted by various Internet muftis and preachers.  Second, 
particularly in the Arab world, these contrasting notions of Islam and Muslim identity 
are not necessarily produced and disseminated on the Internet; they increasingly find 
their way to what I describe as “neglected media,” capitalizing on the notion of 
Reichmuth and Werning (2006), i.e. various small media outlets traditionally neglected 
by the academia yet having massive popularity among the youth, such as video clips, 
video games, video blogs, etc.  In this thesis I argue, that particularly video games 
present a new radical information transferal for the Islamic message in the Arab world 
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and as such constitute a new research agenda both in the field of information science 
and communication studies as well as in Islamic and Arab studies. 
     
Before outlining the general structure and organization of this thesis, I must briefly 
describe the “new media revolution” which erupted in the Arab world after 1990 
(Khamis & Šisler 2010).  This revolution was inspired by a number of factors and their 
accompanying shifts in the media landscape.  First, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the Gulf war that followed it in 1991 were accompanied by the availability of 
CNN’s news coverage of the war throughout the Arab region for free for the first time.  
This phenomenon had multiple implications on the media scene in the region, since it 
inspired many Arab countries to revolutionize their own television coverage through 
allowing privatized satellite television channels as well as by professionalizing their 
own patterns of television coverage along the lines of western television journalism (El-
Nawawy & Iskander 2002).  
 
Second, in the 1990s Internet penetration started to spread throughout the Arab world.  
Although the region generally suffered from “being on the low end of the digital divide” 
(Abdulla 2007, p. 35), facing many challenges, including a lack of human and economic 
IT resources, funds for IT research and development, and solid telecommunications 
infrastructure, this situation is rapidly changing, since many Arab countries are 
currently striving hard to increase Internet penetration rates (Khamis & Šisler 2010).  
The penetration rates vary greatly in different Arab states, yet the region as a whole has 
witnessed an unprecedented rise in Internet penetration levels over the last few years 
(Abdulla 2007, p. 45; Warf & Vincent 2007).  
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According to recent estimations in June 2010 (Internet World Stats 2010), the world 
average Internet penetration is 28.7 %.  Several Arab countries substantially exceed this 
figure, for example: Bahrain (88.0 %), the United Arab Emirates (75.9 %), Qatar (51.8 
%), Saudi Arabia (38.1 %), Kuwait (39.4 %), Tunisia (34.0 %), and Morocco (33.0 %), 
whereas the rest of the Arab world falls slightly below it, like Jordan (27.2 %), Lebanon 
(24.2 %), Egypt (21.2 %), and Syria (17.7 %).  Only in a few Arab countries the Internet 
penetration remains far below the international average, such as Libya (5.5 %), Yemen 
(1.8 %) and Iraq (1.1 %).4 
 
Internet use is increasingly more prevalent among younger age groups within the Arab 
world, especially the 20 to 30 year old age group (Abdulla 2007, p. 50).  There is a 
shortage in reliable data on the income levels and educational backgrounds of Internet 
users in the Arab world, but it is safe to say that Internet use is highest among urban, 
middle and upper class groups, as suggested in studies covering Morocco (Baune 2005), 
Kuwait (Wheeler 2005), Egypt (Abdulla 2007), United Arab Emirates (Sokol & Sisler 
2010), and Saudi Arabia (Sait et al. 2007).   Similar to western societies, the Internet 
usage is a way of life for young, educated Arabs (Khalid 2007).  In the Arab world, the 
Internet is used for many reasons besides having access to news and gaining 
information.  Instrumental sites such as search engines, social contacts through e-mail, 
blogs, and Facebook, as well as the discussion of taboo topics are just some of the uses; 
along with entertainment, sports, and search for moral guidance and religious advice 
                                                 
4 InternetWorld Stats use demographic numbers based on data from the US Census Bureau and Internet 
usage numbers based on data published by Nielsen Online, ITU, and other sources.  For more information 
see:  InternetWorld Stats. 2010. [online]. Nov 17, 2010, [cit. 2010-11-24]. Available online: 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/>. 
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through religious websites (El-Nawawy & Khamis 2009; Bunt 2009; Hofheinz 2007; 
Abdulla 2007; Sokol & Sisler 2010; Khamis & Šisler 2010). 
 
The emergence and rapid proliferation of the Internet in the Arab world raised various 
expectations about its impact on traditional Arab society.  On the one hand, several 
authors argue that the Internet can possibly contribute to the empowerment of 
traditionally marginalized actors, especially in the social, political and religious domain.  
For example, Bunt (2000) and Poole (2002, p. 54) suggest that the openness of the 
Internet allows disenfranchised and marginalized groups to circumvent mainstream 
media and to subvert hegemonic discourses along the lines of gender, sexuality, and age 
(see also Khamis & Šisler 2010).  On the other hand, some authors, like Castells (1996, 
p. 363), argue that the effect of the spread of Internet technologies is likely to be “the 
reinforcement of the culturally dominant social networks, as well as the increase of their 
cosmopolitanism and globalization.”  By the same token, Anderson (2008) discusses 
how the excitement over the revolutionary potential of new media and information 
technologies in the Middle East focused on them as alternatives.  As such, he continues, 
new technologies and alternative channels suggested a transformation of the public 
sphere, by empowering new voices and new people.  Yet, as Anderson demonstrates, 
time and experience have outrun this paradigm and many new actors turned out to have 
roots in old establishments.  Therefore, he argues that alternative models are insufficient 
“because they isolate actors as individuals from the larger story of how micro-processes 
of networked communication are working through today’s macro-processes of 
globalization” (p. 1).  Instead he suggests thinking of new information and 
communication technologies in the Arab world as a complex of “informational and 
technological mobility, of shifting reflexivities that intensify and remix cultural and 
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other practices, and of highly unstable assemblages and contingent effects” (ibid.; see 
also Sokol & Sisler 2010).  It is precisely the complex interplay between technology, 
society, and culture that remixes and reinforces existing practices of social interaction in 
virtual environments; an issue I analyze in this thesis, particularly regarding the 
construction of religious interpretive authority and Muslim identity. 
 
The Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the production of Islamic knowledge on the 
Internet, using case studies of websites providing normative content for Muslim 
minorities in Europe.  With an increasing number of Muslims approaching religious 
scholars and their legal advices on the Internet, a new paradigm has arguably emerged 
in the construction of Islamic knowledge.  The religious scholars issue their advice 
mostly in the form of a fatwa, i.e. an answer to a real or hypothetical inquiry reflecting a 
legal conviction of an individual scholar, based mainly on older rulings and/or his own 
interpretation of the religious texts.  As such a fatwa is not legally binding, but the 
individual petitioner is advised to follow it.  The persuasive power of the respective 
fatwa is thus based mainly on the authority of the scholar (mufti) who issued it.  There 
are thousands of Internet sites on which committees of major Islamic scholars – or even 
just enthusiastic individuals – issue legal opinions that range from questions of personal 
behavior to theoretical political dilemmas.  The Internet has emerged as a transnational 
sphere of blogs and chat rooms in which these opinions and their respective interpretive 
methods are broadly discussed. 
 
Therefore, in this chapter, I attempt to transcend this media-centric logic by situating the 
dispensation of religious opinions in cyberspace into the particular social framework; 
i.e. that of Muslim minorities living in Europe.  From preliminary case studies of 
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Middle Eastern and Western European web spheres it seems that some processes often 
ascribed to the Internet – like the individualization and privatization of religious 
practices and the participation in decision-making – have their roots mainly in other 
factors.  In such cases the Internet represents more of a catalyst or vehicle of 
transmission.  On the other hand some processes are seemingly entrenched in the 
features of the medium itself.  The anonymity of cyber environments allows for a 
greater willingness among petitioners to raise intimate questions, while the transnational 
character of the Internet contributes to the notion of global Islamic identity.  The 
Internet also seems to promote, at least in some specific social settings, the greater 
participation of women in public sphere.  The Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses 
particularly on Sunni websites catering for Muslims in Europe and explores their fatwas 
and other forms of counseling addressing the specific issues arising from living as a 
minority in a non-Muslim majority setting.  It stems from a compound research, during 
which more than 500 fatwas, among other materials, have been downloaded, archived 
and analyzed between 2005 and 2010.  Essentially, in the Chapter 2 I argue that the 
underlying logic behind the Islamic cyber counseling emphasizes the role of the Self, 
the privatization of faith, and the increasing insistence on religion as a system of values 
and ethics.  I also demonstrate that the popularity of Internet preachers and muftis 
converges with the broader transformation of contemporary religiosity, which similarly 
emphasizes the role of the individual.  Such transformation promotes a ready-made and 
easily-accessible set of norms and values that might order daily lives and define a 
practical and visible identity.  Nevertheless, I also suggest that the Internet has in the 
long term reinforced culturally dominant social networks and that while fueling 
individualization and privatization of faith, it simultaneously asserts conformity and 
compliance with established religious authorities. 
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Most academic research of ICT, the Internet, and Islam is based upon written source 
materials, whereas non-written media remain profoundly under studied, in spite of their 
social and political impact.  These media can include, but are not limited to, video clips, 
video games, audio sermons, and others.  In the Arab world these forms of media are 
arguably more consumed and more pervasive than other traditional media, given the 
importance of oral traditions, and literacy rates (Amin & Gher 2000).  In recent years a 
new cottage industry concerned with the production of Arab and Islamic video games 
has emerged, where game designers are attempting to address alleged 
misrepresentations of Arabs and Muslims in European and American games. Their 
attempts to transcend these misrepresentations actively contribute to the shaping of 
Muslim identities among Arab youth, and should be critically studied. 
 
Therefore, the Chapter 3 of this thesis analyses the construction of Muslim identity in 
such neglected digital media, particularly in video games and video clips produced in the 
Arab and Muslim world.  By doing so, this chapter presents both the ways in which 
Muslims and Arabs are represented, and represent themselves, in the above-mentioned 
media. It utilizes the theoretical framework of so-called “neglected media,” and explores 
this media type’s potential in shaping of Muslim identities.  First, I define neglected 
media and set their production and consumption into broader political, cultural, and 
linguistical context of the Arab and Muslim world.  Based on content analysis of more 
than fifty games and interviews with major game producers, I argue that the developing 
Arab and Muslim video game industry plays a significant role in the reproduction of 
Islamic culture and could therefore be perceived as one of the most cutting-edge 
conveyors of contemporary Islam.  At the same time, I analyze how various genres of 
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European and American video games have constructed the representation of Arabs and 
Muslims.  Within these games, I argue, the diverse ethnic and religious identities of the 
Muslim world have been flattened out and reconstructed into a series of social 
typologies operating within a broader framework of terrorism and hostility.  Moreover, 
in this chapter I will also consider the significance of Western attempts to transcend 
simplified patterns of representation that have dominated the video game industry by 
offering what is known as “serious” games.  Finally, I analyze video games and video 
clips with an Islamic emphasis and the various levels at which they convey ethical and 
moral values.  Given their pervasiveness, especially among Middle Eastern youth, we 
are in crucial need today of critical understanding of the different ways these media 
articulate Islam and communicate it to consumers.  Therefore, I discuss the 
appropriation of games by various private Islamic companies, operating in the broader 
religious and cultural context of the Islamic revival and piety movement, for educational 
purposes.  On a more general level, this chapter aims to lay down a theoretical and 
methodological framework for analyzing video games from the perspective of 
information science and communication studies. 
 
Overall, my research objectives aim to present a complex analysis of the role the 
Internet and information and communication technologies play in the production of 
transnational Islamic knowledge and in shaping Muslim identities in a variety of social 
settings.  This thesis is based on fieldwork, conducted in Muslim communities in the 
Arab world and Western Europe, and fundamental research of the relationship between 
Internet and ICT usage and the attempts of various Muslim authorities to establish 
themselves as interpretive authorities in global Islamic discourse.  This thesis also 
studies various forms of non-traditional media, heretofore neglected by the academy, 
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with a profound importance and cultural impact in contemporary society, especially 
among the youth, mainly Islamic video clips and video games.  It aims to enhance our 
understanding of how these forms of media present and subsequently construct Muslim 
identity.  On a more general level, this dissertation deals with the production of 
knowledge and construction of identity in the increasingly networked and 
interconnected communities; the emerging potential of new digital media for 
dissemination of moral and religious values; and the ways public authorities operate 
within the religion-technology interaction. 
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2   The Internet and the Production of Islamic Knowledge 
 
 
An increasing number of Muslims living in Islamic countries and abroad are at the 
present time approaching scholars and counselors via the Internet. Oftentimes they are 
seeking answers to pressing topical social questions; namely how to behave in 
compliance with the religious laws in the modern world.  Today we witness an 
unprecedented proliferation of the Internet websites and satellite television channels 
with an Islamic emphasis in the Arab and Muslim world.  The Internet and information 
and communication technology create new public sphere(s) where different, and 
oftentimes conflicting, concepts of Muslim identity are negotiated.  By doing so, the 
Internet and satellite TV have introduced substantial innovation in both production and 
consumption of Islamic knowledge (Mariani 2006, p. 131).  The development of new 
infrastructures, skills and communication patterns has resulted in the emergence of 
“new media ecology,” where established traditional Muslim authorities compete for 
audiences with charismatic satellite preachers and Internet-based muftis (Anderson 
2003, p. 45).  
 
The development of this new media ecology is particularly relevant to European 
Muslim communities, where experiences of cultural displacement and negotiations on 
hybridity and authenticity are at the heart of contemporary life (Metcalf 1996, p. 22).  
There are hundreds of thousands of sites providing specific “Islamic” content for 
Muslim minorities, ranging from traditional outlets, i.e. fatwas, sermons, and religious 
treaties; through audio lectures, podcasting, and videos on You Tube; to social 
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networking sites, educational video games, and the vibrant blogosphere.  These all 
exemplify what Bunt (2003) calls “cyber Islamic environments” and constitute a space 
where contemporary Islam is articulated. 
 
This chapter aims to transcend the media-centric logic and to analyze the impact of new 
media in the light of the above-mentioned interdependency and hybridization within 
broader social, cultural and political context of Muslim minorities, namely those living 
in Western Europe.5  It aims to analyze one particular segment of such cyber Islamic 
environments, i.e. websites issuing fatwas and providing other forms of counseling 
addressing the specific issues arising from living as a minority in a non-Muslim 
majority setting. More specifically, this chapter focuses on Sunni6 websites catering to 
European Muslim minorities and explores their fatwas addressing the conflicting areas 
between Islamic law and European legal systems.  Fatwa is a traditional institution in 
Islamic law and presents an answer to a real or hypothetical inquiry, oftentimes related 
to the interpretation of religious texts in the light of contemporary conditions. It is 
addressed from a petitioner (mustaftī) to a religious and legal authority (muftī).  
Essentially, fatwa is not legally binding, unless sanctioned by the State, and its 
                                                 
5 Some of the material presented in this chapter appeared in ŠISLER, Vít. 2009. European courts 
authority contested? The Case of Marriage and Divorce Fatwas On-line. Masaryk University Journal of 
Law and Technology. 2009, vol.3, no.1, s. 51-78. Available online: 
<http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=2350>. ISSN 1802-5951; and ŠISLER, Vít. 2007. The 
Internet and the construction of Islamic knowledge in Europe. Masaryk University Journal of Law and 
Technology. 2007, vol.1, no.2, s. 205-218. Available online: 
<http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=1422>. ISSN 1802-5951. 
6 This chapter discusses exclusively the opinions and fatwas of authorities broadly associated with Sunni 
Islam. These opinions can vary significantly from the theoretical approaches taken by Shi’a and other 
Muslim groups. 
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persuasive power is therefore based primarily on the authority of the muftī who issued 
it.  Due to the general non-existence of official Islamic authorities in the Western 
Europe, fatwas became the primary mechanism in dealing with normative issues 
(Caeiro 2003b, p. 3). 
 
After providing a brief introduction into the broader context of Muslim minorities in 
Europe and the fundamentals of Islamic law, this chapter presents different ways, in 
which Sunni fatwa-issuing websites deal with the authority of the State. These range 
from complete denial of man-made law to its pragmatic acceptance in accordance with 
various interpretations of the Qur‘ān and the hadīth.  This chapter argues that the 
Internet and information and communication technologies constitute an increasingly 
important public sphere, in which the various models of coexistence between Islamic 
law and European legal systems are negotiated and Muslim identities are shaped.  
Moreover, it demonstrates how these emerging concepts could subsequently be 
incorporated into existing European legal framework through the institutions of 
contractual freedom and arbitration tribunals. By doing so, the Muslim authorities 
associated with the counseling websites and the sharī‘a councils force European 
societies to reflect publicly upon their normative structures while simultaneously 
reinforcing their own authority within local Muslim communities.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter explores the underlying rationale behind the phenomenon of 
the fatwa-issuing websites, which emphasize the role of the individual and promote 
voluntarily adherence to Islamic law.  Essentially, I argue that the Islamic cyber 
counseling, which is driven by individual petitions and inquiries, emphasizes the 
privatization of faith and the increasing insistence on religion as a system of values and 
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ethics. This chapter also demonstrates that the popularity of Internet preachers and 
muftis converges with the broader transformation of contemporary religiosity, which 
similarly emphasizes the role of the individual. Such transformation promotes a ready-
made and easily-accessible set of norms and values that might order daily lives and 
define a practical and visible identity (Roy 2004, p. 31). The easily-accessible and 
searchable databases of fatwas provide exactly such pre-set knowledge and codes of 
behavior, which the individual can choose from. I thereafter link this rationale behind 
the fatwa-issuing websites to the shifting paradigm within contemporary Islamic 
movements, capitalizing on Roy’s (2004) concepts of “post-Islamism” and “neo-
fundamentalism”. Finally, on a more general level, this chapter aims to provide case 
studies enhancing our understanding of how the Internet shapes existing public spheres 
and how public authorities operate within the religion-technology interaction. 
 
2.1   Muslim Minorities in Europe 
 
In the second half of the 20th century the traditional constituencies of Islam have been 
profoundly reshaped by immigration to the Western Europe.  For the first time, a vast 
number of Muslims have deliberately left states which apply, at least in theory, Islamic 
principles in their legislation and moved to non-Islamic countries.  Since classical 
Islamic jurisprudence does not provide a theoretical framework for such conditions 
(Lewis 1994, p. 16) – and it is questionable what relevance this would have for 
contemporary European Muslims – the key issues of relationship between Islam and the 
State are being defined and negotiated on an everyday basis by the agency of particular 
social actors. Today, these negotiations are increasingly shaped by media and new 
information and communication technologies, particularly the Internet. 
 39 
 
The term “Muslim minorities” does not refer to a homogeneous entity in the European 
context, nor can it be easily outlined and utilized in a discourse regarding religious and 
legal practices.  Muslims in Europe vary greatly in their nationality, ethnicity, and 
beliefs; and may consist of converts, immigrants, as well as genuine minorities settled 
on the continent for centuries.  In Western Europe, the Muslim presence is mostly 
related to immigration that began after the Second World War.  As Fetzer and Soper 
(2005, p. 2) describe it, Muslims were part of a broader wave that brought workers from 
the former colonies and elsewhere to the industrialized states of the West that were 
trying to rebuild in the war’s aftermath.  Private employers and governments across 
Western Europe actively recruited foreign workers to provide the labor necessary to 
continue economic expansion. In the face of the economic recession of the early 1970s 
European states gradually closed their borders to low-skilled workers but allowed for 
the possibility of family reunification and political asylum (ibid.). Thus, immigrants, 
who were supposed to stay in Europe temporarily and return to their home countries 
afterwards, opted instead to bring their families to the continent and accepted Europe as 
their new homeland. This was partly due to their fear that they would be prevented from 
re-entering Europe, were they to have left at that time.  They were also afraid of the 
worsening economic situation in their home countries.  
 
The transition from the status of gastarbeiters to residents brought about a fundamental 
shift in the self-perception of the Muslim minorities and the expectations they have 
associated with the State. The religious beliefs and practices of the immigrant workers, 
who were mostly men, were confined to the private sphere outlined by sub-urban 
dormitories and provisionary prayer rooms. After the reunion of families and setting up 
of normal life, the question of accommodation of broader religious needs appeared. This 
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included various issues ranging from Islamic education in public schools, through the 
permissibility of ritual slaughter, on to the role of Islamic law in family matters.  The 
fundamental matter negotiated in practice by these issues was the relationship between 
Islam and the State, in many cases re-formulating the Church-State relationship in 
general (Ferrari 2000, p. 8).  Albeit to a various degree in particular states and regions, 
Islam became an inseparable part of the Western European landscape. 
 
In Eastern Europe, however, it never ceased to be such; although this fact has been 
largely obscured by the persistent reality of the Cold War.  It was not until the collapse 
of the communist empire that Europe, in the words of Roy (2004, p. 18), “re-
discovered” that there are European Muslim countries (Albania, Bosnia and, tomorrow, 
Kosovo) as well as genuine European Muslim minorities (Pomaks in Bulgaria, Tatars in 
Poland and Belarus).  Most of the Balkan Muslims have been settled in the region for 
centuries, ethnically being mainly of Slavic, Turkish, Alban and Roma origin, and 
became minorities in stricto sensu after the withdrawal and later dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, i.e. during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
centuries.  Yet, in many regions, particularly under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Islam never ceased to play its public role and Islamic law (of the hanafī rite) 
has been applied by the State (Evstatiev 2006, p. 18). Although the communist regimes 
suppressed most religious manifestations in the public sphere, after their fall the issues 
of religious identity and relationship between Islam and the State have resurfaced with 
renewed intensity (Nielsen 1992, p. 4). 
 
Similarly, in many Western European countries, particularly in the UK, the Muslim 
presence dates centuries back. As Ali et al. (2009, p. 8) note, Muslims have established 
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a long standing relation with the United Kingdom which is traceable to the 17th century, 
mainly in diplomatic, commercial and scholarly missions.  As a result of the colonial 
encounter with British Muslim colonies, in 1842 about 3000 Muslim seamen known as 
“lascars” were said to be the early Muslim settlers in the United Kingdom.  They were 
most probably staffers of the East India Company from Yemen, Gujarat, Assam and 
Bengal who use to visit the United Kingdom occasionally but gradually settled and even 
married in port towns and cities like Cardiff, Liverpool, Glasgow and London. 
Similarly, from 1920s to 1970 there was another influx of Muslims from mostly Asia 
migrated to the UK to complement to labor shortage in many industrial cities like the 
Midlands, London, Lancashire, and Yorkshire.  Therefore, Ali et al. (2009, p. 9) argue, 
that hundreds of years back Muslims have been living in the UK and as observed from 
their practices in their early contact, “they exhibited some resistance to the culture of 
their host community in maintaining their religious rituals like funerals, naming 
ceremonies, marriages, form of worship, food, etc.”  This, in turn, showed “their 
preparedness to preserve their identity which was threatened as a result of 
disconnectedness from their homelands and the fear of cultural assimilation” (ibid.).  
Similarly, the question of cultural identity constitutes the key and underlying issue of 
the Islamic websites and councils for Muslim minorities in Europe. 
 
Existing research on the production of Islamic knowledge in Europe (Nielsen 1992; 
Metcalf 1996; Bruinessen 2003; Caeiro 2004; Roy 2004; Peter 2006) indicates a few 
key factors that have to be taken into account when analyzing the fatwa-issuing 
websites.  First, the very existence of a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim society 
implies that there are no Muslim authorities appointed by the State (although this fact is 
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about to change)7 and that sharī‘a is not officially recognized as a source of law. The 
former strengthens the fragmentation of religious authority, individualization and 
privatization of Islam (Peter 2006), whereas the latter transforms the observance of 
Islamic rules into a matter of individual choice. Without the enforceable legal and social 
framework of the majority Muslim society, the role of personal and voluntarily 
adherence becomes more important in following Islamic law.  Correspondingly – 
particularly in Western Europe – where Muslim minorities come from diverse 
backgrounds and lack common cultural or linguistical heritage, the Muslim identity has 
to be reinvented and recast in terms of codes of comportment, values and beliefs.  As 
Roy (2004, p. 23) argues, this identity, self-evident so long as it belonged to an inherited 
cultural legacy, has to express itself explicitly in a non-Muslim or Western context. 
 
In this respect, Ali et al. (2009, p. 7) argue that among Muslim minorities in Europe 
religious identity appears to create formidable networks of multiple identities with 
members willing to abandon their ethnicity for religious solidarity. This is particularly 
observed in relation to the second generation of Muslims in the United Kingdom who 
prefer to be addressed as British Muslims as opposed to say Arabs, Pakistanis, etc. 
(Leweling 2005). 
 
Essentially, the underlying logic behind the development of European Muslim 
minorities emphasizes the role of the Self, the privatization of faith, and the increasing 
                                                 
7 Several member states of the European Union, for example France and the United Kingdom, have 
recently started instructonal and educational programs aimed at training local Muslim imams, versed in 
traditional Islamic religious disciplines and familiar with local laws and regulations. See for example: 
Muslim College, London. [online]. [cit. 2010-11-24]. Available online: <http://www.muslimcollege.ac.uk 
>. 
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insistence on religion as a system of values and ethics.  This by no means implies that 
the emerging “European Islam” may be perceived in the light of the 16th century 
Protestant Reformation, but – more likely – that its multi-faceted representations are 
adapting to contemporary Western forms of religiosity (Roy 2004, p. 5).  As such these 
representations could no longer be analyzed within the discursive of foreign or 
immigrant cultures but, more precisely, in the contexts of globalization, 
deterritorialization and transnationalism.  It is precisely the imaginary space of 
transnational umma (Muslim community), enhanced by the Internet and communication 
technologies, where the traditional Islamic law regains its significance and relevance to 
the daily life through constant discussions, inquiries and admonitions. 
 
2.2   Islamic Law and European Legal Systems 
 
The Egyptian-born yet globally influential Muslim scholar Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (2005, p. 
7) stated that it is the adherence to Islamic law through which Muslim minorities living 
in non-Muslim societies reaffirm their identity. This observation relates closely to the 
nature of Islam and Islamic law. As Schacht (1964) argues, Islam is to a large extent a 
religion of orthopraxy and as such provides believers with a set of relatively concrete 
norms governing all aspects of human existence.  Religious law (sharī‘a) has a central 
position in Islam and covers issues of legal, ritual and ethical nature, which are not 
necessarily regulated by law in the European sense of the word.  Sharī‘a in theory 
expresses the Law of God as directly revealed in the Qur‘ān and manifested by the 
deeds and sayings of the prophet Muhammad and his companions, as recorded in the 
hadīth.  As such sharī‘a is in principle eternal and unchangeable.  Yet we have to 
distinguish between sharī‘a as a concept and as the concrete rules of law, determined by 
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particular methodologies and interpretations of the sacred texts.  Thus the normative 
content of sharī‘a necessarily evolves and undergoes changes in order to comply with 
new social and economic realities.  This is done through constant re-interpretation and 
social re-integration of the Quranic verses and the hadīth by jurisprudence (Khalidi 
1992, p. 28). Islamic law represents an extreme case of a “jurists’ law,” as it was created 
and further developed by private specialists (Schacht 1964, p. 209). Yet, instead of 
disengaging the legally relevant elements of each case and subsuming it under general 
rules, Muslim jurists concentrated on establishing graded series of cases (Schacht 1964, 
p. 205).  This casuistical method in particular is one of the most striking features of 
traditional Islamic law and reinforces the position of fatwas and muftīs. 
 
At the same time, Islamic law remains to a large degree a religious ideal which has 
never been applied in its full extent (Schacht 1964; Mozaffari 1987; Roy 2004).  
Existing legislation in Muslim countries is typically based on a combination of sharī‘a, 
applied mostly in family matters, and foreign legal systems; although the former is often 
referred to as the main source of legislation in the constitution.  As such, sharī‘a 
constitutes more a set of values and a normative framework than a positive law 
framework in the European sense (Roy 2004, p. 197).   
 
Yet, as El-Nawawy and Khamis (2009, p. 91) put it, although the sharī‘a had been 
largely abandoned in most practical applications, following the colonial epoch at the 
conception of the modern nation state, this did not eradicate its cultural relevance and 
ethical significance for the umma, since “The shari’ah had always meant more than the 
legal foundations of the community or a normative code instituted by jurists. It had 
always constituted the ethico-legal matrix that pervaded the life of the community and 
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imbued it with its sense for what constituted legitimacy and what did not” (Abul-Fadl 
1990, p. 36; quoted in El-Nawawy & Khamis 2009, p. 91). 
 
This asymmetry has to be kept in mind when exploring the conflicting areas between 
Islamic law and European legal systems. We have, on the one hand, a multi-faceted 
corpus of constantly negotiated and re-interpreted norms and positive, codified rules of 
law sanctioned by the State on the other. It is particularly due to this asymmetrical 
nature of both systems that the existing research on the relationship between Islam and 
European law is mostly concerned with the Islamic norms and their recognition and 
application by European courts (Potz & Wieshaider 2004; Fetzer & Soper 2005; Rohe 
2007). The opposite, i.e. the acceptance of particular European provisions by Islamic 
law, has been far less discussed; and if so, then mainly by Muslim scholars (Ibn Baz & 
Uthaymeen 1998; Qaradāwī 2005).  
 
Another fundamental feature of Islamic law, which has to be taken into account, is its 
adherence to the principle of the personality of law. Essentially, according to this 
principle, the legal status of an individual is governed by his or her religious affiliation:  
particularly in issues pertaining to matrimonial law and inheritance law.  This principle 
derives from the dhimmī law, i.e. the traditional institution of Islamic law regulating the 
position of non-Muslims living in Islamic territory; and from the concept of millets, 
which were the ethno-religious communities recognized by the Ottoman Empire 
(Evstatiev 2006). These communities have been granted substantial autonomy in 
governing their internal affairs as well as in matrimonial and family law issues; a state 
which actually remains in existence in many Ottoman Empire successor countries in the 
Middle East still today (An-Na’im 2002). Given the persistence of sharī‘a principles in 
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family matters, most conflicts between Islamic law and European legal systems revolve 
around these issues (Rohe 2007, p. 23).  
 
As Ali et al. (2009, p. 12) argue, unlike public law, Islamic personal law does not 
necessarily require the state to function.  The practices covered by it have all along been 
practices among the Muslim diasporic communities.  European legal systems may 
provide for these practices at a general level but this does not exclude the application of 
Islamic injunctions on them.  Thus while the Muslims apply the religio-legal dictates on 
one hand, they also comply with European secular laws on the other hand.  This has 
made the Muslim diaspora subject to dual laws, a situation described in the UK as 
Angrezi Shariat (Yilmaz 2004). 
 
Nevertheless, and contrary to the popular notion, sharī‘a is already officially applied in 
Europe today.  It is explicitly recognized in several member states of the European 
Union, namely in Greece and Spain, as a formal way of contracting a marriage.8  It is 
applicable in family matters in most other European states within the framework of 
private international law, when the chosen lex causae is that of a foreign state applying 
sharī‘a (Rohe 2007).  Finally, in matters pertaining to personal law and law of contract, 
it is incorporated into European legal systems through the institutions of mediation and 
arbitration.  Essentially, in this case the disputing parties present their dispute to a 
Muslim arbiter and stipulate in a civil law contract that they will follow his decision. 
The arbiter thereafter judges the case according to sharī‘a; yet, his decision is 
                                                 
8 Spain recognized the Islamic formal way of contracting a marriage as an option in its Personal Status 
Law in 1992.  In order to ensure necessary legal protections there are compulsory provisions for the 
registration of these marriages (Rohe 2007, p. 20). 
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enforceable through civil law and courts.  In the United Kingdom for example the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal discussed below operates as an institution of this kind.  
Therefore, beyond exploring the fatwa-issuing websites based on a voluntarily 
adherence to Islamic law, this chapter discusses also the arbitration tribunals and sharī‘a 
councils and the various ways in which they utilize the Internet in order to connect with 
their local communities and establish themselves as a source of authority. 
 
2.3   Marriage and Divorce in Islamic Law 
 
Marriage in Islam (nikāh) is a civil law contract concluded between the bridegroom and 
the legal guardian (walī) of the bride.9 The bridegroom undertakes to pay the nuptial gift 
(sadāq, mahr) to the wife herself. The contract must be concluded in the presence of 
free witnesses, two men or one man and two women; this has the double aim of 
providing proof of marriage and disproving unchastity.  This contract is the only legally 
relevant act in concluding marriage (Schacht 1964, p. 161). The principle differences 
between Islamic law and most of European legal systems are that (1) in Islam marriage 
presents a civil contract and as such does not need to be approved by the State nor by 
any religious authority in order to be valid (although most Muslim states require its 
registration); (2) that the impediments to marriage, i.e. the taxative enumeration of the 
“non-marriageable persons” vary in both systems; and (3) although a Muslim man may 
marry a non-Muslim woman, the opposite is forbidden in Islam. 
 
                                                 
9 The walī is the nearest male relative, in the order of succession, followed by the manumitter and his 
succession, and failing those, the judge (qādī). 
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Divorce in Islamic law can take many forms, the most common cases being (1) the 
repudiation (talāq) of the wife by the husband; (2) the dissolution of the marriage by 
agreement (mubāra’a) with mutual waiving of any financial obligations; (3) the tafrīk, 
which is the dissolution of marriage pronounced by a judge (qādī) of his own initiative 
or at the instance of one of the spouses; and finally (4) the khul’, by which the wife 
redeems herself from a marriage for a consideration (Schacht 1964, pp. 164 – 165).10  
With regard to European legal systems, it should be noted that the marriage becomes 
invalid through apostasy from Islam of one of the spouses (Schacht 1964, p. 165).  The 
legal position of the wife is, in theory, obviously less favorable than that of the husband, 
since the repudiation of the wife does not need to be approved by any authority and 
takes immediate legal effect; while any dissolution of marriage initiated by the wife 
requires such approval.11  Especially when considered within the European context, the 
permissibility of repudiation (talāq) and its legal effects are potentially the most 
contested issues. These topics also constitute a substantial portion of the inquiries 
addressed to the Internet muftis. 
 
                                                 
10 The permissibility of khul’, or its particular features, has been disputed by some Islamic schools of law 
(for details see An-Na’im 2002).  
11 In fact, the wife’s situation could be, and often is, considerably improved by specific stipulations made 
in the marriage contract.  These include, for example, conditional repudiation which is pronounced by the 
husband immediately after the conclusion of the marriage and can be accepted by the wife anytime later 
on. 
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2.4   Muftis and their Fatwas 
 
As I have mentioned above, fatwa (pl. fatāwā)12 is an answer to a real or hypothetical 
inquiry and reflects a legal conviction of an individual scholar, based mainly on older 
rulings and/or his own interpretation of the religious texts.  As such it is not legally 
binding, but the individual petitioner is advised to follow it.  The persuasive power of 
the respective fatwa is thus based mainly on the authority of the scholar (muftī) who 
issued it.  
 
In the past, traditional constituencies of Islamic authorities competent for such inquiries 
were delimited by geographical and social factors that were much harder to contravene 
than they are today.  Not only can every Muslim with access to the Internet send his or 
her inquiries to even the most geographically remote mufti, but with the aid of online 
legal sources even individuals who lack a long-lasting and demanding official education 
can establish counseling sites for their peers if their answers are valid and convincing 
enough.   
 
In Western Europe, in the absence of institutionalized Islamic authorities, the muftis and 
their fatwas play a key role in the construction of Islamic knowledge. As Caeiro (2003b, 
p. 2) has noted, “in Europe the fatwa is the only useful mechanism in dealing with 
normative issues.”  It would be naïve to presume that all fatwas issued by various 
authorities play a determining role in social behavior.  Nevertheless, they constitute an 
Islamic discourse which Muslims living in Diaspora use to legitimize behaviors that 
                                                 
12 For the purposes of this thesis I will use the common English plural, i.e. “fatwas.” 
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have already been developed in new social contexts (Caeiro 2003b, p. 2; Mandaville 
2003b, p. 130). 
 
A variety of Islamic websites disseminate or issue fatwas, usually offering a question 
form or petition, in which the petitioner can fill in his or her inquiry, and the mufti or 
body of muftis associated with the particular site can answer it, posting the final fatwa 
on-line.  Some sites even offer a live fatwa session with well-known scholars (e.g. 
IslamOnline.net).  Thus the process of dispensing the fatwa and the communication 
with the mustaftī takes place solely in the cyberspace.  The inquiries range from 
everyday issues to topical questions of Muslims living in non-Muslim society.  The 
following fatwa dealing with the status of videogames and their productions in Islamic 
law was taken from Cairo based website IslamOnline.net 
 
Question:  Dear scholars, As-Salaam ‘Alaykum.  I have a question on 
Computer Games.  Is it Halal or Haram to play computer games?  Is it 
Halal or Haram to make and sell them? If it can fall into both, can you 
please clarify?  Any help is very much appreciated. Jazakum Allah khayran.  
 
Answer (excerpt):  It is not Haram to play computer games as long as none 
of the material contains indecency, pornography or anything against Islamic 
teachings and playing them does not keep one from doing an obligation.  
The same conditions apply to making and selling such games.  However, 
Muslim parents should be on alert regarding the content of these games and 
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pay much attention to the choice of the beneficial games that do not go 
against the Islamic teachings before they bring them to their children.13 
 
The next fatwa tackles a situation of a Muslim fighting for his non-Muslim country and 
has been retrieved from American based website IslamiCity.com 
 
Question:  If a Muslim serves in the army of his non-Muslim country, and a 
war breaks out between his country and a Muslim state, will he be 
considered a martyr if he fights and dies for his country? 
 
Answer (excerpt):  A Muslim only believes in Islam and owes all his 
allegiance to the community which implements Islam as a faith and a code 
of living.  This does not mean that a Muslim who belongs to a minority in a 
country where the majority are non-Muslims may act in a way which is 
detrimental to his country.  If his minority Muslim community enjoys the 
freedom to practice its faith and the protection of the law against 
persecution, then he has no reason to act against the authority in his country. 
[…]  A Muslim may not fight another Muslim except in one case.  If two 
Muslim groups or communities fight against each other, we are required to 
try to establish peace between them.  If one of them launches aggression 
against the other, we all must try to help the victim of aggression against the 
aggressors until the aggression stops when all Muslims are required to re-
                                                 
13 IslamOnline. [online]. [cit. 2006-12-1]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503545740>. 
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establish peace between them.  If a war breaks out, like many of the wars 
we have seen in this century, both combatants may be in the wrong.  In such 
a war, it is more appropriate for Muslim soldiers to refrain from fighting. 14 
 
Today, there are thousands of Islamic websites operating in various European 
languages.  Of these, only a few offer on-line iftā – or the dispensing of legal opinions.  
Some are maintained by semi-official bodies of muftis like IslamOnline.net, closely 
connected with the European Council for Fatwa and Research, some of them are 
operated by individual muftis seeking a global audience, like AskIman.com, a website 
of a South-African mufti Ibrahim Desai, and some are maintained by official fatwa 
issuing committees of Islamic countries, like Fatwa-online.com, which is connected 
with the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatawa of Saudi Arabia (Bunt 
2003; Ameri & Abdulati 2000). 
 
These sites regularly answer the questions of Muslims from non-Muslim countries, 
mainly Europe and the United States.  As we have described above a new paradigm has 
therefore emerged in the construction of Islamic knowledge.  With an ever-growing 
number of Muslims connecting to the Internet and submitting questions to even the 
most geographically remote mufti, today we are in a critical need of considering the role 
and impact, if any, of these Internet-based muftis and on-line fatwas on the production 
of the Islamic knowledge.  
 
                                                 
14 IslamiCity. [online]. [cit. 2006-12-1]. Available online: <http://www.islamicity.com/>. 
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2.5   The Role of the Internet 
 
Roy (2004, p. x) argued that in the contemporary production of Islamic knowledge the 
Internet plays an overwhelmingly important role, “as exemplified in the texts, ideas and 
speeches that are circulating worldwide in an accessible form.”  This is particularly 
relevant to Muslim minorities in the West, where the Internet has become an important 
adjunct to traditional means of communication about Islam and is facilitating a new 
form of Islamic discourse (Bunt 2006, p. 13).  Along the same lines, El-Nawawy and 
Khamis (2009, p. 117) argue that another important aspect to highlight in discussing the 
notion of the virtual umma is the strong impact of the Internet on Muslims living in 
non-Muslim societies, as well as the role played by these young Muslims to bring Islam 
to the Internet.  
 
Those Muslims can reestablish connections with their religion through the 
various services provided to them through Islamic websites. These services 
have made available to those migrant Muslims, who are living in 
transnational, non-Muslim communities, what previously circulated in 
narrow, face-to-face settings and, therefore, helped them to have a sense of 
religious communalism and collectivism that would allow them to 
reconstruct their identities as members of the Islamic faith (ibid). 
 
The issue of identity construction closely relates to what Eickelman and Piscatori 
(2004) call “objectification of Islam,” i.e. “the process by which basic questions come 
to the fore in the consciousness of large numbers of believers: ‘What is my religion?’ 
‘Why is it important in my life?’ and ‘How do my beliefs guide my conduct?’” (p. 38).  
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In Europe, this process also appears connected to larger processes of social change and 
intergenerational shift (Caeiro 2010). This shift from the first generation of Muslim 
immigrants to subsequent generations of European Muslim citizens can be broadly 
described as a shift from a “lived Islam” to a “constructed Islam” (Babès 2004) and it 
inevitably encompasses search for religious authority and “true” Islamic identity.  
Therefore, the various websites providing normative content for Muslim minorities 
discussed below should be approached as venues for “virtual rituals” of “identity 
making” through which immigrant or diasporic Muslims preserve or reconstruct their 
religious identities.  These online platforms range from global Islamic websites, based 
in Muslim majority countries yet addressing Muslim communities from all over the 
world, to local authorities and councils focusing on geographically defined 
constituencies yet linking through the Internet to the transnational Muslim umma. 
 
Several studies have been published concerning the role of the Internet on the 
production of Islamic knowledge, yet their results remain ambiguous and conflicting. 
Bunt (2000, 2003, 2010) has provided an extensive analysis of “cyber Islamic 
environments” in his three monographs. Anderson and Eickelman (2003) have 
discussed more broadly different forms of new media in the Muslim world. Allievi 
(2003) has analyzed the very specific role of information and communication 
technologies in the construction of Muslim identity and communities.  Finally, Schmidt 
(2004) has explored how charismatic role traditionally granted by Sufi sheikh is 
negotiated in the social space that the Internet creates. 
 
The construction of religious authority in Western Europe, with some regard paid to the 
Internet, was studied by Bruinessen (2003) and Caeiro (2003a, 2003b, 2004).  
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Nevertheless, these studies, originating mainly from Western academic circles, lack an 
Arab or Muslim perspective, like the examination of the potential of the Internet for 
da‘wa (spreading the Islamic message) by Mostafa (2000) or the analysis of the Islamic 
discourse on three Muslim Internet discussion forums by El-Nawawy and Khamis 
(2009) .  
 
For a long time the Internet was seen as an influential and subversive medium which 
inherently promotes democracy, direct participation and generally contests established 
and traditional authorities, especially in non-democratic environments.  A major change 
in the organization of society was predicted to occur by some thinkers of the techno 
avant-garde scene (Leary 1994; Huitema 1995; Levy 2001).  Especially after the fall of 
the communist authoritarian regimes in the Eastern Europe, the connection between this 
process and information and communication technologies has taken on a powerful, 
implicit veracity (Kalathil & Boas 2003, p. 1). As Mathews (quoted in Kalathil & Boas 
2003, p. ix) has noted: “In the absence of thorough analysis unexamined assumptions 
about the Internet´s likely impact have become conventional wisdom.”   
 
These very same expectations are clearly evident in works critically analyzing the role 
of ICT in the Arab and Muslim world.  “The Internet and globalization are acting like 
nutcrackers to open societies and empower Arab democrats with new tools” noted 
Friedman (2000).    Directly addressing the issue of on-line fatwas, an American 
Muslim intellectual Muqtedar Khan (quoted in Wax 1999) even stated that “the Internet 
has made everyone a mufti.”  According to other authors, the proliferation of the 
Internet has resulted in the emergence of minority opinions and contributed to the 
dissolution of traditional authorities (e.g. Anderson 2003; Bunt 2006; Mandaville 
 56 
2003a, 2003b).  While the first argument is undoubtedly true, the latter overstates the 
subversive influence of the Internet.  As many suggested, the mere presence of dissent 
discourse online doesn’t give evidence of undermining established political and 
religious structures, as we can clearly see in the case studies of Syria or Saudi Arabia 
(Fandy 1999; Teitelbaum 2002).  Similarly, although Islamic websites have firmly 
entrenched themselves in the media ecology, there is no proof that the Internet itself is 
an antidote to authoritarianism and could radically reshape the foundations of the 
decision making process.  The construction of Islamic knowledge in Europe is a 
complex matter with a lot of social, political and economic factors in play and can not 
be understood solely within a media-centric logic (Allievi 2003, p. 12).  The following 
paragraphs describe three ways in which the Internet and mainly the fatwa-issuing sites 
have contributed to the development of Islamic knowledge within European Muslim 
communities.  These processes, or interventions, will be analyzed within the broader 
context Islamic discursive development in the global sphere, the networking of Muslim 
communities in Europe, and the construction of interpretative authority in relation to 
Islamic law.  
 
2.5.1   Reconstruction of Public Sphere 
 
The Internet arguably constitutes a transnational public sphere in which all issued 
fatwas are searchable and can be – in fact they often are – discussed publicly in blogs 
and chatrooms.  This can be perceived as a substantive difference to previous 
constituencies in which the fatwas of the scholars – although disseminated by mass 
media – were never publicly contested. Moreover, in the networked sphere of the 
Internet the various fatwa-issuing sites are borrowing, reprinting and commenting on 
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foreign fatwas in an approving or disapproving manner.  For example, Caeiro (2004) 
has described a case concerning the permissibility of using a loan in order to solve one’s 
housing situation which was issued in 1999 by the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research.  This particular fatwa has radically reshaped the prohibition of ribā’ (usury) – 
imposed by traditional interpretation of Islamic law – by the mean of hāja (need) in 
which the European Muslims potentially find themselves when trying to find housing.  
The fatwa was disseminated by IslamOnline.net and Ukim.org, and was quickly 
adopted or refused by other sites. Indeed it has triggered a global debate that has mostly 
taken place in cyberspace, and has clearly influenced subsequent fatwas, for example 
one issued later by Al-Azhar (Caeiro 2004, p. 374).  Similar debates and fatwa-
borrowings can be found in many other cases.  The public nature of the process opens a 
larger space for criticism and allows laymen to construct the Islamic public sphere 
(Caeiro 2004, p. 370; see also Eickelman & Anderson 2003, p. ii).  
 
The Internet highlights the myriad concepts, movements and sects of Islam, but it also 
highlights the differences between them.  In particular, the younger Muslims living in 
Europe pay close attention to these differences.  They search for an original or “true” 
Islam, which they can distinguish from the Islam of their parents.  They often see the 
latter as being influenced by local customs of their parents’ country of origin.  In the 
global context, this has contributed to the “essentialism” and “homogenization” of the 
religion (Vertovec 2003, p. 318).  
 
The last process connected to the trans-nationalism of the Internet is manifested by an 
increasing number of fatwas addressing the global problems of the imaginary Muslim 
community – e.g. Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya or Kashmir.  The growing interest of the 
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petitioners in such issues indicates the emerging notion of a global Islamic identity 
(Nielsen 2003, p. 39; Mandaville 2003b, p. 128).  The fatwa issuing sites have reiterated 
and reinforced patterns already observed in mass media – mainly in the pan-Arabic 
satellite televisions – but they have shifted the discourse from a journalistic to a 
legalistic and religious trope.  Thus a virtual Muslim community (umma) is being re-
created on the Internet.  
 
2.5.2   Redefinition of Authority 
 
The Internet has highlighted the marginalized groups and minority opinions in 
contemporary Islam, especially in the beginning, when established traditional 
authorities were not present.  Some scholars have argued that there are a 
disproportionately high number of Internet sites which can be described as Salafi, i.e. 
having clear inclinations to the salafīya movement (Bunt 2006, p. 157).  Moreover, until 
recently the Internet was providing an effective space for dissenting opinions that had 
limited or no access to other forms of mass media, like in the cases of Iranian scholar 
Hussein Ali Montazeri or Egyptian and Saudi Arabian opposition movements (Šisler 
2006b, p. 2).  In most cases the messages of the marginalized or dissenting groups have 
been presented as purely Islamic, with no reference to orthodox or majority opinion. 
 
As we have shown above, a typical discursive covering the Internet, Islam and the 
Middle East has, from the beginning, been dominated by a conventional link between 
information technology and democratization (Kalathil & Boas 2003).  As Anderson 
(2008) has noted, excitement over the revolutionary potential of new media in the 
Middle East focused on them as alternatives: suggesting transformation of a public 
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sphere and the dissolution of traditional authorities.  However, as he argues, time and 
experience have outrun this paradigm 
 
Many new actors turned out to have roots in old establishments.  Often it 
was the cadet generations of elites who brought the new technologies.  
Governments proved adept at deploying the underlying technologies to 
their own ends.  […] Early experiments were absorbed into media 
conglomerates; by the millennium established religious figures had their 
sermons, lessons, and outreach on the Internet for the populations it drew 
and aggregated (Anderson 2008, p. 1). 
 
Over time, the so-called traditional authorities have invaded cyberspace and struggled to 
regain the authority they have allegedly lost.  For example, the Al-Azhar library is now 
online with a huge database of fatwas and other religious texts.  Even in Iran clerics 
have been encouraged by the state to set up their own weblogs, and the religious militia 
is operating their own Islamic cybercafés with protected, i.e. filtered, content (Bunt 
2006, p. 155).  
 
Instead of undermining the traditional and established religious authorities, the Internet 
and ICT created new space in which traditionally educated muftis compete with new 
popular preachers over audiences.  This phenomenon is poignantly demonstrated in 
Mariani’s (2006) case study of the Internet presentations of two foremost Muslim media 
figures – Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, an Al-Azhar graduate and a traditionally defined ‘ālim 
(scholar), and Amr Khāled, holder of an accountancy degree and a newly established 
dā‘iya (preacher).  The Internet and ICT also provide for new usages and practices, 
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which could significantly reshape the production and consumption of knowledge.  For 
example, Riexinger’s (2008) case study of Turkish popular preacher, Harun Yahya, 
demonstrates how the combination of a neglected subject with the innovative use of 
new media can establish opinion leadership, particularly in a Muslim minority context.  
It is also the conditions of European Muslim minorities where, as Caeiro (2003a) and 
Vertovec (2003) have argued, ICT and the Internet tend to displace the interpretive 
authority from scholars towards selective personal interpretation, contributing to the so 
called processes of “individualization” and “privatization” of Islam. 
 
These processes are again particularly evident among the younger generation of 
European Muslims, who search the Internet for different views and opinions, discuss 
them in both in online and off-line environments, and then select those most fitting to 
their own views.  The same selective approach is often applied towards the sacred texts 
– the holy Qur‘ān and Sunna. The reasons for this phenomenon are variegated, most 
frequently cited are the impact of secular education in Western societies and the 
disintegration of traditional social enforcement frameworks. Be this as it may, the 
vehicle and catalyst of this phenomenon is to a continuously increasing extent the 
Internet and the various media outlets it enables.  
 
The last impact of the Internet on the construction of interpretative authority is 
manifested by the fact that more and more Muslims from Islamic countries are seeking 
answers via the Internet from the European-based muftis.  The case of IslamOnline is 
again significant – in its database of fatwas we can find thousands of inquiries allegedly 
submitted from African or Middle Eastern countries, yet answered by European-based 
muftis.  This constitutes a unique and in our modern history quite new situation – the 
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European muftis are, at least in some cases, becoming interpretative authority for the 
Muslim world (Caeiro 2004, p. 371).  
 
2.5.3   Hybridization of Discourse 
 
The third topic for analysis in this chapter is the particular discourse and rhetoric of 
issued fatwas.  Above all, we can clearly recognize a shift to popular, sometimes even 
secular and scientific discourse in the reasoning (obiter dictum) of particular fatwas.  
Because the muftis are addressing a broad audience that has most often been raised in 
secular societies, they attempt to use a common language that refers to scientific and 
sociological arguments – sometimes even to European legal systems.  This could be 
also perceived within the concept of da‘wa – while the sites are often visited by non-
Muslims searching information about Islam, the muftis are encouraged to present them 
the Islamic opinion not only as the law of God but also in a rational way (Mostafa 2000, 
p. 159). 
 
Another characteristic of these fatwas is that the majority are using English. Although, 
for example, the European Council for Fatwa and Research dispenses its opinions in 
Arabic, they are disseminated mainly in English and French (Caeiro 2010).  This is 
necessary for addressing a global audience but it has also some legal connotations.  
When a mufti works with an interpretation of the sacred texts, which are of course in 
Arabic, and replaces the original terms with English equivalents, his translations could 
result in semantic overlapping and blurring. 
 
The third characteristic particular to the rhetoric of online fatwas can be found in the 
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anonymity of cyber Islamic environments, which manifests itself in vast number of 
inquiries concerning intimate and sexual issues 
 
Question (excerpt):  Dear scholars, As-Salamu ‘alaykum. I am a married 
woman.  If my husband does not satisfy me in bed, is it permissible in 
Islam for me to masturbate and satisfy myself?  
 
Answer (excerpt):  In Islam marriage is a partnership based on mutual 
rights and obligations.  It is, therefore, important that both spouses try their 
best to be considerate and sensitive towards the needs and feelings of one 
another and do their best to satisfy each other within the bounds of Islam.  
Sexual fulfillment is an important part of the mutual obligations of 
husband and wife. […]  If he cannot satisfy you through sexual 
intercourse, he is perfectly justified in satisfying you through other 
avenues; he could very well masturbate you; if he were to do this, he is 
working within the perfect limits of Islam; his doing it on you is different 
from you doing it on yourself.  A person masturbating on himself/herself is 
not allowed in Islam except in dire necessity where one fears falling into 
adultery; marriage is intended in Islam to be a shield against that. […]  If 
in spite of your best efforts to convince your husband, he still remains 
insensitive to your needs in this respect, you are justified in taking 
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whatever steps are necessary in terminating your marriage, if you are 
unable to tolerate it.15 
 
The above-mentioned fatwa is an example of a question which would not be raised 
comfortably in a traditional constituency.  It also creates a public space for women 
petitioners, allowing them to address even their most intimate topics within the 
framework of Islam and Islamic law.  The active participation of women in the 
construction of Islamic knowledge is not common but the few exceptions have gained 
significant attention in the media (e.g. the Egyptian sexologist Heba Gamal Kotb).16 
 
We have briefly described the three main groups of processes and changes in the 
construction of Islamic knowledge in Europe in which the Internet plays a significant 
role or at least contributes to them. These processes are related to trans-nationalism, 
discourse and to authority.  In all of them there are other important factors in play, 
mainly the role of other mass media (especially the satellite televisions), education and 
diverse social networks.  
 
As Anderson and Eickelman (2003, p. xi) have noted, a mere plurality of discourses 
doesn’t inevitably lead to civic pluralism.  Thus it is important to stress that the Internet 
“has the potential to promote greater openness in the Islamic decision-making process 
as well as to reinforce entrenched views.”   The most visible impact of the Internet is 
manifested in changes cleaving both across “modern” and “traditional” concepts of 
                                                 
15 IslamOnline. [online]. [cit. 2006-12-1]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503546454>. 
16 Heba Kotb. [online]. [cit. 2006-12-1]. Available online: <http://www.hebakotb.net/>. 
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Islam – in the emerging notion of global Islamic identity and the construction of 
transnational Muslim public sphere. 
 
The particular role of the Internet in the production of Islamic knowledge will be further 
investigated in the following case studies, focusing on one, yet increasingly important 
segment of the cyber Islamic environment, i.e. on the fatwas issued or disseminated 
online and related to the matrimonial issues of Muslims living in non-Muslim societies. 
 
2.6   Case Studies 
 
The case studies presented in this chapter are the result of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of six major websites providing fatwas and other normative content to 
European Muslim minorities. They stem from a larger research on the production of 
contemporary Islamic knowledge in Europe on the Internet, during which more than 
500 fatwas, among other material, have been downloaded, archived and analyzed 
between 2006 and 2009.  In particular, these case studies discuss in detail fatwas related 
to family issues, namely marriage and divorce, and examines the different ways in 
which they deal with possible conflicts with European legal systems.  All the fatwas 
were analyzed in English and/or Arabic respectively, together with a detailed 
examination of the off-line context and background of each of the sites and authorities 
in question. 
 
As Larsson (2007, p. 56) argues, the majority of academic studies of Islam and the 
Internet have so far been descriptive and focused on providing an overall impression of 
Islamic or Muslim homepages: few studies have addressed the relationship between 
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online and offline activities (e.g. Bunt 2000, 2003; Brückner 2001).  Therefore, in order 
to enhance the content analysis of the respective sites and their fatwas, the following 
case studies furthermore explore the connections between such websites and global and 
local Islamic institutions, the interactions between online and offline Muslim 
communities, and the ways in which the normative content online shapes offline 
religious manifestations and practices.  By doing so, the case studies analyze how 
European Muslim minorities utilize the Internet and the various media outlets it enables 
to connect with their faith tradition. 
 
The following case studies do not explore on-line fatwas as part of a discreet and 
coherent theological corpus, but rather as a result of concrete actions of the Muslim 
individuals, who initiated their deliverance.  The extent to which these on-line fatwas 
reflect existing discourses and practices can not easily be determined, yet they all 
constitute differentiated responses to the fundamental questions of modernity; namely 
how to live in accordance with Islamic law in a Western, globalized society. 
 
2.6.1   Islam4Uk.com   
 
Islam4UK.com is an English-language website launched in 2008 and registered in 
Preston, UK. According to its mission statement, it has been established “as a platform 
to propagate the supreme Islamic ideology within the United Kingdom as a divine 
alternative to man-made law”.17 Similarly, its objectives consist of “changing public 
opinion in favour of Islam in order to […] implement the Sharee’ah in Britain”.18 The 
                                                 
17 Islam4UK [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.islam4uk.com/about-us>. 
18 Ibid. 
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website is closely connected with Anjem Choudhary and his teacher Omar Bakri 
Muhammad, a radical Islamist preacher, who played a significant role in the 
development of the Hizb al-Tahrir movement in the United Kingdom between 1986 and 
1996.  Later on, he led another Islamist organization, Al-Muhajiroun, until its 
disbandment in 2004.  Bakri, who is Syrian with Lebanese citizenship, was granted 
political asylum in the UK on the grounds of his involvement with Islamist opposition 
to the authoritarian Syrian regime in the 1980s. He is currently residing in Lebanon and 
banned from entering the United Kingdom.19  Nevertheless, he continues to play a role 
in European Muslim affairs through lectures, texts and videos, disseminated via the 
Internet with the help of his followers and students.20  He also utilizes ICT for 
maintaining direct contact with his audience, as was recently the case with his preaching 
over the telephone to a Muslim rally in north London in March 2009 (Edwards 2009). 
 
Bakri has appointed himself a “Judge of the Shari’ah Court of the UK,”21 and from this 
largely self-proclaimed position he has issued several fatwas discussing the co-existence 
of sharī‘a and European legal systems.  Generally speaking, central to his theoretical 
framework is the notion of complete and radical refusal of all non-Islamic and man-
made laws.  According to Bakri, the only solution capable of bringing justice to 
mankind is the installment of the Islamic state (Edwards 2009).  Since, in his view, the 
last “lawful” Islamic state ceased to exist in 1924 with the abolishment of the Ottoman 
                                                 
19 Banned cleric barred from rescue ship. Guardian.co.uk [online]. 21 July 2006, [cit. 2010-11-14]. 
Available online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/21/syria.immigrationpolicy>. 
20 Covert preaching of banned cleric. BBC News [online]. 14 November 2006, [cit. 2010-11-10]. 
Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6143632.stm>. 
21 Moon Research Centre [online]. [cit. 2010-11-20]. Available online: 
<http://mrc.org.uk/marriage_2.html>. 
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Caliphate, he claims that a believer living today in a non-Muslim society has to strive to 
follow the laws of God only and should not resort to secular law.  The following 
emblematic fatwa was issued in 2000 
 
Question:  What is the Islamic verdict on Civil/Registered Marriages? Are 
Muslims allowed to marry in registry offices?  
 
Answer [excerpt]:  Marriage in Islam is a divine bond between two 
legitimate parties. […]  It is one of the most sacred divine contracts 
because the subject matter is a human being i.e. the would-be wife. [...]  A 
civil marriage is a contract registered in the local council in order for a man 
and a woman to have a relationship governed by the marriage laws of the 
state. Any man can marry any woman, whether they are boyfriend or 
girlfriend, fornicator or “fornicatress”, pregnant or having had previous 
sexual relations. [...]  The fact of the matter is that the Civil Marriage is a 
complete non-Islamic social system and man-made way of life which 
contradicts the Islamic marriage and way of life in all its details. [...]  We 
therefore call upon all Muslims to refrain from marrying in accordance to 
the civil law, any marriage based upon this law is considered to be invalid 
in Islam.  Any children from such a marriage would also be considered 
illegitimate in Islam.22 
 
                                                 
22 Islam4UK [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.islam4uk.com/current-
affairs/latest-news/44-latest/195-the-islamic-verdict-on-civilregistered-marriages>. 
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First, it should be noted that not only does Omar Bakri’s fatwa forbid Muslims to resort 
to civil law, but it implicitly invalidates any marriage concluded in accordance with 
such law and proclaims offspring resulting from those marriages to be illegitimate.  
Such an approach directly challenges the authority of the State and echoes the Islamists’ 
notion of the divine law as the only legitimate source of authority.  Moreover, such law 
is perceived as unchangeable and eternal – i.e. valid and directly applicable in all times 
and places.  Any regime that claims a legislative sovereignty which goes beyond 
enforcement of the law laid down by God – in the words of Qur‘ān beyond merely 
“enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong”23 – is considered oppressive and 
unlawful.24  These and other statements of Omar Bakri, including support of 
international jihād (Bunt 2000, p. 101), eventually led to his ban from entering the 
United Kingdom.25 
 
Yet, when we closely examine the ratio decidendi of the above-mentioned fatwa, we 
discover that the main concern of Omar Bakri lies not only in the fact that the State 
contests the authority of God, but, more precisely, that its law allows indecency and 
contradicts the Islamic way of life.  In other words, the underlying rationale for the 
decision is primarily moral and not political.  This is reflected as well in Bakri’s above-
mentioned call for the installment of the Islamic state, which he perceives as “a 
necessity for the people in order to keep [them] away from personal desire and greed” 
(Edwards 2009). 
                                                 
23 Qur‘ān, sūra al-‘Imrān, verse 104. 
24 Covert preaching of banned cleric. BBC News [online]. 14 November 2006, [cit. 2010-11-10]. 
Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6143632.stm>. 
25 Banned cleric barred from rescue ship. Guardian.co.uk [online]. 21 July 2006, [cit. 2010-11-14]. 
Available online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/21/syria.immigrationpolicy>. 
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From a broader perspective, this emphasis on moral principles follows an emerging shift 
within contemporary Islamist movements, a phenomenon which Roy (2004) calls 
“neofundamentalism” or “post-Islamism.”  Essentially, neofundamentalism shifts the 
focus from the creation of an Islamic state to the promotion of Islamic piety and 
implementation of sharī‘a on a daily basis of personal adherence.  As Roy (1994) points 
out, the conceptual framework of Islamist parties was unable to provide an effective 
blueprint for an Islamic state.  Conversely, the contemporary religious revival in Islam 
is targeting society more than the State and calling to the individual’s spiritual needs 
(Roy 2004, p. 3).  Neofundamentalism appeals to Muslims living as a minority and has 
gained some ground among rootless Muslim youth, particularly among second- and 
third-generation migrants in the West, who have experienced the deterritorialisation of 
Islam (Roy 2004, p. 2).  Yet, the emphasis on individual piety and the endeavor to 
adhere strictly to Islamic laws can take many different forms, as we will see below. In 
fact, the number of actual followers of Bakri’s radical concept is estimated to be 
relatively low (Wiktorowicz 2005), despite his prominent media coverage (Poole 2002).  
 
2.6.2   Fatwa-Online.com 
 
Fatwa-online.com is an English-language website launched in 1999 and registered in 
Medina, Saudi Arabia.  The site is addressing English speaking audience, particularly 
Muslims living in the non-Muslim countries, as expressed in its mission statement 
 
Whilst English-speaking Muslims have been starved of access to officially-
published fataawa which originate in the Arabic language, inshaa.-Allaah, 
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our aim is to make available online, these and many other fataawa in the 
English language for the first time! On a regular basis therefore, we 
endeavour to publish new questions along with their answers, inshaa.-
Allaah.26 
 
The term “officially published fatwas” refers mainly to fatwas issued by the “Permanent 
Committee for Islaamic Research and Fataawa” of Saudi Arabia, as established by a 
Royal Decree in 1971,27 as well to fatwas issued by other prominent Saudi Arabian 
scholars.  The site claims that all these scholars are versed in classical jurisprudence.  It 
also features these scholars’ biographies emphasizing the chain of the teachers, who 
passed their knowledge to each respective scholar.28  Nevertheless, the site is not the 
official website of the Permanent Committee, but rather it is an integral part of informal 
web-ring of eight interlinked, explicitly salafī websites, i.e. hijra.net, madeenah.com, 
markazquba.com, smatch.net, subulassalaam.com and ummahservices.com, all 
registered by the same registrant.  
 
The term salafīyya originally designated the followers of the ideas and practices of the 
so-called “righteous ancestors” (al-salaf al-sālih).  The approach of salafīyya generally 
rejects later traditions and schools of thought, calling for a return to the Qur‘ān and the 
                                                 
26 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/ouraim.html>. 
27 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/scholarsbiographies/15thcentury/permanentcommittee.htm>. 
28 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-9-12]. Available online: <http://fatwa-
online.com/scholarsbiographies/15thcentury/rabeealmadkhalee.htm>. 
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sunna as the authentic basis for Muslim life.  By the end of the twentieth century, 
however, the term salafī came to be applied to different variants of Islamic revivalism.29 
 
The web-page includes a special section labeled “Muslim minorities”, where fatwas 
directly addressed to Muslims living in the West are published.  These consist mainly of 
the fatwas of two respected Saudi scholars, i.e. Shaykh ‘Abdul-‘Azeez Ibn Baaz, former 
Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, and his student Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Saalih Ibn 
‘Uthaymeen, a former member of the Council of Senior Scholars of the Kingdom.  In 
fact, the fatwas published in this section stem, to a large extent, from a previously 
printed collection (Ibn Baz & Uthaymeen 1998).  
 
The site strictly follows a conservative form of Sunni Islam associated with the 
teachings of an 18th century scholar, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, which later 
became the official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia.  On the theoretical level, the 
fatwas published by Fatwa-Online claim the validity of Islamic law for all Muslims, 
regardless their place of residence, and its superiority over man-made laws, particularly 
in cases regarding marriage and divorce 
 
Question [excerpt]:  If a man living within a Muslim minority community 
in a non-Muslim country wants to divorce his wife, should he follow the 
divorce procedures of that country, which controls and enforces its own 
law […], or should he follow divorce proceedings laid down in Islaamic 
law? 
                                                 
29 See the entry salafī  in Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Editor in chief, Richard C. 
Martin. New York : Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 2 volumes, p. 608-610. ISBN 0028656032. 
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Response [excerpt]:  It is not permissible for a Muslim to follow, either in 
his worship or in his dealings with others, other than what is laid down in 
Islaamic law.  Divorce is one of those issues which is dealt with by 
Islaamic law in the most complete manner.  It is, therefore not permitted 
for anyone to go beyond or transgress the limits set by Allaah (Subhaanahu 
wa Ta’aala) concerning divorce. [...]  It is, therefore not permitted for a 
Muslim to transgress those limits set by Allaah and he should divorce 
according to the stipulations of Islaamic law.30 
 
Moreover, in another fatwa Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen urges Muslims living in a non-
Muslim society to appoint an arbitrator who will judge among them according to 
sharī‘a.  This in fact promotes establishment of a parallel legal framework, based on a 
voluntarily adherence, informal authority of the judge and compulsory social 
mechanisms of the community 
 
It is obligatory for the Muslims to appoint a judge to pass judgment 
between them according to Islamic law.  It is not permissible for them to 
take as arbitrators those who do not judge according to Islamic law.  If a 
group or society agree[s] upon him being appointed as arbitrator between 
                                                 
30 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000920_2.htm>. 
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them, then his judgment should be enforced in all matters in which they 
have asked him to arbitrate.31 
 
Another fatwa declares void any marriage in which the wife converts to Islam while the 
husband does not.32  This follows the strict interpretation of Islamic law, according to 
which such marriage is considered void after passing a specified “waiting period” 
(‘idda). Addressing this fatwa to Muslim minorities living in a non-Muslim society in 
fact directly challenges the family laws of the particular states.  Yet, the authority of the 
State is recognized and Muslims can resort to its laws when these do not contradict 
sharī‘a and their acceptance eases bureaucratic and formal obligations 
 
Question:  If it is necessary by law to register a divorce or to follow 
registration procedures with the official authorities in the country where he 
is living, then, after he has divorced according to Islaamic law, should he 
go and formally register it with those authorities? 
 
Response:  There is no objection to him registering it but it should be done 
according to Islaamic law.  He should say that he has divorced his wife so 
and so, the daughter of so and so, according to Islaamic law and then it can 
be entered in the register of those people.33  
                                                 
31 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000903_4.htm>. 
32 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000324_2.htm>. 
33 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000920_3.htm>. 
 74 
 
In another fatwa dealing with a permissibility of studying and working in mixed-sex-
environments, Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen obliges Muslims living in West to “abandon 
their livelihood and seek another from another direction or from another country” if it is 
not possible for them “to gain a livelihood except by what Allaah has forbidden, namely 
through the mixing of men and women.”34  Along the same lines, Shaykh Ibn Baaz 
advices Muslims living in Europe not to marry non-Muslim women, although this is 
permissible in traditional Islamic law in the case of the People of the Book, i.e. 
Christians and Jews 
 
Question: What is your advice concerning some Muslim minorities 
marrying disbelieving women who do not believe in the existence of a 
Creator and what is the effect of that upon the children? 
 
Response [excerpt]:  My advice to all Muslims is that they should not 
marry anyone who is not a Muslim.  A Muslim man should do his utmost 
to marry a Muslim woman because that will be good for him, both in the 
life of this world and in the Hereafter and good for his children as well.  
With regards to marrying kuffaar, if they are not from the People of the 
Book, the Jews and Christians, then, according to clear text and consensus 
of the scholars, it is forbidden. [...] 
 
                                                 
34 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000324_3.htm>. 
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There is no harm, therefore, in marrying women from the People of the 
Book, if the need arises.  However, to refrain from doing so and to marry 
Muslim women is preferable and advisable, especially nowadays. 
 
The risk involved in marrying them these days is greater because they 
have control and power over husbands and might, therefore, lead their 
husbands or their children to kufr in Allaah.  My advice to all my brothers 
everywhere is, that they should not marry non-Muslim women and that 
they should be aware of the risks and end result of doing so.  Rather, they 
should do their utmost to marry Muslim women and to educate and guide 
them to what is good.  This is safer, especially at this time when evil and 
wickedness has increased.  The kuffaar have today gained the upper hand 
over the Muslims, and women in the countries of the kuffaar have power 
and authority and dominate their Muslim husbands and try to attract them 
and their children to their false religion.35  
 
Finally, another fatwa forbids Muslims living in non-Islamic countries to call the non-
Muslims “brothers” or “sisters” because brotherhood, if not established by descent, is 
only in faith. 36 
 
The underlying logic behind the fatwas disseminated through Fatwa-Online resonates 
with the notion of oneness and the unchangeability of sharī‘a, that is valid for Muslims 
                                                 
35 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000822_5.htm>. 
36 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000920_4.htm>. 
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at all times and in all places.  They also urge believers to adhere to the strict 
interpretation of Islamic Law, particularly in matters related to practices defining visible 
and audible Muslim identity.  Such approach directly contradicts the concept of 
jurisprudence of minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) promoted by Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī and 
other, mainly European and North American, Muslim scholars (see below).  Thus, the 
translation of originally Saudi Arabian fatwas into English and their agile dissemination 
through various media outlets reflect a broader struggle over interpretive authority in 
Sunni Islam.  In the context of European Muslim minorities, however, this struggle also 
inevitably involves foreign policy issues. 
 
Generally speaking, many Muslim states provide their former citizens and their 
descendants with religious and cultural support, including educating and sending imams 
to European mosques, establishing cultural centers, and funding satellite TV 
broadcasting.  The Turkish, Algerian and Moroccan governments in particular are very 
actively involved in Europe in retaining control over their emigrants (Roy 2004, p. 137).  
However, as Roy argues, “Saudi Arabia claims to represent all Muslims in the West and 
has created an array of institutions to spread Salafism and foster non-assimilation” 
(ibid.).  The above mentioned fatwas of prominent Saudi Arabian scholars in fact 
emphasize religiously-based neo-ethnicity and promote communitarisation, i.e. the 
trend of identifying people primarily as an ethno-cultural or religious group and only 
secondarily as individual citizens (Roy 2004, p. 20).  Although the direct impact of 
Fatwa-Online on individual behavior is questionable, the fatwas of Ibn Baz and 
Uthaymeen circulate broadly in cyber-Islamic environments.  
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While discussing the interactions between online platforms and offline religious 
communities, we should note that direct communication between petitioners and muftis 
is not enabled by Fatwa-Online, although the authors add new fatwas on a regular basis 
(Bunt 2003, p. 143).  Instead of utilizing the interactive potential of the medium, the 
authors of Fatwa-Online perceive the Internet as an emerging sphere where the salafī 
message should be disseminated.  As such, the site doesn’t provide space for dialogue 
or critical deliberations but rather it translates the already existing religious knowledge 
into a new digital domain.   
 
Beyond textual material the site also offers audio files of Qur‘anic recitations and 
sermons of respected Saudi Arabian scholars for download.  This in particular meets the 
above mentioned Amin and Gher’s (2000) claim of the oral cultural heritage pertaining 
to digital communication in the Arab Muslim world.  By the same token, El-Nawawy 
and Khamis (2009, p. 77) argue that “In today’s virtual Islamic community, many 
Islamic websites, in an attempt to gain the trust of their visitors, are trying to reflect the 
oral tradition by allowing these visitors to download Quranic recitations, with a high 
sound quality, for free.”  This notion echoes what White (2003) calls the “orality of 
trust,” i.e. the local bonds created through word of mouth and simultaneous face-to-face 
interactions which form the backbone of social cohesion in Islamic countries.  Yet, as 
White argues, “the depersonalized language of modern media has limited credibility in 
niche ecologies characterized by a culture of orality and personal interactions” (p. 176).  
Therefore, the strive of Fatwa-Online to provide its readers with authentic audio 
sermons of respected scholars, together with the above-mentioned detailed biographies 
of these scholars emphasizing the chain of the teachers who passed their knowledge to 
them, should be, in the light of Islamic tradition, perceived not only as a way to 
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establish authority of the salafī message itself but also as a way to maintain credibility 
of the site per se.  This credibility is of paramount importance given the fact that the site 
seems not to be directly maintained or even supervised by any of the above-mentioned 
scholars. 
 
The issue of trust is even more important when we examine other, more interactive, 
sites linked in the Fatwa-Online web-ring.  These include the smatch.net, which is an 
“online matrimonial resource designed for Salafi adults to find their suitable Salafi 
marriage partner”37 and UmmahServices.com, which offers various “certified third 
party services”, such as paying a fidya, the redemption in the monetary value of one 
sheep from the omission of certain religious duties during the hajj, or sadāqa, the 
almsgiving at the end of Ramadan.38  All these services are paid through PayPal and the 
owners of the site guarantee that they will be performed “according to the noble Qur‘ān 
and the authentic Sunna.”39 
 
Not only do online platforms such as UmmahServices.com effectively establish a new 
kind of Islamic e-commerce but, more importantly, they substantially transform the 
performance of traditional Muslim rituals.  By a single click believers from all over the 
world can feed the fasting inside Al-Masjid al-Nabawī during the month of Ramadan or 
pay the badal hajj, i.e. the performance of the obligatory hajj on behalf of those who 
                                                 
37 smatch.net [online]. [cit. 2010-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.smatch.net/>. 
38 UmmahServices.com [online]. [cit. 2010-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.ummahservices.com/fidyah.htm>. 
39 UmmahServices.com [online]. [cit. 2010-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.ummahservices.com/badalhajj.htm>. 
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have died whilst not having done so.40  Upon online payment the badal hajj will be 
performed by a student from the Islamic University of Medina or Umm al-Qura 
University in Mecca who will complete all the hajj rites and, at the same time, “benefit 
from the fee he receives by allowing him to maintain himself or his family whilst 
studying.”41  
 
Therefore, through the cyber Islamic environment of UmmahServices.com the 
conception of “religion online” (Helland 2000) directly connects to offline practices and 
local communities. In this context, Wellman and Gulia (2003, p. 187) argue that, while 
operating via the Internet, virtual communities are glocalized 
 
They are simultaneously more global and local, as worldwide connectivity 
and domestic matters intersect. Global connectivity de-emphasizes the 
importance of locality for community; online relationships may be more 
stimulating than suburban neighborhoods. 
 
The Fatwa-Online web-ring provides precisely such global connectivity to the salafī 
Muslim community. It links Muslims living in the West with students in Mecca and 
Medina through participation in collective rituals, enables them finding a spouse within 
their local salafī community, and provides them with collection of fatwas offering 
ready-made set of norms and values. The online community formed around Fatwa-
Online, which further expands to real-world social networks, meets in particular the 
Roy’s claim (2004, p. 30) that, in the conditions of globalization, westernization and the 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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impact of living as a minority, Muslim communities are no longer “the product of a 
given culture or civilization, but of the will of individuals who experience a process of 
individualization through deculturation and who, explicitly and voluntarily, decide to 
join a new community based solely on the explicit tenets of religion.” 
 
2.6.3   AskImam.org 
 
AskImam.org is an English-language website launched in 2004 and registered in 
Alexandria, Virginia, USA.  It seems to be a technically-updated mirror of the site Ask-
Imam.com which has been in operation since 2000 and is hosted and maintained in San 
Jose, California, USA. Both sites contain fatwas issued by the muftī Ebrahim Desai, a 
former head of the Dar ul Ifta department at Jamiatul Ulama (Council of Muslim 
Theologians) in Camperdown, South Africa.42  The aim of both sites is to “provide easy 
access to common Islamic questions and answers to anyone using the World Wide 
Web.”43 
 
Essentially, Desai holds the position that Muslims living in a non-Muslim country are 
bound to follow the laws of that country as long as they are not contrary to sharī‘a.44  
The methodology of how to determine such contradiction is not explained on Desai’s 
webpage, but can to some extent be discerned from the fatwas he has issued in 
particular cases.  His approach follows casuistic and legalistic interpretations of sharī‘a 
                                                 
42 Jamiatul Ulama Kwa Zulu Natal [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.jamiat.org.za/index.html>. 
43 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.askimam.org/about.php>. 
44 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=4db27ac0a921fcd91f643fbdcf5c26bb>. 
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focusing more on individual deeds and their requirements than on rules of law and their 
validity as such. In other words, if a particular deed or act satisfies both procedural and 
substantial conditions laid down by Islamic law, it is valid according to Desai, 
regardless of the law under which it has formally been carried out.  Thus, a marriage 
contracted in accordance to civil law at a municipal registry office constitutes a valid 
Islamic nikāh if two Muslim witnesses have been present and the Islamic impediments 
to marriage have not been breached.45  
 
In a similar manner, Desai considers any divorce approved by a civil court valid on the 
condition that it has been initiated by the husband.46  This reflects the above-mentioned 
concept of talāq (repudiation) granted by sharī‘a to the husband only.  In one of the 
many fatwas issued on that matter, Desai actually extends the Islamic concept of 
revocability of talāq to civil court decisions.  Moreover, he explicitly invalidates any 
civil divorce initiated by the wife, unless the marriage was annulated by a Muslim judge 
in advance 
 
Answer [excerpt]: If the husband instituted divorce through court and it 
was granted, it will be regarded as only one Talaaq-e-Raj'ee (revocable 
divorce). The husband can revoke the divorce within the Iddat period.  If 
he did not revoke it, the Talaaq will be changed to Talaaq-e-Baain 
                                                 
45 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=3a1f6208c913a3fe44905186b6f12c20>. 
46 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=f69061373bbbaf9c606057b53493dc21>. 
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(irrevocable divorce). […]  If the wife instituted the divorce through Court, 
it will not constitute Talaaq.47  
 
Desai’s strict legalistic approach is most evident in contested cases, where he often 
refuses to issue a fatwa unless he knows the exact wording of a civil court’s decision so 
he can determine its validity from an Islamic point of view.48  Finally, in a manner 
somehow similar to the Uthaymeen’s concept of arbitrary courts, Desai suggests to 
Muslim women that they contact local Muslim authorities in order to get tafrīk 
(dissolution of marriage) granted, before (or even instead of) seeking divorce through 
civil courts 
 
Question [excerpt]:  Can a woman file for divorce with the secular courts to 
release her from a marriage of zulm where the man has been guilty of 
adultery? 
 
Answer [excerpt]:  The decree of divorce granted in a secular court does 
not constitute an Islamic divorce (Talaaq) if the wife is an applicant. […]  
If a woman is oppressed and she requests her husband to issue her a Talaaq 
and he refuses, then the woman should contact her local Ulama body, for 
example, the Jamiat and present her case there.  The Ulama will advise her 
                                                 
47 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=7c700f9e8e81880d7a52f8a236793de5>. 
48 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=543dd28ef94d141d12d1c18ed3c6584d >. 
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accordingly.  That may include an application for an annulment of her 
marriage.49 
 
The case of AskImam meets, in particular, the above-mentioned Riexinger’s (2008) 
claim of establishing an authority through the innovative use of new media combined 
with filling a gap on the religious market.  The number of questions related to family 
issues and initiated by Muslims living in Western Europe clearly indicates that this is 
fertile ground for counseling and establishing opinion leadership.  As Bruinessen (2003) 
has stated, religious authority is expressed most clearly and explicitly in the relationship 
between mustaftī and muftī.  The very act of asking someone for a fatwa is the most 
explicit recognition of that person’s religious authority.  Ebrahim Desai exemplifies a 
scholar who, although being trained in non-Azhari institution outside of the Arab world, 
gained global recognition mainly through mass support accumulated via information 
and communication technology. 
 
                                                 
49 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=e90e87e526e4c18a78197dbb7012c408>. 
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2.6.4   IslamOnline.net
50
 
 
The Arabic and English website IslamOnline.net was launched on 24 June 1997.  It is 
owned and controlled by the Al-Balagh Cultural Society, a non-profit company 
registered in Doha, Qatar (Mariani 2006, p. 136). Although the website is registered in 
Qatar as well, it operates mainly from Cairo, Egypt. According to its mission statement, 
IslamOnline “aims to present the unified and lively nature of Islam that is keeping up 
with modern times in all areas.”51 With regard to Islamic law, the website’s objective is 
 
                                                 
50 The fieldwork research for this thesis, including downloading, archiving, and analyzing fatwas from the 
IslamOnline website, has been conducted in 2008 – 2009.  Therefore, this chapter reflects the state of 
matters within this particular timeframe.  In March 2010, during finalizing this thesis, the Al-Balagh 
Society, a Qatari association that owns Islamonline.net, decided to reorganize the website and to transfer 
supervision of its content and technology, as well as its administration, from its Cairo-based editors to the 
association’s main headquarters in Doha (MEMRI 2010).  In response, some 300 of the website’s Cairo 
employees who faced layoffs as a result of this decision launched a strike.  After interceding on their 
behalf, Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī was dismissed by the Qatari government from his position as chairman 
of Al-Balagh’s board of directors.  The employees, in collaboration with Al-Qaradāwī, responded by 
launching a new website that would, according to their statement, continue the Islamic legacy already 
established by IslamOnline (MEMRI 2010).  This new website, OnIslam.net, preserves to a large degree 
the structure and range of content of the original IslamOnline website.  The Arabic version of the original 
IslamOnline website has been substantially changed, reflecting the owners aim to limit its content to 
religious issues only.  The English version of the original IslamOnline website is still available online, yet 
it is not linked from its Arabic counterpart and seems to be not updated since April 2010.  The following 
text analyzes the content of the original website unless stated otherwise. 
51 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/English/AboutUs.shtml>. 
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To expand the circle of introducing Islam; present its comprehensiveness 
and the way its system and laws complement each other; to affirm its 
balance, fairness and applicability in all places and times; and present the 
tolerance and the humanity of its laws.52 
 
IslamOnline constitutes one of the most influential fatwa-issuing websites (Bunt 2003; 
Mariani 2006; Gräf 2007).  It offers a vast, searchable fatwa database, forms to 
electronically submit an inquiry for a new fatwa, and live “fatwa-sessions” with various 
muftis immediately answering users’ questions.  The body of muftis and counselors 
associated with IslamOnline is large and consists of many different authorities, ranging 
from al-Azhar graduates to European and North American imams.  Yet, the site is 
particularly connected with the European Council for Fatwa and Research and the 
above-mentioned scholar, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī. The latter was born in a small Egyptian 
village in 1926 and received traditional religious training at al-Azhar, one of the most 
important Islamic educational institutions in the world.  Later on, he worked for the 
Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments (awqāf) and founded and presided over the 
Department of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar.  Qaradāwī owes his 
international “fame” mainly to his program al-Sharī‘a wa-l-Hayāt (Sharī‘a and Life) 
aired for the first time in September 1997 by the Qatari satellite television station, Al-
Jazeera (Mariani 2006, p. 134).  Since 1997 he has also run his own website, which is in 
Arabic only. 53 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Qaradawi.net [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.qaradawi.net>. 
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As a well-known and regarded scholar, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī is highly influential in the 
production of global Islamic knowledge.  He is particularly active in the affairs of 
European Muslim communities.  In 1997, together with Faysal Mawlawi, he initiated 
the creation of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, a private body of muftis 
issuing fatwas specifically dealing with the conditions of Muslim minorities in Europe 
(Caeiro 2003b).  Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī coined the concept of fiqh al-aqalliyyāt 
(jurisprudence of minorities) and dedicated a whole legal treaty to this topic (Qaradāwī 
2005).  Essentially, he argues that Islamic law is valid for all Muslims regardless of 
their country of residence; nevertheless, the jurisprudence of minorities should take into 
account such minorities’ respective place, time, and conditions.  The main aim of fiqh 
al-aqalliyyāt is to help Muslim minorities lead wholesome Islamic lives according to 
sharī‘a while maintaining positive interactions with the non-Muslim majority 
(Qaradāwī 2005, p. 23). 
 
Generally speaking, the site IslamOnline adheres to the main principles of fiqh al-
aqalliyyāt. Yet, due to the diverse range of muftis associated with the site, the concrete 
fatwas vary substantially in their decisions and reasoning. This is particularly evident in 
fatwas related to family issues  
 
Question:  I would like to know the point of view of Islam if a Muslim 
living in a Western country, where polygamy is regarded unlawful, has to 
have a second wife due to some reasons. 
 
First Response [excerpt]:  The Muslim man who has a second wife [...] has 
to follow the channels of law in order to legalize his second marriage in the 
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country he lives in. [...]  If the attempts to legalize the second marriage fail, 
the person could document his (second) marriage in one of the Islamic 
centers. [...]  The problem he might face in the future is regarding getting 
birth certificates for the children from his second wife.  But I think there 
are some flexible European laws concerning registering names of the 
children born even from illegitimate relationships. 
  
Second Response [excerpt]:  A Muslim living in a non-Muslim society is 
obligated to follow the laws.  We cannot say that their laws are contrary to 
the Shari`ah, so we have to follow the Shari`ah. Taking a second wife is not 
a necessary requirement; there is no mandatory duty on the Muslim to have 
a second wife.54 
 
The fact that two different decisions were actually given is specific to IslamOnline.  It 
resembles the institution of dissenting opinion known from European jurisprudence and 
demonstrates the dynamic behind the decision-making processes within the body 
operating the site.  Both fatwas have been issued by muftis living in Western countries 
and knowing the local laws and customs. Both recognize the authority of civil law; 
albeit in very different ways.  The first fatwa by Sheikh Ahmad Hulail, imam of Tariq 
ibn Ziad Mosque in Frankfurt, Germany, recommends that believers de facto avoid the 
law; whereas the latter by Jamal Badawi, member of the Fiqh Council of North 
America, strictly obliges them to abide by it.  Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī has stated that in the 
                                                 
54 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503547860>. 
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case of contradicting fatwas a Muslim must follow the one that “his true conscience 
believes is closer to the truth” (Caeiro 2003b, p. 32).  This statement in fact echoes the 
emphasis on the role of the individual and the privatization of faith, as we will discuss 
below. 
 
It seems that over the course of time fatwas issued by IslamOnline more or less 
converge to the second, Badawi’s point of view.  For example, the following fatwa 
delivered by Faysal Mawlawi, Deputy Chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research, validates civil marriages as long as they are not contracted between the 
“unmarriageable” persons as defined in Islamic law  
 
Question: Is the civil marriage conducted in Western and European 
countries valid from a Shari’ah point of view? 
 
Answer [excerpt]: The legal marriage which is done in European countries 
is regarded as a valid marriage in Shari`ah as long as there is no legal 
reason in Shari`ah against the marriage. [...] For instance, a Muslim is not 
allowed to marry his foster-sister, though this is permissible in European 
laws. Likewise, a Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a non-Muslim 
and a Muslim man is not allowed to marry any non-Muslim other than a 
Christian or Jewish woman, though all types of inter-faith marriage are 
permitted in Western laws.55 
                                                 
55 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503546430&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar>. 
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Mawlawi’s approach seemingly corresponds with the above-mentioned one of Ebrahim 
Desai. Yet, when we closely examine his reasoning, we discover that Mawlawi 
scrutinizes the marriage’s validity only from the substantial law’s point of view and not 
from the procedural one.  In fact, this indicates de facto recognition of the civil law and 
its procedures and leaves the responsibility for choosing the spouse in accordance with 
Islamic law to the individual believer.  
 
Similarly, the European Council for Fatwa and Research, although in theory 
acknowledging the imperative for Muslims to resort to Islamic law only, in fact 
recognizes the authority of secular civil law and its courts based on principles of 
choosing lesser harm and preventing chaos 
 
Question:  What is the Islamic ruling regarding the divorce issued by a 
non-Muslim judge? 
 
Answer [excerpt]:  The principle is that a Muslim only resorts to a Muslim 
Judge or any suitable deputy in the event of a conflict.  However, and due 
to the absence of an Islamic judicial system in non-Muslim countries, it is 
imperative that a Muslim who conducted his Marriage by virtue of those 
countries’ respective laws, to comply with the rulings of a non-Muslim 
judge in the event of a divorce.  Since, the laws were accepted as governing 
the marriage contract, then it is as though one has implicitly accepted all 
consequences, including that the marriage may not be terminated without 
the consent of a judge. […]  The jurisprudence (Fiqh) principle applicable 
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in this case is that whatever is normal practice is similar to a contractual 
agreement.  Also, implementing the rulings of a non-Muslim judiciary is an 
acceptable matter, as it falls under the bringing about of what is considered 
to be of interest and to deter what is considered to be of harm and may 
cause chaos.56 
 
Finally, Ahmad Kutty, a scholar of Islamic studies at the Islamic Institute of Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada, recognizes civil law to its full extent in the following fatwa also 
published by IslamOnline  
 
Question [excerpt]:  Do you think that it is important to wait until civil 
divorce is completed if Islamic divorce has been issued long ago? 
 
Answer [excerpt]:  Islam teaches us to abide by the laws of the land; Islam 
never favors anarchy and lawlessness.  Since we don't have Shari`ah courts 
in Western countries, we should govern ourselves by the existing laws as 
best as we can.  After all, marriage and family life are not personal issues; 
rather they have direct bearing on communities and societies.  It is highly 
important for you to finalize your legal divorce before getting married 
                                                 
56 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503544364&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar>. 
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again.  In this way, you can avoid any unforeseen harm that may arise due 
to lack of legal support.57 
 
Similarly, another key fatwa dealing with the coexistence of sharī‘a and European legal 
systems states that “since those Muslims are not living in Islamic countries and they 
have to respect the laws and rules of the countries where they live, some of the 
teachings of Islam, especially recommended deeds, are not fully applied on them.”58  
However, it emphasizes that “they have to strive their best to apply as much as they can 
of the teachings of Islam.” 59  Taking a different tack, another fatwa states that Muslims 
minorities “are supposed to hold fast to the marked features of their own Islamic 
identity and never try to compromise their faith in order to fit in their societies.” 60  
Nevertheless, in certain situations, “the law of necessity may apply to certain 
individuals under specific circumstances.”61  As an example it mentions wearing a 
niqāb which, while acceptable in certain countries, could be considered extremely 
bizarre and out of the ordinary in others.  In the latter case, Muslims living in the West 
                                                 
57 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1146992942251&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar>. 
58 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503549292&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar>. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1171274627715&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar>. 
61 Ibid. 
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“should always look at the pros and cons and try [their] best to apply the rules of Islam 
to the best of our ability.”62 
 
Most of the above mentioned fatwas on IslamOnline generally adhere to the concept of 
fiqh al-aqalliyyāt, although the different interpretations result in significantly different 
decisions. Nevertheless, namely in comparison with the previously-described, fatwa-
issuing websites, IslamOnline as a whole presents a more moderate approach towards 
Islamic law.   The site seems to follow the concept of “balance and moderation” (al-
wasatiyya wa-l-i’tidāl) as coined by Qaradāwī and adopted by other Muslim scholars.  
It refers to the maintenance of balance between old and new as well as between the 
different Islamic legal schools and doctrines. Moderation then means opposition to 
extremism, which, according to Qaradāwī, can include both secular and radical trends 
(Gräf 2007, p. 3).  Essentially, IslamOnline could be labeled as a post-Islamist project, 
using Roy’s terminology, in the sense that it strives to promote sharī‘a on a basis of 
daily adherence and behavior. Yet, in contrast with Fatwa-Online and its legalistic 
interpretation of sharī‘a, IslamOnline tries to reconcile Islamic law with contemporary 
conditions. As such, it could be perceived as part of what Baker (2003, p. 111) calls “an 
Islamist project of peaceful resistance, intellectual reform, and gradual, social 
transformation in the unprecedented conditions of a globalized world”. 
 
Both websites emphasize the role of the individual and his/her voluntarily adherence to 
Islamic law; albeit in a very different manner.  The muftis associated with Fatwa-Online 
urge believers to distance themselves from the State and to establish private councils, 
judging their affairs according to rigid interpretations of Islamic law with an 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
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indisputable and predefined set of norms.  On the other hand, IslamOnline invites 
individuals to discuss these interpretations and the following set of norms and engages 
the believers in the rebuilding of the imaginary global Muslim umma by deliberate 
observance of these rules. 
 
Correspondingly, IslamOnline is distinguished by its technological standards and the 
extent of interactivity and engagement available to the user.  In comparison with the 
sites Fatwa-Online or Islam4UK, which mainly re-publish fatwas issued elsewhere, 
IslamOnline enables direct deliverance of fatwas in a live, computer-mediated session.  
Not only does this feature utilize the potential of ICT to its full extent, but it also 
enhances the attractiveness and topicalness of the site. As al-Qaradāwī has stated, 
exploiting the Internet in the service of Islam is necessary and a religious obligation 
(fard) (Kouřilová 2008).  This imperative is reflected as well in the site’s mission 
statement 
 
The Internet has created a realm of opportunities for communication. We 
pledge to take advantage of these opportunities to achieve the highest 
levels of integrity, precision in content and creative professionalism in 
design. We work hard so that IslamOnline.net’s content, information, and 
ideas are presented professionally to gain the distinction that will make it 
credible and attractive.63 
 
                                                 
63 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/English/AboutUs.shtml>. 
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The discursive of this statement in fact echoes Haenni’s (2008) notion of “private 
religious entrepreneurship”. He uses this term to describe the assemblage of Islamic 
piety, usage of communication technologies, and marketing strategies.  Up to the 
present day, IslamOnline, which exemplifies precisely such a private religious initiative, 
remains one of the most successful Islamic websites worldwide in terms of visitors per 
day.64  The muftis on the site may lack the official recognition by the State, but they can 
be sure that their fatwas are read and discussed from Morocco to Malaysia. 
 
While exploring the online offline interaction we should shed light on the recent 
expansion of IslamOnline into a new digital domain of Second Life, an online multi-user 
virtual world.  Second Life is a privately-owned, subscription-based 3D application 
created by the company Linden Lab and launched in 2003.  Second Life presents an 
entirely user-created environment in which members use official design tools to shape 
the in-world (Radde-Antweiler 2007, p. 187).  IslamOnline sponsored a virtual re-
creation of the city of Mecca and the simulation of the hajj pilgrimage, which was 
released in December 2007, just prior to the 2007–2008 hajj season.  The purpose of the 
simulation was to educate Muslims about how to participate in the hajj and non-
Muslims about this important ritual and the various steps that pilgrims take.  The hajj 
simulation in Second Life reconstructs a realistic environment and allows users to freely 
explore it, move from one stage of the simulation to another, and interact with its 
objects.  Yet, and more importantly, it allows users to share their experience with others 
through both visual representation of their avatars and a textual in-world chat and 
                                                 
64 According to Alexa, IslamOnline has the 2nd highest rank in the category “Top/Society/Religion and 
Spirituality/Islam” and 3714th highest rank in general. It is preceded by IslamWay (islamway.com, ranked 
1616th overall) and followed by the website of Amr Khaled (amrkhaled.net, ranked 6238th overall). See 
Alexa [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.alexa.com/>. 
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messaging system.  Therefore, through creating the perception of mutual “presence” 
among its individual visitors, the hajj simulation can be experienced collectively and 
even facilitate “ritual experience” for some of its users, as reported by Heidbrink (2007) 
and Derrickson (2008).  At the same time, IslamOnline regularly utilizes Second Life for 
online lectures and interviews, creating a platform where individual Muslims from all 
over the world can directly engage in dialogue with respected scholars in high-tech 
virtual environment.  
 
2.6.5   Islamic-Sharia.org 
 
The Islamic Shari’a Council is a quasi-Islamic Court founded in 1982 in Birmingham, 
UK. It strives to represent an “authoritative body” consisting of a panel of scholars from 
many established institutions in the UK, including London Central Mosque and Islamic 
Cultural Centre in London, Jamia Mosque and Islamic Centre n Birmingham, and 
Islamic Centre in Glasgow. According to its mission statement 
 
The Council considers itself to be a stabilising influence within the UK 
Muslim community. Outside of Muslim countries, Islamic institutions are 
essential for the survival of Muslim communities. Other establishments 
such as mosques, schools, universities and banks preserve the Muslim 
identity of a community and create a protective environment for young and 
old alike.65 
 
                                                 
65 Islamic Sharia [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-
us/about-us-10.html>. 
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The Council issues fatwas, provides mediation, and judges cases presented to it by 
individual petitioners.  It primarily deals with issues pertaining to family and 
matrimonial law, namely with divorces granted by civil courts in the UK which are not 
necessarily considered valid in the eyes of the Islamic law.  As I have discussed above, 
divorce in Islamic law can take many forms, the most common cases being the 
repudiation (talāq) of the wife by the husband, the dissolution of marriage (tafrīk) 
pronounced by a judge, and the khul’, by which the wife redeems herself from a 
marriage for a consideration.  Also, as I have demonstrated in the previous case studies, 
according to some Muslim scholars, namely the Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen, a divorce 
granted by a non-Islamic court is not valid at all in the eyes of Islamic law.66  According 
to many others it is not valid if the wife was the petitioner.67  In all these case the 
Islamic Shari’a Council enables the parties to obtain an Islamic divorce.  According to 
its statistics, by August 2010, the Council had dealt with more than seven thousands 
cases.68  
 
The Council is not legally recognized in the UK. Rather it represents an informal 
parallel court which supplements the State’s legal system and its institutions in cases 
where these, according to the Council’s members, fail to meet the necessary 
requirements laid down by the Law of God.  At the same time, as its website states 
 
                                                 
66 Fatwa-Online [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000920_2.htm>. 
67 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.askimam.org/fatwa/fatwa.php?askid=e90e87e526e4c18a78197dbb7012c408>. 
68 Islamic Sharia [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-
us/about-us-9.html>. 
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The fact that it is already established, and is gradually gaining ground 
among the Muslim community, and the satisfaction attained by those who 
seek its ruling, are all preparatory steps towards the final goal of gaining the 
confidence of the host community in the soundness of the Islamic legal 
system and the help and insight they could gain from it. The experience 
gained by the scholars taking part in its procedures make them more 
prepared for the eventuality of recognition for Islamic law.69 
 
As such, the Islamic Shari’a Council exemplifies the “arbitration tribunals” as 
envisioned in the fatwa by Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen which urges Muslims living in a 
non-Muslim society to appoint an arbitrator who will judge among them according to 
sharī‘a.70  This, in turn, promotes establishment of a parallel legal framework, based on 
a voluntarily adherence, informal authority of the judges and compulsory social 
mechanisms of the community. Simultaneously, the broader mission of the Council to 
gain recognition of sharī‘a in the UK enters another, political sphere where the very 
concepts of coexistence between Islam and the State are negotiated. 
 
The Council has launched its English website Islamic-Sharia.org as late as in 2007.  As 
such, it at first seems to meet the El-Nawawy and Khamis’ (2009, p. 74) claim that 
traditional ‘ulama have failed to adapt to the new media ecology and “change their 
message to cope with the new social and cultural developments”. Therefore, El-
Nawawy and Khamis argue, they have particularly failed to understand the mentality of 
                                                 
69 Islamic Sharia [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-
us/about-us-7.html>. 
70 Ask Imam [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.fatwa-
online.com/fataawa/muslimminorities/0000903_4.htm>. 
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young Muslims and to gain their trust and confidence.  Yet, soon after it went online, 
the website Islamic-Sharia.org gained substantial traffic and the Council’s fatwas are 
sought by many young people of various and multifaceted background.  Therefore, the 
case of the Islamic Shari’a Council rather exemplifies what Anderson (2008) describes 
as migration online of established religious networks and institutions, which, at first 
being slow to adapt and thus preceded by “new Islam’s interpreters,” eventually proved 
adept at deploying the underlying technologies to their own ends and re-established 
their presence and authority online. 
 
When compared with the above-mentioned global Islamic websites, such as Fatwa-
Online and IslamOnline, it should be noted how the website of the Council is firmly 
linked to its local UK Muslim community and the services the Council provides for it.  
As is the case in the above-mentioned sites, Islamic-Sharia.org contains large and 
searchable database of fatwas.  Yet, it also offers an online form for requesting an 
offline appointment, where the petitioner can specify his or her problem, so an 
appropriate member of the Council can prepare for the meeting.  Recently, the site 
introduced downloadable forms for petitioners seeking Islamic divorce, i.e. talāq for 
men and khul’ for women. In the case of talāq, the husband has to provide his and his 
wife details, reasons for asking divorce, details about children and financial obligations, 
and pay the required fee. Upon receiving the application the Council will issue a talāq 
form to the husband which he has to sign in front of two witnesses and return back to 
the Council.  The Council will then inform the wife by sending her a letter giving her 
thirty days to submit her claims. If she has no objections (or no response is received), 
and providing all other requirements are met, the Islamic divorce certificate will be 
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issued by the Council.  At the same time, the petitioners are advised to consult a 
solicitor for obtaining a civil divorce.71 
 
Therefore, the primary difference between other Islamic websites providing legal and 
religious consultations and Islamic-Sharia.org lies in the online offline connections, 
where the muftis of the Council directly communicate with the petitioners, seek to be 
informed about particular details of each respective case, and offer a possibility of face-
to-face meeting.  In this context, Thomson (1995) noted that new methods of religious 
interaction and communication on the Internet have depersonalized the content and 
structure of the traditional religious message 
 
To the extent that the transmission of tradition becomes dependent on 
mediated forms of communication, it also becomes detached from the 
individuals with whom one interacts in day in day-to-day life. 
 
The activities of the Council to a large extend transcend this depersonalization and seek 
to create a bond of trust between the petitioners and the muftis, which, in turn, reaffirms 
the Council’s authority as a religious and quasi-legal body.  Echoing Thompson’s 
thought, El-Nawawy and Khamis (2009) have argued that the Internet, in and by itself, 
is not capable of solely taking on the responsibility of helping today’s young Muslims 
develop a clearly defined self-identity in a complex post modern environment.  Instead, 
they suggest that “the offline community, represented in the home, school, and mosque, 
should bear part of the responsibility in guiding young Muslims and arming them with 
                                                 
71 Islamic Sharia [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.islamic-
sharia.org/docman/divorce-froms/divorce-form-men/download-2.html>. 
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the necessary tools that would help them differentiate between authenticated and 
nonauthenticated religious message in the virtual community” (p. 76).  The Islamic 
Shari’a Council, although not legally recognized in the UK, and the website it maintains 
constitute a successful example of establishing arbitration and reconciliation council for 
local community while linking this offline institution to global online umma 
simultaneously. 
 
2.6.6   MATribunal.com 
 
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) was established in 2007 in Birmingham in 
order to “provide a viable alternative for the Muslim community seeking to resolve 
disputes in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law and without having to resort to costly 
and time consuming litigation.”72  As the webpage states, the establishment of MAT is 
an “important and significant step towards providing the Muslim community with a real 
opportunity to self determine disputes in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law.”73 
 
Unlike the Islamic Shari’a Council mentioned above, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
operates within the legal framework of England and Wales thereby ensuring that any 
determination reached by it can be enforced through existing means of enforcement 
open to normal litigants. Yet, as the website states 
 
                                                 
72 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.matribunal.com/>. 
73 Ibid. 
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Although MAT must operate within the legal framework of England and 
Wales, this does not prevent or impede MAT from ensuring that all 
determinations reached by it are in accordance with one of the recognised 
Schools of Islamic Sacred Law.  MAT will therefore, for the first time, 
offer the Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes 
in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the 
outcome as determined by MAT will be binding and enforceable.74 
 
MAT operates under the Arbitration Act 1996.75 Therefore, its procedural rules require 
that each tribunal must consist of at least two members, one a scholar of sharī‘a and the 
other a solicitor or barrister registered to practice in England or Wales.  Although the 
official website of MAT Matribunal.com doesn’t contain any fatwas for Muslim 
minorities living in Europe, the following statement summarizes the MAT opinion 
regarding the coexistence of sharī‘a and non-Islamic legal systems 
 
We believe in the co-existence of both English law and personal religious 
laws.  We believe that the law of the land in which we live is binding upon 
each citizen, and we are not attempting to impose Shariah upon anyone.  
Shariah does however have its place in this society where it is our personal 
and religious law.  What a great achievement it will be if we can produce a 
result to the satisfaction of both English and Islamic law!76 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Arbitration Act 1996 [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/ukpga_19960023_en_1>. 
76 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.matribunal.com/values.html>. 
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As Ali et al. (2009, p. 16) have argued, female Muslims in the UK oftentimes express 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the khul’ divorce is treated and the lack of 
impartiality in typical Shari’a Councils which are presided by men.  This, among other 
factors, could probably have led MAT to stress on its webpage that it has “young 
qualified people, male and female, sitting as members of the Arbitration Tribunal” and 
that “there will be no race or sex discrimination in this organisation.”77  This statement 
can in fact resonate with feelings of many young Muslim women who feel that although 
“English courts do not have the competency to discuss issues of Islamic law,” (Ali et al. 
2009, p. 17) they, particularly in issues regarding divorce and matrimony related 
problems, provide Muslim women with more protection than traditional Islamic sharī‘a 
councils (ibid.).  Perhaps as a mean of differentiation of the MAT towards the global 
Islamic websites, which are often supervised by scholars from Arab Muslim countries 
such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, the website Matribunal.com emphasizes that the MAT 
scholars or lawyers are not from abroad but from within the UK.78 
 
Finally, when regarding the online offline interaction we should note that the website 
Matribunal.com features an application online form which can be used for submitting a 
request for dispute resolution.  By electronically submitting this form, the petitioner 
submits himself or herself to the jurisdiction of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal to 
arbitrate on all matters relating to the particular case.79  Therefore, the Tribunal does not 
only transcend the limitations of most of the sharī‘a councils by successfully integrating 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: 
<http://www.matribunal.com/application.html>. 
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its rulings into the enforceable framework of the English legal system; moreover, it also 
fully utilizes the possibilities of the Internet to create not only a “bond of trust” between 
the petitioner and the mufti but an online, legally binding agreement between the two 
parties in a way known previously rather from the domain of e-commerce and e-
government. 
 
In this respect, Bunt (2010) argues that new media and ICT based services have the 
potential to be a significant channel of influence and authority in Muslim communities.  
According to him, the modes and communications dynamics of scholars, opinion 
providers and petitioners (or consumers) are shifting in response to technological 
developments, while maintaining the essence of long-held traditions of religious 
authority and interpretation.  Again, this is particularly true in the case of Muslim 
minorities in Europe, where the online counseling, issuing of fatwas, and online and 
offline arbitration intersect with issues of multiple identities, citizenship, the 
relationship between the host and migrant communities, legal pluralism, and cultural 
continuities. 
 
2.7   Concluding Remarks 
 
The case studies provided in this chapter have briefly explored six distinct websites 
providing normative content in English and Arabic for European Muslim minorities.  
By no means should this list be considered as an exhaustive one, since there are many 
similar sites with significant influence80, and others aimed at Turkish, French, or 
                                                 
80 For example, the above-mentioned IslamWay.com; AmrKhaled.net; Bouti.com, Dar-alIfta.org, 
IslamiCity.com, IslamOnline.net, Islam-qa.com; and others.  
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German speaking audience.  There are also plenty of popular Islamic websites, whose 
authors deny the concept of fatwa as such and strive for different, non-legalistic 
interpretations of Islam.81  As has been stated above, the examples quoted in the case 
studies stem from a broader corpus of more than 500 analyzed fatwas.  Most of these 
fatwas could actually be subsumed under one of the patterns explored in this chapter, 
ranging from radical denial of State law to its pragmatic acceptance. 
 
What again has to be emphasized here is the predominantly declarative and symbolic 
value of a fatwa (Mozaffari 1987, p. 44).  Especially in the European context and 
without any legally-enforceable framework, following a fatwa remains completely 
deliberate and the latter constitutes more of a legitimization of existing social practice 
than a normative act per se (Caeiro 2004).  Moreover, a substantial amount of believers 
do not perceive Islam primarily as a legal framework, nor do they resort to an Internet 
muftī. As Roy (2004, p. 20) puts it: “Although there is a long tradition of exegesis and 
fatwa on what a Muslim should or should not do when confronted with a non-Muslim 
environment and practices, most Muslims find a way to deal with that without 
contacting Fatwa-Online.com.”  Furthermore, a considerable number of Muslims are not 
particularly interested in performing religious practices, while not denying their Muslim 
identity as such (Rohe 2007, p. 16). 
 
Yet, the popularity of normative-content oriented sites, e.g. the IslamOnline or Amr 
Khaled,82 and the successful establishment of some predominantly Internet-based 
                                                 
81 For example the North American Muslim intellectual, Muqtedar Khan, and his website Ijtihād [online]. 
[cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.ijtihad.org>. 
82 Amr Khaled [online]. [cit. 2009-4-20]. Available online: <http://www.amrkhaled.net>. 
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muftis, e.g. Ebrahim Desai, indicates the appeal this form of religious guidance has to 
many believers.  As we have already argued, to a large extent the popularity of Internet 
preachers and muftis converges with the broader transformation of contemporary 
religiosity, which emphasizes the role of the individual and privatization of faith.  
Correspondingly, the easily-accessible and searchable databases of fatwas provide pre-
set knowledge and codes of behavior, which the individual can choose from.  This is 
even exemplified in the phenomenon of so-called “fatwa shopping”, when a person 
approaches different authorities in order to obtain a fatwa that suits his or her needs 
(Hosen 2008).  
 
Beyond the emphasis on the individual, another underlying logic of the fatwa-issuing 
websites is the question of identity.  We have already mentioned the Qaradāwī’s (2005, 
p. 7) claim that it is the adherence to sharī‘a through which Muslim minorities living in 
non-Muslim societies reaffirm their identity.  Yet, as we have demonstrated, sharī‘a as 
a legal norm does not survive as such in a non-Muslim environment.  Therefore, in the 
words of Roy (2004, p. 191), it has to be recast either in spiritualist and modern terms, 
or as a normative code of behavior that draws a clear boundary between Muslims and 
non-Muslims.  From this point of view, the fatwa-issuing websites aimed at Muslim 
minorities living in Europe play a more effective role in shaping the latter’s identities 
than in the construction of a coherent and sustainable legal framework. 
 
Information and communication technologies cannot have any social or political impact 
apart from their use by human beings (Kalathil & Boas 2003, p. 2).  Indeed, some of the 
fatwa-issuing websites, e.g. Islam4UK, call for radical rejection of man-made laws and 
therefore directly challenge the authority of the State and its courts.  Yet, the majority of 
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sites de facto recognizes the sovereignty of the State and provides believers with 
guidelines how to live in accordance with sharī‘a within a non-Muslim legal system.  
Inherently, the principles promoted by these sites are based on voluntarily adherence 
and individual responsibility, since the muftis lack any legal means to enforce their 
decisions. 
 
In his prescient work, Dasetto (2000) laid down five possible models of settlement of 
active Islam in Europe.  According to him, these are (1) assimilation to the Western 
model of religion as a private and spiritual sphere; (2) cosmopolitan integration 
preserving institutionalized cultural references and laws; (3) dissent and rejection of the 
West and its models; (4) diasporas of networked and self-concerned communities; and 
(5) geopolitization of minorities as an appendix to the foreign policy of their states of 
origin.  By no means are these models mutually exclusive.  The Internet fatwas in fact 
exemplify the existing as well as the possible future assemblages of Dasetto’s model.  
 
In reality, the theoretical frameworks manifested by the various fatwa-issuing websites 
are mostly already embodied in the practices of European Muslims; albeit to varying 
degrees.  As we have stated above, contrary to the popular notion, sharī‘a is already 
applied in Europe today.  We have also demonstrated that, beyond the realm of private 
international law and marriage contracts, sharī‘a is also incorporated into European 
legal systems through the institutions of mediation and arbitration, as exemplified in the 
existence of Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.  Moreover, several autonomous tribunals 
have been established that echo the Uthaymeen’s idea of sharī‘a judges, e.g. the Islamic 
Shari’a Council in UK which provides Islamic divorce independently of and separately 
from the United Kingdom’s legal system.   
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It is not only the Muslim authorities who formulate ideas challenging the legal status 
quo.  In his highly-publicized speech for Radio 4’s World at One programme in 
February 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, said that the 
adoption of certain aspects of sharī‘a law in the United Kingdom seems unavoidable; 
specifically referring to family law and marital issues.  He argues that this step would 
help maintain social cohesion and points out that similar Orthodox Jewish courts (Beth 
Din) are already in operation in the UK.83  Similarly, Lord Chief Justice Phillips stated 
in his speech at the East London Muslim Centre in July 2008 that the UK already goes a 
long way towards embracing sharī‘a in the context of family disputes.  He did however 
lay down clear limitations for such a process  
 
There is no reason why principles of Sharia Law, or any other religious 
code should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution. It must be recognised, however, that any sanctions for a 
failure to comply with the agreed terms of the mediation would be drawn 
from the laws of England and Wales. So far as aspects of matrimonial law 
are concerned, there is a limited precedent for English law to recognise 
aspects of religious laws, although when it comes to divorce this can only 
be effected in accordance with the civil law of this country.84 
  
                                                 
83 Sharia law in UK is (unavoidable). BBC News [online]. 7 February 2008, [cit. 2010-11-16]. Available 
online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7232661.stm>. 
84 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal [online]. [cit. 2009-4-25]. Available online: 
<http://www.matribunal.com/downloads/LCJ_speech.pdf>. 
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The public statements of various religious and State authorities take us back to the 
Habermasian notion of the public sphere, as a sphere between the civil society and the 
state, where critical public issues of general interest are discussed.  As Casanova (1994, 
p. 228) has poignantly stated, “By entering the public sphere and forcing the public 
discussion or contestation of certain issues, religions force modern societies to reflect 
publicly and collectively upon their normative structures.”  As we have demonstrated, 
the authority of European legal systems is not contested by the virtual fatwa-issuing 
websites, but reconfigured by the very real behavior of concrete social actors.  
Nevertheless, it is increasingly on the Internet and in the multiple public spheres it 
creates where these new configurations are constantly negotiated and new models of 
European Muslim identity are shaped.  Therefore, the fatwa-issuing websites constitute 
a prominent example of how technology reconfigures the politics of religious authority 
in the contexts of globalization, deterritorialization, and transnationalism. 
 
Beyond analyzing the content of the above-mentioned websites, this chapter also aimed 
to explore the connections between the respective websites and global and local Islamic 
institutions, the interactions between online and offline Muslim communities, and the 
ways in which the online counseling shapes offline religious manifestations and 
practices. 
 
Despite the different religious and ideological background of the respective sites, they 
all manifest high level of media hybridization and interdependency.  This can be 
particularly observed in the assemblage of textual and audiovisual normative content 
offered by Fatwa-Online; in the virtual “live fatwa sessions” or the hajj simulation 
recreated in the immersive environment of Second Life sponsored by IslamOnline; and 
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in the “legally binding” electronic submissions provided by Muslim Arbitrational 
Tribunal.  The underlying logic behind these technological innovations could be 
perceived as an attempt to transcend the depersonalization associated with electronic 
media and create a “bond of trust” between the petitioners and the muftis, thus asserting 
the latter’s authority. Mandaville (2003b, p. 136) notes that how Islam becomes 
represented in new forms and via new media has special significance in the context of 
“the fragmentation of traditional sources of religious authority.” This means that “the 
traditional ‘ulama are increasingly finding themselves bypassed in favor of, for instance, 
Muslim youth workers, in the search for religious knowledge” (p. 137).  
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the traditional and established religious authorities are 
apparently aware that their message in order to be heard has be recast in accordance 
with new cultural and media ecology.  Moreover, they proved very successful in 
utilizing the new media technologies.  Yet, at the same time, the technology enabling 
the communications between individual petitioners and religious scholars favors 
bottom-up approach since the fatwas issued depend on the petitions the website has 
aggregated.  In this respect, El-Nawawy and Khamis (2009, p. 217) argue that the 
Internet constitutes a new manifestation of a Muslim umma that is not based on 
authority, but on public participation.  In other words, there is an independence from 
traditional religious authority and institutional hegemony, where the discourse is driven 
by the concerns of publicly oriented individuals rather than by institutional powers.  
This is supported by the fact that it is the petitioners, not the muftis, who set the agenda 
for the issues to be discussed on most of the websites that we analyzed.  By the same 
token, Ali et al. (2009, p. 50) suggest, that fatwa represents a bottom-up approach “to 
informing and influencing the formal legal system and is representative of the ordinary 
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Muslim’s concern regarding ‘Islamicness’ of actions and issues around her/him.”  
Nevertheless, despite the agenda being set by the individual petitioners, it is the 
traditional established authority, oftentimes closely linked to existing religious 
institutions, who issues the fatwa or give the advice.  Therefore, I argue that the Internet 
is in the long term capable of reinforcing culturally dominant social networks and that 
while fueling individualization and privatization of faith, it could simultaneously assert 
conformity and compliance with established religious structures.  At the same time, the 
success of the global Islamic websites operated from Arab Muslim countries among 
European Muslim minorities indicates that “the search for religious authority shows that 
Muslims in the West aspire to a transnational community united in belief and practice” 
(Walker 2007). 
 
Moreover, the case studies show that the growing interdependency of various media 
outlets featured by the Islamic websites is coupled by similar hybridization to the 
discourse.  Arguably, one important factor that has contributed to the increasing 
accessibility of the Internet technology in the virtual Islamic public sphere beyond the 
circle of the religious elite or ‘ulama is its vernacular nature. This feature has led to the 
“reintellectualization of Islamic discourse.” Eickelman and Anderson (1999, p. 12; 
quoted in El-Nawawy & Khamis 2009, p. 70), who coined the term described it as 
follows 
 
By reintellectualization, we mean presenting Islamic doctrine and discourse 
in accessible, vernacular terms, even if this contributes to basic 
reconfiguration of doctrine and practice. Reintellectualization has 
sometimes been thought of as the province of folk or local Islam, a category 
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that has been criticized for deflecting attention from the presence of the 
global in the local throughout the Muslim world. But more is involved with 
new media and new people: Islamic discourse has not only moved to the 
vernacular and become accessible to significantly wider publics, it has also 
become framed in styles of reasoning and forms of argument that draw on 
wider, less exclusive or erudite bodies of knowledge, including those of 
applied science and engineering. 
 
As El-Nawawy and Khamis (2009, p. 71) put it, the vernacular nature of Islamic 
websites providing normative content is not the only factor that has contributed to the 
popularity and wider audience; another important factor is the wide variety of 
controversial issues that have not often been discussed in the conventional Islamic 
circles.  
 
Finally, all the concepts of Muslim identity provided by the various online platforms 
explored in the case studies essentially constitute differentiated responses to the 
question how to live in accordance with Islamic law in a modern, globalized society. 
Particularly given the media attention the fundamentalist or salafī concepts of Islam and 
Islamic law, as expressed e.g. by the website Fatwa-Online, gain in the global news 
media, we are today in crucial need of critically understanding the other dimensions of 
the modern Islamic revival movements, which, according to Khan (2006, p. xiii) 
advocate a “moderate discourse that seeks to find a place for Islam as well as 
democracy (and to) explore the contentious domain where freedom and faith, 
democracy and theology negotiate a mutually compatible future.” Such discourse, as 
demonstrated in the establishment of Muslim Arbitration Tribunal or in fatwas 
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disseminated by the former IslamOnline,85 reinterprets the traditional Islamic law in the 
light of contemporary conditions and provides for a modern, global Muslim identity. 
 
                                                 
85 See footnote 50. 
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3.   New Media and the Construction of Muslim Identity 
 
 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, information and communication technology 
(ICT), particularly the Internet, and its possible role in the construction of contemporary 
Islamic knowledge has been the subject of intensive academic interest in the last 
decade.  The primary interest of many of these studies was on the possibilities of ICT in 
the process of democratization of Muslim societies.  Therefore, a number of pioneering 
studies focus on the question of authority and lay interpretations of Islam and fatwa-
issuing websites (Anderson 1997, 2003; Bunt 2000, 2003; Brückner 2001).  Later on 
several authors suggested that ICT and the Internet tend to displace the interpretive 
authority from scholars towards selective personal interpretation, contributing to the so-
called processes of “individualization” and “privatization” of Islam (Caeiro 2003b; 
Vertovec 2003).  
 
Indeed, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, the above-mentioned processes 
apply to Muslim minority settings where, given the absence of institutionalized and 
traditional authorities, fatwas play a key role in the construction of Islamic knowledge.  
On the other hand, when we transcend the media-centric logic and analyze the influence 
of ICT and new media in the broader context of diverse social settings, the results in 
Muslim majority societies appear to be more ambiguous.  Of course we can find many 
examples of challenges to the traditional and established authorities via the Internet in 
the Middle East, like the cases of Iranian scholar Hossein Ali Montazeri (Abdo 2000), 
Saudi Arabian Shaykh Muhammad al-Mohaisany (Bunt 2005) or the Egyptian on-line 
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newspaper Al-Sha’b associated with Hizb al-amal party (Abdel-Latif 2004). Yet these 
examples appear to be isolated and anecdotal in the broader context. Indeed, does this 
“cyber-resistance” pose a challenge to established authorities within Muslim societies?  
As we have seen this does not necessarily mean undermining those authorities in the 
long term.  Apart from increasing possibilities of state control over the content of digital 
media, in the last few years various institutions and formal authorities have started to 
reclaim the public sphere created by ICT and the Internet by setting their own web 
pages and producing their own digital media content.  In the same time the increasing 
penetration of the Internet in the Arab and Muslim world can bolster the economic 
development, as well as increase general public satisfaction and thus favor institutions 
and authorities in an indirect manner (Kalathil & Boas 2003, p. 8).  For example, in her 
research concerning the role of the Internet in Kuwait, Wheeler (2005, p. 187) 
concluded that the local cultural values and politics are aided by global technologies 
used to enhance the place of Islamic conservatism in everyday life.   
 
As I have already noted, the information and communication technology can not have 
any social or political impact apart from its use by human beings (Kalathil & Boas 
2003, p. 2).  Latest research suggests that the dominant modes of use of the Internet in 
the Arab and Muslim world do not differ significantly from its uses elsewhere (Bunt 
2006; Wheeler 2005; Abdulla 2007; Hofheinz 2007).  Bunt (2006, p. 154) even argues 
that the patterns of Internet use constitute mainly of general surfing habits like 
retrieving information about popular culture, reading news, chatting and gaming, 
whereas the access to specific Islamic content represents only a small part of it.  Similar 
examples are to be found in the work of Hofheinz (2007, p. 75), although he suggests 
that religion has a greater weight on the Arab Internet than elsewhere.  The results of 
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comprehensive fieldwork conducted by Abdulla (2007, p. 143) among the students of 
American University in Cairo also concur with past research of different Internet user 
population, indicating five primary motives for using the Internet as information 
seeking, surveillance, entertainment, personal utility, and social interaction.  
 
Several authors have already expressed concern that written content of digital media, 
including the Internet, is not necessarily representative in the relation to Islam and new 
media. For example, Allievi (2003, p. 15) claims that non-written media are more 
pervasive and more consumed than others by Muslim audience.  He argues that current 
Islamic discourse belongs far more to “oral culture” than to written production.  This 
claim pertains particularly to the production of knowledge in the Arab region. As Amin 
and Gher (2000, p. 136) put it 
 
Arabic cultural heritage must be considered when trying to evaluate the 
impact of digital communication in the Arab world. Primary among many 
cultural issues is the fact that the oral tradition is the preferred mode of 
communication among Arabic peoples.86  
 
Moreover, non-written media play an important role in the production of Islamic 
knowledge in the Arab and Muslim world also due to the generally lower literacy rates 
(Boyd 2003, p. 241; UNESCO 2010).  Another important factor which must be taken 
into consideration is the penetration of the Internet and other ICT in the region.  
Although the first has grown considerably in the last few years, as we have shown in the 
Chapter 1, it still remains relatively low in comparison to the Western world, whereas 
                                                 
86 See also Boyd (2003, p. 241). 
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television, video, CD and DVD players pervade much of the society (Amin & Gher 
2000, p. 114; Boyd 2003, p. 252; Internet World Stats 2010).  Alterman (2001) 
presumed that the Middle East’s “mid-tech” revolution – the widespread diffusion of 
1970’s technologies, like videocassettes, photocopiers and satellite television – would 
be more socially and politically consequential than the Internet in the short to medium 
term.  Although today this list should more correspondingly encompass audio cassettes, 
CDs and DVDs, video games, MP3 players and others, the fundamental factors 
determining the importance of these “small media” devices remain the same, i.e. the 
dominant oral culture, low literacy rates, and wide, inexpensive availability.  The latter 
is to a great extent the result of loose or missing copyright enforcement in most Arab 
and Muslim countries (BSA 2007).  Throughout most of the Arab and Muslim world, 
consumers can buy unofficial copies of audio sermons, music, latest movies or video 
games for very low prices in semi-official stores or from a plentiful supply of street 
vendors (like the well known sūq al-sarūja in Damascus or shāri‘a al-shawarbī in 
Cairo).  
 
Most academic research of ICT and the Internet in the Arab and Muslim world is based 
on written materials (mainly websites and blogs) with an emphasis on normative Islamic 
content, e.g. fatwas and lectures.  Other non-written digital media remain profoundly 
understudied, in spite of their arguable social and political impact.  This paradigm 
prevails not only in our preferences and evaluations of primary sources – where 
something that is “written” can be quoted and put into a bibliography, i.e., included in 
the academic rituals – but also in the very way we understand cultural transmission and 
its methods.  As Allievi (2003, p. 15) says, “We often read Islam through the literature it 
produces, and from this we deduce Muslims, using a procedure that appears ‘natural’ to 
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us or which is at any rate habitual for us, whilst it is only ‘cultural’.”  These habitual 
mechanisms have to be taken into account, particularly when it comes to research on 
information and communication technology (ICT) and the new patterns of media 
production and consumption. 
 
In this respect, Ong (1982) coined the term “secondary orality” to describe the tendency 
of electronic media to echo the communication patterns of oral cultures.  His work 
seems especially prescient in light of recent ICT developments, which have enabled new 
forms of audiovisual communication, social networking, and non-written individual 
expression (e.g., video blogging, posting on YouTube, etc.).  In the linguistic and 
cultural context of the Arab world, the notion of oral tradition reveals two important 
facts.  First, given generally lower literacy rates, it has to be taken into account that 
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is not the primary communication mode for most of the 
Arab public.  Nevertheless, at the same time, the written sources studied by Western 
academia are almost exclusively in MSA.  On the contrary, non-written popular media 
are produced in various linguistic modes, usually combining MSA with a local variation 
of colloquial Arabic.  Second, spoken Arabic offers greater space for structural and 
semantic repetition, which ensures both linguistic cohesion and rhetorical force. In the 
Arabic language and the Arab-Islamic cultural tradition, repetition is often used for 
creating rhetorical presence, which enhances the persuasive potential of the discourse 
(Johnstone 1991).  As I will demonstrate below, the concept of orality is significant both 
to Islamic video clips and video games, and particularly to their instructive and 
educational content. 
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Therefore, in this chapter I aim to transcend this written-media centric logic and 
consider how consumer identity and identification are constructed in non-written digital 
media, particularly video games, video clips and other “neglected” digital media 
produced in the contemporary Muslim communities.87  In particular, this chapter 
analyzes contemporary Arab video game production, utilizing the theoretical framework 
of so-called “neglected media”, and explore this media type’s potential in shaping of 
Muslim identities.  First, it defines neglected media and set their production and 
consumption into broader political, cultural, and linguistical context of the Arab world. 
Based on content analysis of more than fifty games and interviews with major game 
producers, I argue that the developing Arab video game industry plays a significant role 
in the reproduction of Islamic culture and could therefore be perceived as one of the 
most cutting-edge conveyors of contemporary Islam.  On a more general level, this 
chapter aims to lay down a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing 
video games from the perspective of information science, communication studies, and 
cultural studies. 
 
 
                                                 
87 Some of the material presented in this chapter appeared as ŠISLER, Vít. 2009. Video Games, Video 
Clips, and Islam: New Media and the Communication of Values. Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass 
Consumption. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009, p. 231–258. ISBN 1443814059; and 
ŠISLER, Vít. 2008. Digital Arabs: Representation in Video Games. European Journal of Cultural 
Studies, 2008, vol. 2, no. 11, p. 203-220. ISSN 1367-5494. 
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3.1   Neglected Media, Youth Culture, and Identity 
 
Reichmuth and Werning (2006, p. 47) introduced an umbrella term “neglected media,” 
which encompasses a broad variety of popular and pervasive media systematically 
omitted by academia. According to their definition 
 
Neglected media exhibit strong popular appeal and economic relevance, 
contrasted by lack of cultural prestige and scientific coverage. Often, they 
have a profound impact on the collective imagination, although this so-
called passive knowledge is seldom accepted as culturally relevant.  
 
Neglected media could include audio clips, video clips, video games, comic strips and 
others. By no means should this list be considered a closed one, for new forms of digital 
media are emerging almost overnight and quickly gaining a broad audience (like videos 
shared on YouTube, podcasting, machinimas, etc.).  In other words, neglected media are 
not defined by any specific form, but rather by their pervasiveness, social relevance, and 
academic marginalization.  For the purpose of Arab and Islamic studies neglected media 
should encompass also audio khutāb (sermons) and lectures, disseminated both offline 
(on audio cassettes, CDs and DVDs) and online (MP3 and video downloads, 
podcasting).  Such lectures are a popular genre in the Arab world and constitute an 
important part of al-islām al-sawtī (voice Islam).  
 
The production and consumption of neglected media have to be analyzed in the broader 
context of youth popular culture.  By the term “youth popular culture,” I mean those 
cultural texts, artifacts, and practices which are attractive to large numbers of people 
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from more recent generations, which are often mass-produced on a global scale (Marsh 
2005).  Popular music, video clips and video games are usually designed with their 
youth consumer base in mind and tend to incorporate and reflect its tastes, imaginations, 
and expectations (Reichmuth & Werning 2006, p. 47).  At the same time, youth culture 
and youth as a social group is of growing importance in the contemporary Arab world.  
According to estimations the region as a whole is very young, with a median age 
slightly below 22 years; over a third of its population is under 15; and only 6% is aged 
60 and over (Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005, p. 564).  The issue of identity construction 
among variant youth subcultures is thus of key importance in understanding the 
dynamics of present and future of the region’s development.   
 
Brown et al. (1994, p. 813) have reflected the role of media in the construction of youth 
identity 
 
Individuals actively and creatively sample available cultural symbols, 
myths, and rituals as they produce their identities. For teens, mass media are 
central to this process because they are a convenient source of cultural 
options. 
 
Other authors correspondingly suggest that new media plays a central role in the 
construction of children’s social identities (Marsh 2005).  Nevertheless, “identity” in 
digital media culture is often understood through acts that dislocate embodied identity 
from the self online and how such a dislocation enables one to enact multiple, 
contradictory identities.  In fact, very few theories of identity in digital media culture 
tackle the ways that virtual identities are deeply connected to the non-digital world 
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(Murphy 2004).  Since the process of individual identity construction is an ongoing 
reflexive process between the individual and the social surroundings, the context, in 
which the above mentioned cultural symbols, myths, and rituals appear, is of paramount 
importance.  Among the most important aspects determining the Arab video game 
production is the local perception of the medium per se as predominantly Western, i.e. 
non-Islamic and in some case even morally “corrupted.” 
 
The alleged impact of popular digital media on Muslim youth and the fact that 
substantial amount of its production is of Western (or more generally, non-Islamic) 
origin constantly concerns many researchers, authorities, and public policy makers in 
the Arab and Muslim world.  For example, some researchers suggest that watching 
satellite television is linked to a desire for materialism and Westernization among 
Egyptian youth, including “the desire to leave the country, to indulge in fast food, and 
to follow the latest in Western style and fashion” (Elewa 1998; Qulaini 1997; both 
quoted from Abdulla 2007, p. 22).  Others argue that contemporary video clips exhibit 
explicit sexuality, commodification of female bodies, and desensitization to violence, 
which corrupts Muslim youth’s moral behavior (Darwish 2007).  By the same token, the 
fact that open access to various forms of new media and particularly the Internet is seen 
by many authorities as a threat to Arab or Muslim culture, values, and traditions, is 
repeatedly confirmed by several researchers (e.g. Amin & Gher 2000; Boyd 2003; 
Abdulla 2007; Mernissi 2006; Wheeler 2005). 
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3.2   Islamic Revival and Consumer Culture 
 
The term “Islamic revival” has been commonly used as an umbrella term, referring to 
various contemporary Islamic movements and their emerging presence in the public 
space in recent decades.  Lapidus (1997) defines “Islamic revival” as both a response to 
the conditions of modernity – to the centralization of state power and the development 
of capitalist economies – and a cultural expression of modernity.  The revivalist 
movements emphasize Islamic values and strive to cope with contemporary problems 
through a renewed commitment to the basic principles, though not the historical details, 
of Islam.  Mahmood (2004) recognizes three important components that make up the 
Islamic revival: state-oriented political groups and parties, militant Islamists, and a 
network of socio-religious, non-profit organizations that provide charitable services to 
the poor and perform the work of proselytizing.  At the same time, she stresses that the 
term refers not only to the activities of state-oriented political groups, but also more 
broadly to a religious ethos or sensibility that has developed within contemporary 
Muslim communities.  According to her, this sensibility manifests itself, among others 
ways, in marked displays of religious sociability, including adoption of the hijāb (veil) 
or brisk consumption and production of religious media and literature.  
 
In this chapter, I use the term “Islamic revival” in its broader sense of Islamization of 
the socio-cultural landscape of media and society. This refers specifically to the 
growing role Islam and Islamic piety play in the public space, which is visible and 
audible through books, music, clothes, and new media (Olsson 2007).  As I have 
mentioned above, most media analyzed within this chapter are targeted to younger 
generations.  Young people, in turn, constitute a large and creative part of the Islamic 
 123 
revival (Abu-Lughod 1998).  They consume new technologies and are innovative, when 
it comes to new political organizations and social movements, including social networks 
enabled by ICT.  Media producers are well aware of this fact and therefore Islamic 
video games and video clips are designed with the youth consumer base in mind and 
tend to incorporate and reflect its tastes, fantasies, and expectations.  Abaza (2005) 
describes similar linkages as “a happy marriage between religion and consumer culture 
in the making” (p. 39).  This phenomenon, which Haenni (2005) calls “market Islam,” 
is by no means limited to the realm of new media. It is also becoming increasingly 
visible in other segments of popular culture as well, such as markets for toys 
(Kuppinger 2009), for women’s fashion, or for rap music (Alim 2005).  The fact that 
culture and religion are increasingly becoming a market issue prevents clear distinction 
of the religious, educational, and economic motivations among media producers – if 
such a thing were ever possible.  As I will demonstrate below, the Islamic new media 
market is open to various subjects with significantly different backgrounds, motivations, 
and agendas. 
 
3.3   Video Games and Video Clips in the Arab world  
 
Video games and video clips stand for emblematic examples of neglected media. Both 
constitute a popular leisure time activity for a substantial part of Arab youth.  At the 
same time, they are increasingly gaining economic and social relevance within the 
fabric of Arab consumer culture.  Helal Saeed Almarri, general director of Dubai World 
Trade Centre, has recently stated that digital gaming has turned out to be a very 
important market in the Arab world, with not only the young population of the region, 
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but also a wider adult audience increasingly investing a higher proportion of its 
disposable income in specialized hardware and software (Fakhruddin 2008).  
 
However, the rising video game culture is not limited to only the wealthy Gulf states.  
The growing emergence of cyber cafés facilitates wide access by consumers in many 
Muslim countries to the latest game industry products (Baune 2005).  As Abdulla 
(2007) reports in her survey, there is currently a huge number of internet cafes in Egypt: 
even in the most rural and poorest areas of the country.  Especially in sha’bī (popular) 
quarters of Arab cities, one can find plenty of specialized cyber cafés dedicated to 
gaming.  They are equipped with networked computers and occupied till late at night by 
a predominantly young, male audience – playing games and socializing around these 
activities.  I have to emphasize that this emerging “gaming culture” is not characterized 
only through playing the games, but through the systems of exchange and discussion 
that surround them; watching and commenting others playing, swapping of software 
and cheats, downloading new games from peer to peer networks, etcetera, i.e. activities 
seen as centrally important aspects of what makes games an important social activity 
(Facer 2003, p. 8).  Thus, the consumption of games is by no means only a passive 
process, but rather it is a dynamic interaction between production and fulfillment of 
expectations, meanings, and messages. 
 
Unlike other audiovisual media, video games immerse consumers into action and 
engagement, rather than inaction and passive reception.  At the same time, they provide 
youngsters with a convenient source of cultural symbols, myths, and rituals as they 
produce their identities.  The question of identity construction is thus central to video 
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games, since they enable a risk-free and socially acceptable way of engaging in a virtual 
body play. As Murphy (2004, p. 224) puts it  
 
One gets to repeatedly ‘do over’ an action or re-live an experience 
infinitely until one has perfected the necessary game skill to advance 
through the game. This play with the virtual body, which we could also 
call an avatar or what gamers call a player-character, is also a play with 
identity.  
 
Conversely, video and audio clips have had a presence in the region for a long time and 
have already established themselves as important conveyors of religious, cultural, and 
political messages.  Anyone who has carried out fieldwork research in the Arab world 
has most likely noticed the overwhelming number of audiocassettes, CDs, DVDs, and 
VCDs with music, movies, lectures, sermons, and other content that are available on 
every street corner.  These media pervade much of society and play an important role in 
the reproduction of culture.  Most popular Islamic lay preachers make sure that their 
lectures are available both in print and in audio format (Olsson 2007, p. 8). 
 
3.4   Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
 
In the last few years a new critical approach towards video games has emerged, largely 
referred to as “game studies,” which places video games in their broader social context 
(Frasca 1999, 2004; Juul 2005; Prensky 2005; Bogost 2006).  Game studies, as a 
relatively new discipline, utilize a large spectrum of research ventures, coming mostly 
from literary and film studies, cultural studies, psychology and computer science 
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(Reichmuth & Werning 2006, p. 46).  Unlike film or other audiovisual media, 
videogames are interactive which implies that any content analysis has to cover three 
intertwined levels: audiovisual signifiers, narrative structure and a game play, which is 
the rule system governing the players’ interaction with the game.  On all these levels, 
cultural, social, or even politically relevant messages can be communicated to the 
players.  The hidden system of rules is particularly important, because it shapes and 
limits the choices and decisions player can make during the game.  Therefore, as Turkle 
(1995) notes, the very process of game-playing can be viewed as learning to understand 
the “rules code.”  In a similar vein, Frasca (2004, p. 21) argues that 
 
Video games not only represent reality, but also model it through 
simulations. This form of representation is based on rules that mimic the 
behavior of the simulated systems. However, unlike narrative authors, 
simulation authors do not represent a particular event, but a set of potential 
events. Because of this, we have to think about their objects as systems 
and consider what laws govern their behaviors.  
 
The interactive element of game play is of crucial importance for the gaming 
experience, yet it poses substantial theoretical and methodological difficulties for 
analysis.  The game rules cannot be described using classical audiovisual methods like 
segmentation into sequences and shot-by-shot analysis.  Several methodological 
approaches exist for the description of non-determinist structures in game narration.  
For this chapter’s purposes I have utilized Finite State Machines and Petri Nets analysis 
for game description (Natkin & Vega 2003; Brom & Abonyi 2006) and segmentation 
and shot-by-shot analysis for video clip description (Vanoye & Goliot-Lété 2001).  
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Bogost (2007, p. vii) suggests that video games are an expressive medium, which 
represent how real and imagined systems work, and invite players to interact with those 
systems and form judgments about them.  Regarding the above-mentioned rule systems, 
Bogost argues that video games open a new domain for persuasion and instruction, 
thanks to their core representational mode, procedurality.  He calls this new form 
“procedural rhetoric” and defines it as the art of persuasion through rule-based 
representations and interactions, rather than the spoken word, writing, images, or 
moving pictures. As Bogost (2007, p. ix) explains 
 
This type of persuasion is tied to the core affordances of the computer: 
computers run processes, they execute calculations and rule-based 
symbolic manipulations. […] Among computer software, I want to suggest 
that videogames have unique persuasive power. […] In addition to 
becoming instrumental tools for institutional goals, video games can also 
disrupt and change fundamental attitudes and beliefs about the world, 
leading to potentially significant long-term social change.  
 
Just as verbal rhetoric is the practice of using oratory persuasively, procedural rhetoric 
is the practice of authoring arguments through computation and execution of processes.  
In the case of video games, the term procedural rhetoric means that the rules of the 
game themselves convey a persuasive message to the player.  Therefore, it is precisely 
the procedural rhetoric of games, which I analyze in the following case studies, drawing 
from FSM and Petri Nets analysis of the game play, description of visual signifiers, and 
accompanying text materials (such as manuals and booklets).  The materials for this 
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research were gathered during fieldwork in Syria (2005), Lebanon (2005), and Egypt 
(2006, 2007-2008).  A significant number of games and clips have been downloaded 
from freely accessible websites, such as You Tube, Islamic Torrents, etc.  The materials 
include more than 300 video games and video clips.  All the European and American 
games were played in English whereas the Arab games were played in Arabic.  
Moreover, during the fieldwork in Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon, I have interviewed 
several key game designers and developers.  These interviews were recorded in Arabic. 
 
As has been mentioned above, video games constitute an important part of the 
entertainment media fabric in the Arab world.  Until recently games of western origin 
have almost exclusively dominated the market. Unsurprisingly, local authorities, 
researchers, and game designers are concerned about the negative influence of western 
games on Arab youth.  For example, an Egyptian psychoanalyst, Dr. Khalil Fadel 
(quoted in Mernissi 2006, p. 121), stated that “games invade our children’s rooms and 
are available in the cyber-cafes which now exist on every street corner.”  According to 
Fadel, games are responsible for inciting violent behavior among Arab youth because 
they glorify “solitude, narcissism, and hatred of the other,” all of which reflect the 
cultural choices of the Westerners who produce them.  By the same token, Kuwaiti 
Imam Nabil Al Awadi criticizes western video games for “corrupting morals.”88  As a 
result, some western games have even been banned in several Arab countries, usually 
                                                 
88 Washington Post: Is There a Video Game War Between Islam & the West? Game Politics, [online]. 
2006, October 9, [cit. 2010-11-14].  Available online: 
<http://www.gamepolitics.com/2006/10/09/washington-post-is-there-a-video-game-war-between-islam-
the-west>. 
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for explicit display of sexuality or violence, as was the case of the game Grand Theft 
Auto: San Andreas (Rockstar Games, Inc. 2004) in the United Arab Emirates.89  
 
Similar criticism of violent video games and their promotion of aggressive behavior is 
regularly voiced in the United States and Europe (Anderson & Bushman 2001).  Yet, 
Western video games are furthermore criticized in the Arab world for misrepresenting 
Islam and Muslims, such as the game Call for Duty.90   
 
In fact, a substantial part of video games take place in the Middle East or anonymous, 
yet overtly Middle Eastern, settings.  The ways in which Western games represent 
Middle East, Arabs and Muslims have been already analyzed by both Western and 
Middle Eastern scholars (Marashi 2001; Reichmuth & Werning 2006).  Generally 
speaking, as I will discuss in the following chapter, these games exhibit very similar 
stereotyping and schematizations already known from other media.  The two dominant 
modes of representation can be labeled as “digital orientalism” and a conflictual 
framework based on current political and military affairs.  Particularly strategy and 
action games (esp. first-person shooters) based on real or fictitious Middle Eastern 
conflicts tend to portray Arabs and Muslims as enemies in the narrative framework of 
fundamentalism and international terrorism.  These games in particular have already 
                                                 
89 GTA IV Banned in UAE. Game Politics, [online]. 2008, May 3, [cit. 2010-11-14]. Available online: 
<http://www.gamepolitics.com/2008/05/03/gta-iv-banned-in-uae>. 
90 Washington Post: Is There a Video Game War Between Islam & the West? Game Politics, [online]. 
2006, October 9, [cit. 2010-11-14].  Available online: 
<http://www.gamepolitics.com/2006/10/09/washington-post-is-there-a-video-game-war-between-islam-
the-west>. 
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raised serious concern among researchers and game designers in the Arab world and 
influenced local game production. 
 
3.5   Representation of Arabs and Muslims in Video Games 
 
The term “representation” refers to the construction of meaning through symbols and 
images.  In the digital age, video games have established themselves as a form of 
mainstream media that shapes our comprehension and understanding of the world by 
constructing, conveying and iterating various representations.  Galloway (2006, p. 71) 
has extended the traditional debates concerning representation into the realm of video 
games, considering “whether images (or language) are a faithful, mimetic mirror of 
reality thereby offering some unmediated truth about the world, or conversely whether 
images are a separate, constructed medium thereby standing apart from the world in a 
separate semantic zone.”  According to Galloway, the discursive of visual or textual 
representation of meaning is no longer sufficient in game studies.  Instead the actions 
and the game world in which they transpire must be analyzed.    
 
In-game representations of Arabs and Muslims have to be contextualized in a broader 
narrative structure that covers Islam as it appears in news and popular media (Said 
1978, 1997; Shaheen 2000; Poole 2006; Wingfield & Karaman 2001; Pintak 2006; 
Karim 2006).  The dominant mode of representation of Arab and Muslim cultures in 
European and American media generally exploit stereotypical generalizations and 
clichés. As Wingfield and Karaman (2001, p. 132) have noted 
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The Arab world – twenty two countries, the locus of several world 
religions, a multitude of ethnic and linguistic groups, and hundreds of 
years of history – is reduced to a few simplistic images. 
 
Nevertheless, in the post 9/11 world bi-polarized rhetoric has intensified in both 
Western and Arab media.  The dichotomy between “us” and “them” helps to reinforce 
simplistic ideas of a collective Self and its hostile Other.  Recent surveys and research 
have revealed some disturbing findings about how the Muslims are being “othered” in 
European and American media  
 
1. The dominant discourses overwhelmingly present most followers 
of Islam as a threat (Karim 2006; Poole 2002; Richardson 2004). 
2. Islam is most likely linked with terrorism (Karim 2006; Miller 
2006; Manning 2006).  
3. The representation of “ordinary Muslims” is marginalized 
(Richardson 2004). 
4. A conflictual framework dominates (Karim 2006; Manning 2006). 
 
Particularly significant among these is the research of Shaheen (1984, 2000, 2001), who 
has studied the manner in which popular culture has projected and reified images of 
Muslim Arabs for more than two decades.  Shaheen presents us with an analysis of 
selected media portraits, paying specific attention to American television programs and 
motion pictures and the impact that these images have on Arab and Muslim identities.  
The stereotypes he has found, he argues (Shaheen 2000, p. 2, 4), can lower self-esteem, 
injure innocents, impact policies, and encourage divisiveness 
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On the screen, the Muslim Arab continues to surface as the threatening 
cultural Other. […]  He/She lacks a human face and lives in a mythical 
kingdom of endless desert dotted with oil wells, tents, run-down mosques, 
palaces, goats, and camels.  
 
Video games, as “cultural artifacts,” presumably don’t stand outside of these broader 
tendencies.  Moreover, they seem to exploit the above-mentioned stereotypes and 
clichés in more apparent manner than other forms of media.  As Reichmuth and 
Werning (2006) have argued, stereotypical representations tend to be reproduced in 
neglected media in more explicit forms partly because these media are considered less 
relevant in cultural discourse and thus less subject to media critique. 
 
At the same time video games possess certain specific, distinguishing features.  Frasca 
(2004, p. 93) suggested that game simulations fundamentally possess the potential for 
developing a tolerant attitude 
 
Unlike narrative, simulations are a kaleidoscopic form of representation 
that can provide us with multiple and alternative points of view.  By 
accepting this paradigm, players can realize that there are many possible 
ways to deal with their personal and social reality.  Hopefully, this might 
lead to the development of a tolerant attitude that accepts multiplicity as 
the rule and not the exception.  
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Thus between the more critical argument of Reichmuth and Werning and the supportive 
outlook of Frasca exists a certain tension: do video games merely reinforce and 
intensify received cultural stereotypes, or do they contain the potential for challenging 
and undermining these stereotypes? 
 
In this chapters I am addressing the apparent discrepancy between the above-mentioned 
statements and argue that although the production of European and American 
mainstream video games exhibit a strong cultural bias when constructing and 
reinforcing stereotypical representations of Arabs and Muslims, the medium possess the 
potentiality to deliver culturally balanced representations.  I will demonstrate this by 
examining iconographical representations of Muslims and Arabs, narrative structures 
and game play in European and American video games.  Furthermore, the Chapter 3.5.4 
analyzes genuine attempts to transcend the simplifying patterns of representation in 
video games which can be found in the emerging genre of so-called “serious games.”  
In this respect the potentialities of simulation, as proposed by Frasca, are investigated in 
practice.  Finally, in the Chapter 3.6, I will examine how these misrepresentations 
directly concern Arab game designers and have influenced local game production.  
Essentially, I will demonstrate how video game creators esteem games introducing 
“their” point of view, but will argue that this Arab and Islamic point of view does not 
necessarily destroy or subvert bi-polar cultural representations.   
 
Research examining ethnic and racial issues in video games is to date relatively sparse 
(Everret 2005; Chan 2005; Leonard 2006).  Everret (2005) has analyzed the ways in 
which video games reinforce, reject, or alter iconographical representations.  Similarly, 
Chan (2005) has suggested that we develop a critical attentiveness to the constituencies 
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of racialized difference and the ways in which these differences are structured and 
represented in game world contexts.  Leonard (2006) has described the so-called 
“emerging military entertainment complex” in the US and the various tropes of 
representing the enemy in war games. 
 
Symbolic and ideological dimensions of in-game representational politics related to 
Arabs and Muslims have been analysed from different perspectives (Machin & 
Suleiman 2006; Marashi 2001; Reichmuth & Werning 2006).  Marashi (2001) has 
introduced the stereotypical modes of representation of Arabs in selected combat video 
games focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Reichmuth and Werning (2006) have 
described the exploitation of Oriental topoi in various genres of western video games.  
Finally, Machin and Suleiman (2006) have compared the discursive of two Arab and 
American war video games, focusing on the ways in which they recontextualize and 
frame real-world events. 
 
3.5.1   Orientalism in the Digital Age 
   
Video games inherently provide a schematized image of the world.  Game characters, 
apart from the heroes who posses background and personality, are often being depicted 
by several distinctive symbols only.  The in-game surroundings and setting are similarly 
frequently rendered by iteration of limited number of textures and schemes.  This also 
applies to the considerable amount of games which adopt Middle Eastern settings in 
quasi-historical or fantasy manner, e.g. Prince of Persia (Broderbund 1989); The Magic 
of Scheherazade (Cultural Brain 1989); Arabian Nights (Krisalis 1993); Al-Qadim: The 
Genie’s Curse (SSI 1994); Beyond Oasis (Sega 1995); Persian Wars (Cryo 2001); 
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Prince of Persia: The Two Thrones (Ubisoft 2005) etc.  Although some of these games 
stand out due to their graphics or plot and are considered milestones within their genre, 
such as Prince of Persia or Al-Qadim, they more or less share the visual and narrative 
features of “Orientalist” imagery. 
 
Said, in his classic work (1978), has analyzed the “Orientalist” discourse of 19th and 
early 20th century which re-creates Islamic society as a timeless and exotic entity.   Fine 
arts and photography which presented the Middle East in a naive and historicizing way 
had, according to Said, served to exclude it from the “modernity” and thus have 
endorsed the patronizing and colonial approach of real politics.  When examining the 
visual signifiers used by the above-mentioned games to create the “Middle Eastern” 
impression, we find very much the same patterns.  These include motifs such as 
headscarves, turbans, scimitars, tiles, and camels, character concepts such as caliphs, 
Bedouins, djinns, belly dancers and Oriental topoi such as deserts, minarets, bazaars, 
and harems.  However, as Reichmuth and Werning (2006, p. 47) have noted, Said’s 
concept that the Western imagination construes the Orient as one ahistorical entity, 
conflating historical fantasies with contemporary reality, is usually not evident in video 
games.  Games portraying a contemporary and a historical/ fantastical Middle East 
constitute separate categories, mostly using different imagery, narrative and game play, 
as we will see below. 
 
Barthes (1982, p. 195) gives a diagnosis of how imitative arts comprise two messages: 
“a denoted message, which is the analogon itself, and a connoted message, which is the 
matter in which the society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it.”  
Unlike the fine arts video games often contain a narrative.  Although this narrative 
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usually serves only as an introduction to a larger “quest,” together with the images and 
game play it shapes the broader connoted message of the game as a whole.  In the 
majority of the model games analyzed in this section the plot begins with the 
kidnapping of a woman (princess, sister, daughter) by an evil character (vizier, caliph, 
demon) and the hero’s in-game raison d’etre is to save her and gain revenge.  (In Al-
Qadim, to the contrary the caliph’s beautiful daughter Kara is a final reward for the 
young hero.)  In Prince of Persia, Arabian Nights and The Magic of Scheherazade the 
hero is unjustly imprisoned in a caliph’s dungeon and his quest is to save himself from 
beheading, in XZR (Renovation Game 1988) he has to assassinate the caliph.  Although 
these narratives are typical for common medieval fantasy settings, such imagery is 
particularly dominant in the frame of reference to the “Middle East,” reinforcing 
stereotypical notions of arbitrary cruelty and barbarism.  
 
As was already mentioned, almost all of these games construct “fantastical” Middle 
East using quasi-historical elements in order to give the player an oriental impression.  
Only a few games concerning Middle East are based on real historical events, e.g. Age 
of Empires 2 (Microsoft 1999) which contains the campaign of Saladin.  This is 
particularly remarkable when compared with the number of European and American 
historical games which usually provide the player with substantial amount of factual 
information.  On the other hand, the narrative of the above-mentioned games evokes 
realm of Thousand and One Nights, constructing Middle East as a place without history.  
This prevalent “Orientalist” mode of representation can thus be perceived as an 
exclusion from constructive discursive, overshadowing the represented contribution to 
contemporary reality.  
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3.5.2   Representation of Enemy 
 
When speaking of the “other,” we may refer to somebody like ourselves, whom we 
identify as “one of us,” a stranger (“one of them”) or even the unknowable other (what 
Lévinas calls autrui).  In the majority of action games (esp. first-person shooters, FPS) 
the point of the game is to kill “others” who typically belong to the category “one of 
them” (Dahlberg 2005). The key question, then, is how the “others” are constructed by 
the game.  
 
The Middle East is a favorite virtual battleground. Action-genre games like War in the 
Gulf (Empire 1993); Delta Force (NovaLogic 1998); Conflict: Desert Storm (SCi 
Games 2002); Full Spectrum Warrior (THQ 2004); Kuma/War (Kuma Reality Games 
2004) and Conflict: Global Terror (SCi Games 2005) take place in the Middle East or 
in ostensibly anonymous yet overtly Middle Eastern settings. 
 
Generally speaking, the player controls American or coalition forces, while enemy units 
are controlled by the computer.  Playing for the other side is typically not allowed.  The 
enemy is depicted by a set of schematized attributes which often refer to Arabs or 
Muslims – head cover, loose clothes, dark skin color. In many cases the in-game 
narrative thereafter links these signifiers to international terrorism and/or Islamist 
extremism.  Delta Force: Land Warrior presents a scenario in which Arabs from 
several countries have banded together into a terrorist organization bent on undermining 
the activities of the United States.  Full Spectrum Warrior is set to a fictional but overtly 
Muslim country of Zekistan, “a haven for terrorists and extremists” (Leonard 2004).  
While the US or coalition soldiers are usually humanized and individualized, e.g. by 
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their nicknames or specific visual characteristics, the enemy is collectivized, and 
linguistically functionalized as “various terrorist groups,” “militants,” and “insurgents” 
(Machin & Suleiman 2006).  At the same time, the moral mission, professionalism, and 
courage of the forces controlled by the player are emphasized by the in-game narrative 
and scripts.  The enemies are on the other hand presented in a way which suggests they 
are not “real” soldiers, which thereby removes legitimacy of their actions (Machin & 
Suleiman 2006, p. 9).  This could be manifested even on the level of the artificial 
intelligence controlling the enemy soldiers via scripts including undisciplined poses, 
shouting and yelling (Full Spectrum Warrior), raising weapons above their heads, 
laughing mockingly after they kill (Delta Force), etc.  Thus the in-game behavior of the 
enemies to some extent exemplifies the concept of “unlawful combatants.”  This is 
reminiscent of what Žižek (2002) has referred to as the Agambenian term of Homo 
sacer, an individual who is foreclosed from the political space proper and whose 
resistance is regarded as criminal act. 
 
Unlike the games already mentioned, the strategy Command & Conquer: Generals 
allows the player to choose from three sides of a fictional conflict: the United States, 
China, and the Arab “Global Liberation Army.”  Again the description of these 
struggling factions is significant: “The United States has powerful and expensive units, 
including well-armed infantry and vehicles that can heal themselves.  Their superior 
intelligence capabilities and flexible air force allow them to strike quickly anywhere on 
the map” (Chick 2003, p. 1).  The Arab Global Liberation Army, on the other hand, is 
distinguished by “terrorists with car bombs and truck bombs, suicide bombers with 
explosives strapped to their bodies, anthrax and biotoxin delivery systems and angry 
mobs of Arabs wielding AK-47s” (ibid).  In such cases, as Greenfield (2004, p. 2) has 
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noted, “the choosing to be ‘enemy’ adds no objectivity, it just makes it harder to win – 
the enemy is still depicted in racist terms.”  
 
Nina Huntemann stated in an interview with Barron (2004) that “9/11 is so culturally 
significant that the games take on a new meaning.”  Apart from a dramatic increase in 
games whose objective is fighting terrorism and combat games set in the Middle East, 
the militarization of the public sphere is a trend that has modified digital entertainment 
as a whole.  Recent studies examine increasing collaborations between the games 
industry and the military in the United States (Li 2004; Leonard 2004; Barron 2004; 
Nieborg 2006).  Video games are being used as a public relations tool for promoting the 
U.S.  Army and recruitment (America’s Army) or as a means of explaining and 
vindicating the “War against Terror” (Kuma/War).  The latter is a FPS action game 
based on real campaigns of the U.S. Army, mainly from the War in Iraq.  New 
downloadable missions are available every month covering recent operations, with Arab 
or Afghani terrorists or insurgents as enemies.  Missions like Spring Break Fallujah 
(2004) and Battle in Sadr City (2005) allow the player to engage in “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.”  Assault on Iran (2005) even anticipated America’s potential further 
engagement by carefully changing the depiction of enemies to Iranians.   
 
When a game is set in a particular Middle Eastern country and based on real conflict, 
the re-telling of the narrative inevitably reshapes its comprehension and evaluation, 
schematizing complex political relations into a bi-polar frame.  Huntemann (quoted in 
Barron 2004) compares similar games with the Why We Fight war films made by 
Hollywood directors in the 1940s but comments that the interactive character of the 
video games medium makes the game’s message more like How We Fight.  She noted 
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that such games are provided with an overwhelming load of technical information about 
weaponry and technology of war but fail in providing background for the deeper 
understanding of the conflict and its outcome.  Similar opinion has been expressed by Li 
(2004, p. 118) in his analysis of America’s Army 
 
The ergodic virtual representation of war in video games engages the 
public in a participative mimesis within the confines of instrumental media 
system, so thereby detaching it from actual communicative reasoning. 
 
Therefore, the militarization of video game trope, having reinforced the bi-polar frame 
of the good Self and the evil Other, obviates any further explanation of the reasons for 
the conflict. 
 
3.5.3   Introducing the Other 
   
If there is one example that constitutes an attempt to challenge this broader pattern – 
matching in particular Frasca’s claims concerning simulation – it is surely Sid Meier’s 
Civilization series (1991 – 2006).  The famous strategy games allow players to act on 
the part of various civilizations and engage in building cities, establishing trade routes 
and interacting with others on a diplomatic or military basis through thousands of years 
of virtual history.  Each civilization has its own unique traits and all are presented in a 
very culturally-sensitive way.  The balanced game play allows the player to choose any 
side and generally rewards cooperation. Civilization 3: Conquests (Atari 2003) has 
introduced historical Middle Eastern scenario, being one of the few exceptions 
mentioned above.  The game is equipped with an encyclopedia containing a substantial 
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amount of historical, ethnographical and cultural information.  In the words of 
McKenzie (2004, p. 69) “Sid Meier turns history and anthropology books into strategy 
game.”  The in-game description of many features of Islamic civilization is unique for 
its correctness and sensitivity, e.g. the description of Jihad.91  The same sensitivity 
applies to the selection of the representative figure for game diplomacy: the first caliph 
Abu Bakr and not the prophet Muhammad, whose depiction in a video game would be a 
considerably delicate subject.  
 
On the other hand, the ideological frame of Civilization has been challenged by 
Friedman (1999).  He argues that the game proposes imperialism by rewarding violent 
exploration and expansion.  The Civilization series have evolved considerably from the 
time of Friedman’s essay and the game play has been changed in favor of cooperation 
and nonmilitary approach.  Moreover, simulations intrinsically transcode historical 
realities into specific mathematical models and make any axiological judgments 
problematic.  As Galloway (2006, p. 103) has noted 
 
“History” in Civilization is precisely the opposite of history, not because 
the game fetishizes the imperial perspective, but because the diachronic 
details of lived life are replaced by the synchronic homogeneity of code 
pure and simple. 
 
To relate this broader observation to our topic we can conclude that despite the possible 
contradictions in the ideological frame of Civilization, the game is one of the few 
                                                 
91 Civilization III: Play the World [online]. [cit. 2010-4-25]. Available online: 
<http://www.civ3.com/ptw_prof_arab.cfm>. 
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exceptions in which Arabs and Muslims are not functionalized as enemies nor depicted 
in Orientalist manner but constitute a possible representation of the player’s Self. 
 
3.5.4   Serious Games 
 
Finally, the European and American attempts to transcend the culturally biased 
representations should be mentioned.  Most of them can be found in the emerging media 
of so called “serious games.”  The term refers to games with an agenda, whose aim is 
not only to entertain but also to deliver some message to the audience.  In the context of 
racial stereotypes related to Arabs and Muslims three serious games are worth 
mentioning. Real Lives (Educational Simulations 2004) is a life simulator which gives 
the player an opportunity to “grow up” and “live” in almost any country in the world.92  
Global Conflicts: Palestine (Serious Games 2007) puts the player into the role of a 
journalist who has just arrived to Palestine and whose task is to write an unbiased article 
about the unfolding events.93  PeaceMaker (ImpactGames 2007) is a strategy game 
which allows the player to be Israeli Prime Minister or Palestinian President while his 
task is to establish peaceful and stable solution to the conflict.94  
 
In these games a culturally balanced representation is central to the design in most of 
the terms analyzed in this chapter, i.e. visual signifiers, narrative, and game play.  These 
games are meant as educational tools and provide additional materials for students and 
teachers.  In Global Conflicts: Palestine the game characters, both Arabs and Israelis, 
                                                 
92 Educational Simulations [online]. [cit. 2010-4-25]. Available online: 
<http://www.educationalsimulations.com>. 
93 Global Conflicts [online]. [cit. 2010-4-25]. Available online: <http://www.globalconflicts.eu>. 
94 Peace Maker [online]. [cit. 2010-4-25]. Available online: <http://www.peacemakergame.com>. 
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are individualized by distinctive graphical features and humanized by their background 
stories, presented to the player via textual interface.  As a journalist, the player of 
Global Conflicts gains information by talking to locals, e.g. a Palestinian imam, an 
Israeli soldier, a Palestinian mother of a martyr, or an Israeli teenager.  Communication 
is central to game play and constitutes the only action the player can perform.  The 
reality in the game is constructed through personal memories, whose presentation to the 
player varies according to the relationship he has maintained with the particular speaker.  
This is reminiscent of Bruner’s (2003) notion of narrative reality construction and its 
negotiability.  Moreover, by choosing the role of a journalist – whose perception of 
events is mediated by subjective testimonies – as the representation of player’s virtual 
self, the authors immerse the player in this negotiability and allow him to explore it in a 
particular conflict.  In the realm of video games, Global Conflicts is unique in 
constantly contesting the reality it creates, utilizing the persuasive power of the media 
for a critique of its own authenticity.  In other words, Global Conflicts engages player in 
the game’s reality construction, making a meta-commentary on the instantiation of an 
event and its media re-creation. 
 
PeaceMaker, on the other hand, is a strategy game in which the player acts as Israeli 
Prime Minister or Palestinian President and needs to establish a peaceful solution to the 
conflict.  The game play of PeaceMaker is based on the feedback from player’s 
counterpart and representation and introduction of the other is thus a key element of the 
game.  Compared to the hyper-realistic, computer-generated imagery of the action 
games mentioned above, PeaceMaker utilizes only still photos and news-like articles 
for in-game events.  Yet, as Adams (2007) notes, it succeeds in giving a realistic 
impression 
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There’s no animation in PeaceMaker, nothing cute, nothing that someone 
can dismiss as ‘only a game.’ When a missile strike goes awry, or a suicide 
bomber strikes, the blood and bodies you see on the screen are those of real 
people. More than any other game I’ve ever played, PeaceMaker portrays 
the truth – or a subset of it – both the good and the bad. 
 
The veracity of images extends itself to the perception of the whole game as portraying 
“the truth,” although in this case as a serious learning tool.  The reality constructed by 
PeaceMaker introduces an important novel aspect in the domain of procedurality: 
asymmetric game play. The Israeli side has direct control over those issues that most 
strongly affect the Palestinians: curfews, border controls, and trade restrictions, and the 
Israeli PM can send or withdraw his armies at will, bulldoze Palestinian homes, or order 
missile strikes.  Yet he can also, after suitable diplomatic maneuvering, invest in 
Palestinian reconstruction and infrastructure.  The Palestinian President, by contrast, has 
very limited powers and has to beg for just about everything: money from the world 
community for domestic projects and security concessions from the Israelis (Adams 
2007).  By subverting one of the fundamental rules of strategy games – the balance of 
both sides – PeaceMaker and its procedural forms re-create the actuality of the real-life 
conflict perhaps better than most more technically advanced mainstream video games.  
 
Given the relative novelty of these games, a proper consumption study is not yet 
available, but preliminary results from implementation of Global Conflicts: Palestine in 
Danish high schools are promising (Egenfeldt-Nielsen & Buch 2006).  Although serious 
games can presumably expand their influence in the realm of digital entertainment and 
 145 
contribute to subvert the dominant stereotypes of ethnical representation, their impact 
on the mainstream game production cannot be overestimated. 
 
3.5.5   Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has explored stereotypical representations of Muslims and Arabs in 
European and American video games on three different levels – iconographical, 
narrative, and game play, i.e. the rule system governing the player's interaction with the 
game.  
 
First general observation on its underlying logic is that the mode of representation 
seems to depend to a great extent on the genre of the game.  Adventure and role-playing 
games typically portray the Middle East in fantasy or quasi-historical manner, 
exploiting what Said calls “Orientalist” imagery, whereas action games and especially 
first-person shooters present the Middle East in a contemporary and decidedly 
conflictual framework, schematizing Arabs and Muslims as enemies.  The latter exhibit 
strong cultural bias on a variety of levels and particularly demonstrate Reichmuth’s and 
Werning’s concept of “neglected media.”  The reason for this dependency is closely 
connected to the question of stereotyping and schematization in video games itself and 
lies in the linkage between production and consumption.  Since video games are usually 
produced with their consumer base in mind, they tend to incorporate and reflect general 
imaginations of the Arab Muslim world which prevail among Western public as well as 
audience’s expectations regarding particular genres.  The producers logically “intend on 
maximizing revenue and implement their own assumptions of their audience's tastes, 
expectations, and consumption habits” (Reichmuth & 
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the highly competitive nature of the game market together with high production costs 
reinforces the iteration of proved and successful patterns in game genres and content 
(several commercially successful games laid down frameworks which have dominated 
the market for years, e.g. DOOM, ID Software 1993; or Dune 2, Westwood 1992). 
 
In this respect the media analysis of Karim (2006) is worth mentioning, with his 
findings that “the more closely a journalist report reproduces the common stereotypes of 
a particular people, the greater the likelihood that it will be highlighted in a newspaper.”  
As I have shown, similar logic seems to determine the tropes of representation in video 
games. 
 
Second, although in this chapter I have been using the term Arabs and Muslims, in the 
vast majority of European and American games the diverse ethnic and religious 
identities of the Islamic world have been flattened out and reconstructed into a 
monolithic representation.   Although this corresponds to the broader tendencies of 
reporting on Islam and the Middle East in Western media (Karim 2003; Poole 2002), in 
video games this simplification and schematization seems to be even more prevalent.  
Apart from missing academic reflection and media critique the reason could be also 
technological.  As was previously mentioned the non-player characters are often 
depicted by a limited number of reiterating textures, models, and other visual signifiers.  
The technological limitations thus intrinsically promote schematization which leads to 
social stereotyping. 
 
Today we are in crucial need of critically understanding the symbolic and ideological 
dimensions of in-game representational politics. Obviously no single factor leads to 
stereotyping. As Shaheen (2000, p. 11) pointed out: “Undeniably ignorance continues to 
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be a contributing factor.”  The most dangerous effect of stereotyping is that the negative 
images are sometimes perceived as real portrayal of the other culture.  This applies 
mainly in the absence of positive ethnic images, particularly when these 
schematizations remain unchallenged.   
 
3.6   Self-representation of Arabs and Muslims in Video Games 
 
The production of video games in the Arab is in the early days of its development. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong notion among game designers that Arabs and Muslims 
are being misrepresented and that their image is being distorted by Western production.  
Radwan Kasmiya (quoted in Roumani 2006), the executive manager of the Syrian 
company Afkar Media says 
 
Most video games on the market are anti-Arab and anti-Islam.  Arab 
gamers are playing games that attack their culture, their beliefs, and their 
way of life. The youth who are playing the foreign games are feeling guilt.  
 
Similar concern has been expressed by the Central Internet Bureau of Lebanese 
Hezbollah movement 
 
The problem behind video games is that most of them are foreign made, 
especially American.  Therefore, they bear enormous false 
understandings and habituate teenagers to violence, hatred and grudges.  
In addition, some enfolds humiliation to many of our Islamic and Arab 
countries, where battles are running in these Arab countries, the dead are 
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Arab soldiers, whereas the hero who kills them is – the player himself – 
an American. 95 
 
Consequently, this concern has resulted in many attempts to craft video games which 
would reflect Middle Eastern reality with more historical, cultural and religious 
relevance.  Thus the appropriation of originally Western media of video games has been 
from the beginning engaged.  Video games have not been perceived as neutral 
containers by the Arab and Muslim producers and they mostly do not utilize them as 
such.  Arguably the first game with a specific “Islamic” content was Rumāh al-hijāra 
(Stone Throwers) created by Syrian student of medicine Muhammad Hamza in 2000.  A 
technically very simple game deals with the Intifada Al-Aqsa and puts a player into the 
role of a Palestinian defending the Al-Aqsa Mosque from Israeli soldiers.  
 
The Arab game production has developed and significantly polarized from the time of 
Stone Throwers, bringing various concepts and interpretations of Islam, Islamic culture, 
and Muslim identity into the realm of digital entertainment.  In the following case 
studies I will briefly introduce the key recent distinctive approaches towards the 
articulation of Arab and Muslim identity in video games. 
 
Essentially, given the above-mentioned misrepresentation of Arabs and Muslims in 
mainstream Western video games, there has been an urge to present Arab youth with 
alternative games, which would reflect their culture and religion in a more appropriate 
way.  As such, the emerging Arab video game industry has been engaged from its very 
                                                 
95 Special Force [online]. [cit. 2005-3-30]. Available online: 
<http://www.specialforce.net/english/indexeng.htm>. 
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beginning, perceiving games not as neutral containers but as a medium communicating 
significant cultural, political and religious messages to youth.  Beyond first-person 
shooter games based on real conflicts with Israel in Palestine and Lebanon, which 
provide Arab youth with heroes of their own and retell the story of the conflicts from 
the Arab perspective (Tawil-Souri 2007), a large number of educational games appeared 
on the market, aimed at teaching the basic tenets of Islam, the history of Islamic 
civilization, or promoting “positive and family values” as opposed to the perceived 
depravity and violence of Western mainstream games. 
 
3.6.1   Video Games, Education, and the Communication of Values 
 
As Piaget (1962) and Vygotsky (1978) have argued, play is a crucial method through 
which we test ideas, develop new skills, and participate in new social roles.  In this 
respect early video games raised various expectations about their educational value.  
Given the fact that motivation is regarded to be a key aspect of effective learning, the 
popularity of games among younger generations has inspired many educators.  Indeed 
early research on arcade-style games has demonstrated that games create intrinsic 
motivation through fantasy, control, challenge, curiosity, and competition (Malone 
1981; Cordova & Lepper 1996). 
 
Soon early video games were appropriated by private companies operating within the 
framework of various religious traditions.  As Campbell (2010) notes, the key focus 
within early religiously-inspired video games was to entertain while teaching players 
about important aspects of their religion and culture.  The history of religious video 
games dates back to the late 1980s when the company Wisdom Tree started to develop 
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Christian games for the Nintendo Entertainment System (Bogost 2007, p. 287).  Perhaps 
the most successful of these was the Bible Adventures (Wisdom Tree 1991), recreating 
three Bible stories: Noah and the Ark, the story of the baby Moses, and David and 
Goliath.  Recently another prominent Christian game appeared on the market, the real-
time strategy game Eternal Forces: Left Behind (Inspired Media Entertainment 2006), 
based on a popular book series and dealing with the final confrontation of believers with 
the forces of the Antichrist.  Similar examples of religious edutainment can be found 
also in Judaism, such as The Shivah (Manifesto Games 2006), an adventure game in 
which a Rabbi must solve the mystery behind a monetary gift made to his congregation 
in order to make sure that it has not been cursed (Campbell 2010). 
 
Regarding the procedural rhetoric of religious video games, Bogost (2007, p. 287) 
argues that recent movements in the video game industry have utilized procedural 
rhetoric mainly in order to create games supporting existing social and cultural 
positions, including stable moral systems and organized religion.  To a large extent this 
is the case of most educational video games with an Islamic emphasis, as I demonstrate 
below, although distinctive exceptions exist. 
 
3.6.2   Islamic Edutainment 
 
The majority of educational games with an Islamic emphasis fall into the category of 
so-called edutainment (i.e. educational entertainment).  Most edutainment products are 
designed according to a behaviorist paradigm, exposing players to educational content, 
testing them (via quizzes and puzzles), and finally allowing them to play the game as a 
reward.  Nevertheless, despite their simplicity, the Islamic edutainment games seem to 
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be quite successful economically, at least from their increasing presence in the market.  
Their marketing strategies usually target parents, offering them “safe” entertainment for 
their children, more or less connected with education on the basic tenets of Islam. The 
following advertisement by the US-based company Islam Games represents a generic 
example 
 
Our goal is to provide you with quality, Islamic entertainment for both you 
and your children. Thanks to high levels of interaction, video games are 
actually a great learning tool. Yet, unfortunately, many games available on 
the market address issues contrary to the teachings of Islam. This results in 
our children tending to identify with secular values and concepts more 
than with those of Islam. By providing an alternative to mainstream video 
games, we can help our children, in a subtle way, learn to identify with 
Islamic values, and thereby become more closely attuned to the teachings 
of Islam.96 
 
Significantly, the first educational games that introduced Islamic moral values into the 
realm of virtual entertainment appeared in the West and were designed in English.  A 
parallel is to be found in the first Islamic websites, designed and managed by Muslim 
students in Europe and the United States (Hofheinz 2007). 
 
To date Islam Games has produced four games (Arabic Letter Bazaar, Maze of Destiny, 
Ummah Defense I and II).  In most of them children learn about Islam through simple 
puzzles and quests, like putting together al-fātiha from Arabic letters or memorizing the 
                                                 
96 Islam Games [online]. [cit. 2005-6-20]. Available online: <http://www.islamgames.com>. 
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verses from Qur‘ān.  The most famous game by Islam Games is undoubtedly the 
Ummah Defense, particularly because it has been accused of spreading religious hatred 
by Thomas Friedman in New York Times (Friedman 2005).97  
 
Similar examples of Islamic educational games can be found in Islamic Fun CD 
(Innovative Minds 1999).  The authors advertise the game as follows: “Your child will 
learn about Islam by playing lots of exciting games full of colorful animations and cute 
sound effects.”98  Islamic Fun CD contains a compilation of short puzzles and quizzes 
teaching children the basic tenets of Islam, suwar (chapters of the Qur‘ān) and ahādīth 
(deeds and sayings of the prophet).  The set also contains controversial game The 
Resistance in which the player represents “a farmer in South Lebanon who has joined 
the Islamic Resistance to defend [his] land and family from the invading zionists.”99  
Again, as was the case with Ummah Defense, Islamic Fun has provoked many critical 
reactions in the Western media.  For example, Spencer (2002) argued that Islamic Fun 
“instills ancient Islamic resentments in today’s youth.”  The reason for this was not only 
the controversial game The Resistance (clearly referring to the Lebanese Hezbollah 
movement) but also some quotations in other puzzle games, like the presentation of 
                                                 
97 Ummah Defense is a very simple action game dealing with a fight against evil robots that attack the 
Earth. The introductory message, which started the previously mentioned alarmed reaction, says that in 
the distant future all of humankind will embrace Islam (whereas the attacking robots are labeled as 
“unbelievers”). The game has surely an ideological implicit meaning but not much more than the usual 
Western action games, in which the united Earth of the future is depicted clearly as today’s Euro-
American civilization. 
98 Islamic Fun CD [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: <http://www.inminds.co.uk/islamic-
fun.html>. 
99
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Mustafa Kemal as “a hater of Islam, [who] forbade the use of Arabic in Turkey, banned 
the hijab and closed down the Aya Sofya Mosque in Istanbul.”100  The webpage of 
Innovative Minds is registered in the city of Crawley in the UK and apparently has a 
shia background, which can be found e.g. in their latest game Lion of Allah, whose 
purpose is to: “learn about the life, courage and wisdom of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib 
(AS).”101 
 
A typical product of Islamic edutainment are CDs and DVDs, with a set of simple 
games, puzzles, and quizzes, aimed at teaching the hadith (sayings and deeds of the 
prophet Muhammad), verses of the Qur‘an, prescriptions for ritual ablution and prayer, 
etc.  Besides games, they often contain short, animated video clips with educational or 
moral messages, e.g., Syrian educational CD Ta‘līm al-salawāt.  The video clips follow 
a typified narrative structure, usually exposing the main character to a temptation that 
he or she overcomes with the help of the teaching of Islam.  In the end the reference to 
the corresponding hadith or Quranic verse is included.  Other educational products (e.g., 
Egyptian Arkān al-Islām) simply instruct children how to behave in particular 
situations, like giving thanks before meals, proper Islamic greetings, etc.  If a game is 
intended to communicate Muslim values to the player, it reflects the same patterns using 
basic interactive elements, like choosing the right (sahīh) scenario from among various 
options (Egyptian game Al-Muslim al-saghīr), putting together Quranic verses from 
Arabic letters, or adventure games focused on searching for collections of hadith (i.e., 
the U.K. game Abu Isas, Quest for Knowledge, Abu Isas Games 2006).  In this respect 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
101 Fun Learn: Islamic Game Series [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://www.inminds.co.uk/fun-learn.html>. 
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these Islamic educational games somehow resemble popular TV shows, in which 
children compete in their knowledge about religion, as described by Kawakibi (2007). 
  
Close examination of the above-mentioned advertisement by the company Islam Games 
reveals that the text is in fact marketing two different things to parents.  First, the 
obvious Islamic educational content, and second, the educational potential of video 
games per se.  In most cases, however, the game and the educational content constitute 
two separate elements.  Oftentimes, an educational video clip is followed by a classic 
video game without any Islamic emphasis, serving only as a possible reward and 
motivating factor for the children (e.g., Egyptian al-Mughāmirūn).  Given the high 
popularity of video games among youth, they are often used for promotional purposes 
(Šisler 2005).  In 2007, a number of U.S. churches used the commercially successful, 
first-person shooter game Halo 3 for so-called LAN parties to attract young to people to 
the church.102  A similar strategy, i.e., including games on their websites, was 
recommended to internet evangelists.103  Many Islamic websites dedicated to da‘wa 
(invitation to Islam) have been actually using the same concept for years – e.g., 
NetMuslims.com.  In this context, the games themselves have no educational or 
proselytizing content – they are purely fun and a vehicle for peaking interest in the web-
page content.  In some cases, the economic motives behind the production of so-called 
                                                 
102 Thou Shalt Not Kill, Except in a Popular Video Game at Church. The New York Times [online]. 7 
October 2007 [cit. 2010-9-21]. Available online: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/us/07halo.html?_r=1>. 
103 “By offering a range of fun games to play, an evangelistic website can become more sticky – i.e. 
encourage return visits and enhance the perceived value of the site. In this context, the games themselves 
have no evangelistic content—they are purely ethical fun.” GospelCom [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. 
Available online: <http://guide.gospelcom.net/resources/games.php>. 
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“Islamic” games seem to be more relevant than the religious ones.  For instance, the 
U.K. game Abu Isa’s A New Dawn: Learn Asma-ul-Husna (Abu Isas Games 2006) is a 
classic action game that places the player in the role of spaceship pilot and is allegedly 
aimed at the teaching of Asmā al-Husnā (The 99 Most Beautiful Names of God).  As 
the package labeling says: “Battle your way through enemy planets while learning the 
names and attributes of your Creator.”  The educational aspect of the game manifests 
itself only via the display of a random Name of God on the screen every time the player 
scores. 
 
In this regard, Bogost (2007, p. 291) argues that many of the religious video games 
address the consumption of religion as much as, or perhaps more than, the principles of 
religion.  As such, these games offer not only a poignant commentary on the general 
function of religion in the marketplace but also a deeper insight into the emerging 
Muslim consumption culture and its relation to global consumerism.  As Haenni (2009) 
describes it, this growing Muslim consumption culture appropriates global brands and 
products and refashions them along the lines of Islamic, halāl principles.  This 
commercialization of religion – or the Islamization of commerce – therefore becomes 
an important cultural, religious or even political tool:  mirroring the relationship with 
the West; mirroring, above all, Muslim societies’ views of themselves, as well as the 
identity transformations that affect them (p. 329). 
 
Despite the fact that markets in many Arab cities seem to be flooded by such Islamic 
edutainment products and a substantial number of these are produced also by American 
and European companies, recent research suggests that the high expectations that early 
edutainment would enhance learning have not been achieved.  The reasons mentioned in 
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this regard are that such tools were poorly designed, simplistic, repetitious, and did not 
allow players any active exploration opportunities (Egenfeldt-Nielsen 2005).  Moreover, 
simple games and animated video clips seem to satisfy mainly younger kids (6-10 years 
old).  For older audiences, these games pale in technological and conceptual comparison 
with mainstream game production.  As a reviewer noted about the Islamic educational 
game Maze of Destiny, produced by Islam Games: “Not at all what we expected, far too 
boring for children by today’s gaming standards” (Samina Saeed).104  Similar 
observations have been made regarding edutainment products in general – simple 
educational games do not easily attract teenagers (Egenfeldt-Nielsen 2005). 
 
3.6.3   Replaying the History of Islam 
 
Pink (2009, p. xvii) has argued, that educational media, including video games, that 
communicate religious values and try to appeal to adolescent and adult audiences, have 
to be conceptually and technologically as up-to-date as their non-religious counterparts 
in order to successfully achieve their educational goals.  By the same token, McDonnell 
(1993, p. 98) stated that  
 
Education, including religious education, has on the whole been 
comfortable with the language of print and the logical, sequential mode of 
thinking that print favors.  Now, religious education has to find ways to 
                                                 
104 Simply Islam [online]. [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: 
<http://simplyislam.com/iteminfo.asp?item=54854>. 
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understand and appreciate the non-linear, associative mode of making 
sense of the world.  
 
These observations relate noticeably to the afore-mentioned Islamic edutainment 
products, which do not really utilize the fundamental features of video games – i.e. 
interactivity, immersion and exploration.  The recent trends in using video games for 
learning and education stray from the digital game-based learning paradigm (DGBL).  
The idea of DGBL has been around for more than three decades (Coleman 1971), but it 
got its second wind with the recent information technology and Internet boom.  Most 
full-fledged video games differ from basic edutainment games in two aspects.  First, 
they immerse players in complex and rich environments, allow them to explore 
numerous strategies for action and decision, and require them to complete demanding 
tasks with increasingly difficult objectives (de Freitas 2006).  Second, at least some full-
fledged video games, most notably strategy games, are actually based on well-
developed, sound theories of learning in order to engage players and instruct them how 
to play and win the game (Gee 2007).  Many suggest that by situating players in these 
games’ worlds, where they can freely move and act, the games can promote problem-
solving, goal-oriented behavior, engagement and motivation (Gee 2007; de Freitas 
2006; Squire 2005).  Generally, it seems that full-fledged video games could be 
particularly useful for generating a deeper understanding of certain key principles of 
given topics: mainly when dealing with complicated and multifaceted issues, which are 
hard to comprehend through factual knowledge only. 
 
Among the first full-fledged video games published in the Arab world, conceived with 
an educational purpose in mind, was Prophet’s War (Future Soft n.d.), a strategy game 
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aimed at teaching players the early history of Islam by situating them in virtual re-
enactments of key historical battles between Muslims and pagan Arab tribes. As the 
description of the game states 
 
In the application The Prophet’s War you will witness in detail the events of 
the Islamic conquest (Badr, Uhud, Khandaq) and see how the Prophet 
(peace be upon him) and his Companions dealt with them. You’ll explore 
the style of war, tactics, and maneuvers of the Messenger of God during the 
fights between Muslim soldiers and the idolaters. You will witness how it 
was possible for the Prophet to lead his soldiers to victory and to the 
establishment of the Islamic state through interactive animations and audio 
explanations. By these means the places of the battles will be re-created and 
you will become a member of the Muslim forces. You will be excited about 
their zeal as you will stand among them to hear the verses of God and the 
words of the Prophet. 
 
Although the game’s graphics pale in comparison with its mainstream counterparts, for 
the first time it offered Arab players a Muslim hero and real historical scenarios 
reconstructed primarily according to Islamic historiography, such as Ibn Ishāq’s Al-Sīra 
al-nabawīya.  In contrast to the above-mentioned Islamic edutainment, this game 
utilizes the full potential of the video game medium by situating the player inside a 
virtual and interactive reconstruction of real historical events.  In this regard, Malone 
(1981) distinguishes two main categories of learning games: intrinsic and extrinsic.  In 
an intrinsic game, Malone argues, the content is an integral part of the game structure.  
A typical example of an intrinsic game is for example a flight simulation game, where 
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the game itself is about flying a plane, or Sim City, where players learn the rules of 
urban development by trying and succeeding or failing.  Extrinsic games, on the other 
hand, are games where the content and the game structure are less closely linked, or not 
linked at all.  The paradigm here is the question or trivia game, where the questions can 
be about any subject, but the game remains essentially the same (Prensky 2005, p. 115).  
As we have demonstrated above, most Islamic edutainment games fall into this 
category, using questions about the basic tenets of Islam as a mechanism for progress in 
a separate video game.  On the contrary, Prophet’s Wars is one of the first examples of 
an Islamic educational game that meets the criteria of Malone’s (1981) intrinsic learning 
game – through integrating the tactics and strategic decisions made by the Prophet into 
its game structure. 
 
Probably the most-developed intrinsic educational game with an Islamic emphasis is 
Quraish, created by the Syrian company, Afkar Media.  Similarly to Prophet’s Wars 
this real-time strategy game deals with the origin and spread of Islam, as well as the pre-
Islamic Bedouin wars and the early Islamic conquests (al-futūhāt al-islāmīya). Its 
author Radwan Kasmiya describes the game as follows 
 
Quraish sheds light on luminous pages of the Arab and Islamic history in a 
new and indirect method.  It attempts to liberate reason in a world of 
amusement dominated by instinct.  It simply tries to turn amusement into 
constructive rather than destructive industry. [...]  We have tried to give 
replies to plenty of questions through Quraish, such as whether Muslims 
were the same as other invaders who crossed the path of the world?  What 
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gives them distinction over others? How could they defeat the greatest two 
empires in the world?105  
 
Radwan Kasmiya strongly believes in the educational potential of video games.106 In 
Quraish, published both in English and Arabic, his aim was to challenge the 
misconceptions of the West about Islam, as well as educate Muslim youth in Islamic 
history. According to him young Muslims “do not read anymore” so new ideas about 
how to approach them are needed. In the same time he wants to reestablish a “digital 
dignity” of Islamic civilization, which he perceives as being distorted by Western 
media.107  In his rather ambitious mission video games are perceived as cutting edge 
technology for cultural dialogue, conveying different points of view and enabling the 
exchange of ideas.  Quraish is his most distinctive attempt in this respect to date, and 
differs significantly from his previous games (see below). 
 
The game is a clear appropriation of the real-time strategy genre as established by Dune 
2 but cultural distinctions can be traced on all three levels relevant from the point of 
content analysis, i.e. visual signifiers, narrative and game play.  Although the game 
theoretically allows the player to control four different nations – pagan Bedouins, 
Muslim Arabs, Zoroastrian Persians and Christian Romans – the main campaigns can be 
played only through the perspective of a Bedouin chieftain Hani, or Muslim general 
Khālid Ibn al-Walīd. The campaigns cover all the main military affairs of pre-Islamic 
                                                 
105 Quraish User Manual (2007, p. 7). 
106 Personal communication with Radwan Kasmiya, Damascus, May 2005. 
107 Ibid. 
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Arabia and the early Muslim state, i.e. al-jāhilīya (First Encounter), al-ridda (Apostasy 
Wars), futūh bilād fāris (Conquer of Persia) and futūh bilād al-shām (Conquer of Syria).  
 
The narrative of the game is based on classical Islamic historiography, like the opening 
scene which is built on Muhammad Ibn Ishāq’s description of the Battle of Trench 
(ghazwat al-khandaq), taken from sīrat rasūl allāh (Life of Allah’s Messenger).108  
Quraish in particular meets the above-mentioned Amin and Gher’s (2000) claim of 
Arab oral culture heritage, as every mission starts with unusually long and well-
developed introductory story narrated in classical Arabic.  Through those introductions 
many concepts of pre-Islamic Arab culture and early Islamic history are communicated 
to the player, e.g. sharaf and ‘ird (Bedouin honor codes), thar (lex talionis), or murūwa 
(manliness).  During the particular missions the player takes part in many real historical 
events, e.g. the war between Ghassanids and Lakhmids, and visits places like Hira, 
Ukaz, or Medina, which topographies seem to be based on available historical 
descriptions. 
 
The same cultural sensitivity is manifested on the visual level.  Although the game 
covers the most important period in the history of Islam, the prophet Muhammad, 
whose depiction would be a highly delicate matter, is present in the game only through 
memories and dialogues with his companions.  This approach is in a way somehow 
similar to the one which the authors of the movie Al-Risāla (The Message, 1976) have 
chosen.  At the same time, the “ordinary” visual signifiers, like the Bedouin tents, 
                                                 
108 Sīrat Rasūl Allāh is a traditional Muslim biography of the prophet Muhammad compiled by 
Muhammad Ibn Ishāq (Medina 85 A.H. - Bagdad 151 A.H.). It survives mainly in the later editions of Ibn 
Hishām and al-Tabarī. 
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clothes and facilities have been arguably designed with respect to their historical 
function and presumed outlook.109 
 
As has been mentioned above, video games as an interactive medium possess some 
fundamental features which cannot be described using classical audiovisual methods, 
like segmentation into sequences and shot by shot analysis.  There exists several 
methodological approaches how to describe non-deterministic structure of the game 
narration, e.g. Finite State Machines (FSM) or Petri Nets (PN).  As Natkin and Vega 
suggest (2003, p. 83), the main structuring aspects of most games can be divided into 
levels (the main linear part of the game structure), quests (the unity of a goal, obstacles 
and the resolution method) and transactions (the atomic action of a player).  Petri Nets 
is then a particular case of transition system formalization, i.e. graphic representation of 
structuring aspects. Fig. 1 presents an example of Petri Nets analysis of one Quraish’s 
level.  It consists of transactions (activities which can occur in the modeled system), 
places (current states of the system) and arcs that connect them.  For better clarity only 
quests are depicted, although in fact all the transactions required by the particular quests 
could be modeled as well. 
 
                                                 
109 Personal communication with Radwan Kasmiya, Damascus, May 2005. 
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Fig. 1. Petri Nets description of the game play of the al-Khiyār level from the Quraish game. 
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For this methodological excursion I have chosen the 6th level of the game called al-
khiyār (The Choice) hence it puts player in front of decisions directly concerning 
identity construction and generally unusual in the realm of digital entertainment.  The 
player represents a leader of the pagan Shayban tribe which is allied with the Quraish 
tribe during the time of their struggle with Muhammad’s Muslim forces in Medina.  The 
player’s first quest (Q1) is to build an army and then (Q2) join the tribes besieging 
Medina in the famous Battle of the Trench.  In this historical battle (627 AD) the 
outnumbered Muslims under Muhammad’s command successfully defended the city of 
Medina, partly because of the trench they dug around it.  The game’s main narrative 
follows the historical events so after the unsuccessful charge the leaders of the Quraish 
tribe decide to withdraw from the battle.  The player with his Shayban tribe is then 
offered Islam (Q3).  If he accepts (Q6) the Shayban tribe joins Muslims in order to 
defeat the rest of the attacking Hawazin tribe (his former allies).  If he refuses he is 
given another option (Q5) to keep his religion and pay a tribute (al-jizya) to the 
Muslims.  Again, if he accepts the game follows as has been already mentioned (Q6).  If 
he refuses both Islam and the tribute his quest (Q7) is to defeat the forces in Medina. 
 
The game play analysis of this particular mission demonstrates how Afkar Media have 
transcended both the simplistic pattern of edutainment and ideological schematizations 
found in the above-mentioned former Islamic educational games.  Instead of limiting 
the educational and persuasive aspect of games to simple exposure to Islamic and thus 
sahīh (proper) content, they have constructed an immersive environment which allows 
player to explore numerous strategies for action and decision, enabling him finally to 
experiment with the very identity of his virtual Self.  Although the preference of the 
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authors is clearly communicated through the game play (i.e. defeating the Muslims (Q7) 
borders on the impossible), they have introduced the concepts of free will and explicit 
identity construction into the realm of Islamic educational games. 
 
Unlike previous Islamic educational games, Afkar Media products cannot be simply 
lumped into the framework of the Islamic revival, since their mission is more 
educational and cultural in nature.  Radwan Kasmyia has explained to me that he 
refuses the concept of da‘wa in video games and perceives the latter rather as a cutting-
edge venue for cultural dialogue.110  In this respect, he has also coined the phrase 
“digital dignity” to describe his work.  According to his explanation this concept is 
comprised by pride, self-esteem, and aptitude. “It is how an Arab teenager feels when 
he puts his hands on a game that reflects his point of view, knowing that non-Arabs may 
play it too.”111  From the perspective of Arab gamers even a normal fantasy action game 
like Qalat al-Nasr (Castle of Victory, Afkar Media 2003) could have cultural meaning 
in the sense that the hero who fights evil is Arab and speaks the Arabic language. 
 
3.6.4   Immersive Virtual Worlds 
 
A recent trend in game-based learning is built on the concept of so-called “immersive 
virtual worlds.”  Immersive virtual worlds are defined as given environments, which 
may be explored in a nonlinear way by learners (de Freitas 2006).  They include 
artifacts and objects and allow users to learn by exploring the environment and its 
objects in a relatively open-ended way.  Moreover, multi-user virtual worlds enable 
                                                 
110 Personal communication with Radwan Kasmiya, Damascus, May 2005. 
111 Ibid. 
 166 
collaboration among players and thus promote social networking, teamwork and group 
decision-making (Brom et al. 2010). 
 
There exist many examples of multi-user virtual worlds on the internet today.  The most 
prominent and famous example is represented by the privately-owned, subscription-
based 3D application Second Life (Linden Lab 2003) that went live online for public use 
in 2003.  As Radde-Antweiler (2007) describes it, for the most part Second Life 
resembles various traditional Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MORPG), but 
differs in some important points.  First, Second Life does not have a specific goal or 
quest like the conquest of land or defeat an enemy.  Instead, the game places emphasis 
on user creativity and it offers the possibility of creating things and buildings.  As such 
it presents an entirely user-created environment in which players use official game 
design tools to shape the in-world (Radde-Antweiler 2007, p. 187).  Many educational 
institutions, including universities, have created their own virtual educational 
environments in Second Life, conceived as cutting edge venues for learning and 
instruction. 
The most-developed example of an educational Islamic environment in Second Life 
represents a virtual re-creation of the city of Mecca and the simulation of the hajj 
pilgrimage.  The simulation was sponsored by Islam Online, a popular and 
comprehensive Islamic website discussed in the Chapter 2.6.4.  As Derrickson (2008) 
describes, the Mecca simulation was released in December 2007, just prior to the 2007–
2008 hajj season, with the purpose of educating Muslims about how to participate in the 
hajj and non-Muslims about this important ritual and the various steps that pilgrims 
take.  In the simulation all parts of Mecca relevant to the hajj are recreated, together 
with clearly-defined paths marked by large, chronologically-ordered numbers placed 
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throughout.  These numbers, once “touched,” activate a note card that gives virtual 
pilgrims specific information about their present station and instructions for that station.  
The project designers say the degree of interactivity in the 3D virtual world provides 
participants the ultimate step-by-step guide to the hajj 
The Second Life Hajj project is exceptional in that it breaks all the 
traditional limits of training. It allows the trainees to actually interact and be 
part of the program, in addition to providing them all the textual material 
they may need.112  
 
Although there is a current controversial discussion whether Second Life could be 
defined as a game from an emic perspective (Radde-Antweiler 2007), it nevertheless 
uses technologies appropriated from online video games and, when it comes to learning, 
utilizes the concepts known from educational immersive worlds (de Freitas 2006).  
When analyzing the “game play” of the hajj simulation in Second Life, the distinction 
between virtual worlds, edutainment products, and full-fledged Islamic video games 
becomes clear. The hajj simulation in Second Life reconstructs a realistic environment 
and allows users to freely explore it, move from one stage of the simulation to another, 
and interact with its objects.  Yet, and this more importantly, it allows users to share 
their experience with others through both visual representation of their avatars and a 
textual in-world chat and messaging system. Therefore, through creating the perception 
of mutual “presence” among its individual visitors, the hajj simulation can be 
                                                 
112 Islam Online [online]. [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-
News/NWELayout&cid=1196786035497>. 
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experienced collectively and even facilitate “ritual experience” for some of its users, as 
reported by Heidbrink (2007) and Derrickson (2008). 
 
The potential of multi-user, virtual worlds for the performance of religious rituals is 
even more evident in the existence of several virtual mosques in Second Life.  As 
Derrickson (2008) notes, as of April 2008 there were eight mosques in Second Life.  In 
addition to the Mecca complex described above, Second Life has others, most of which 
are based on famous real life mosques. The Chebi mosque, for example, is a replica of 
Cordoba’s Mezquita mosque.  The Hassan II mosque is based on its real counterpart in 
Casablanca, Morocco.  Others copy the Blue Mosque of Istanbul and the Alhambra.  
Despite the fact that most Islamic authorities do not deem a prayer conducted in such 
virtual environments as valid (Brückner 2001) – although it is widely agreed that 
multimedia applications, including video games, are a vital tool for learning how to 
perform the prayer – for many individuals the virtual mosques constitute sacred places 
where they gather to “pray” (Heidbrink 2007).  For example, the introductory notecard 
to the Chebi Mosque reads  
For the benefit of those who use the masjid (mosque) as a place of worship, 
we kindly request that visitors behave with the same level of respect as they 
would visiting a mosque in real life. It is customary for people entering a 
masjid to remove their shoes. 
In this respect Radde-Antweiler (2007) argues that an increasing number of Second Life 
residents use this multi-user world not only as a kind of virtual playground, but also as 
an extension of their real-life possibilities that have to be taken seriously.  The users are 
both socially and religiously very active and consequently transfer real life activities, 
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and therefore also rituals, into virtual space.  Radde-Antweiler predicts that with the 
shift of technical boundaries, former seemingly fixed religious and ritual frameworks 
will be modified and transformed. 
 
Steinkuehler and Williams (2006) have described online multi-user worlds as virtual 
“third places” which create “spaces for social interaction and relationships beyond the 
workplace and home […] that typically function to expose the individual to a diversity 
of worldviews.”  The examples of the hajj simulation and the Chebi Mosque in Second 
Life illustrate how virtual, multi-user environments based on the immersive worlds 
paradigm and user-created content can serve both for presenting someone else’s 
worldview and faith as well as important social and educational tools for a given 
religious community.  These simulations create “third places” that enable users to create 
and share their own content that guides, teaches, and instructs.  At the same time they 
facilitate on-line social networking among individual users, and, at least for some, serve 
as environments for performing religious rituals. 
 
In January 2008 the release of a new Islamic educational game based on the concept of 
immersive world was announced.  The game, which was conceived in Saudi Arabia and 
is supposed to be developed in Europe, looks to help children learn about the hajj 
pilgrimage.  Players will supposedly be able to lead pilgrims through the different 
stages of hajj by acting as security guards, first-aid workers, or other service providers.  
According to the authors, educational bodies and psychologists from Saudi Arabia will 
oversee the game’s development.  The hajj game aims to provide a positive learning 
experience for children, a feature that is arguably missing in popular video games.  As 
Amer bin Mohamed Al-Mutawa, one of the designers, says  
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Most video games available on the local market today do not contribute to 
increasing the skills or the intellectual capacities of consumers and do not 
encourage good deeds among children.  Furthermore, these games rely 
heavily on the concept of “survival of the fittest” through theft, kidnapping, 
murder, destruction, and the creation and manipulation, for example, of 
mafia groups in order to win the game.113 
 
The hajj game is clearly morally and religiously focused, in a way similar to the 
educational games mentioned above.  Nevertheless, the concept of immersive 3D virtual 
environment, which allows players to engage directly in the organization of the hajj, 
transcends the simple framework of edutainment and situates the players in a virtual 
world which encourages them to experience various situations and processes firsthand. 
 
3.6.5   Digital Resistance and Global Muslim Identity 
 
A direct answer to the above-mentioned Western war games schematizing Arabs and 
Muslims as enemies (like Delta Force or America’s Army) came from the Central 
Internet Bureau of Hezbollah in 2003.  The action game, entitled Al-Quwwat al-Khāsa 
(Special Force, Solution 2003), is a promotional tool for the movement, deals with the 
Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon and glorifies the role of Hezbollah in the retreat 
of the Israeli Army.114   
                                                 
113 Hajj Video Game Coming to a Gaming Console Near You. Asharq Alawsat [online]. 8 January 2008 
[cit. 2010-9-21]. Available online: <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=7&id=11393>. 
114 Special Force [online]. [cit. 2006-6-5]. Available online: <http://specialforce.net>. 
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Special Force can essentially be perceived as a manifestation of a broader phenomenon 
which I refer to as “digital resistance.”  This is an umbrella term for substantial amount 
of games created in the Arab world, which are based on real-world conflicts (mainly in 
Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon).  In almost unvarying manner these games appropriate the 
genre of first-person shooter and, by the authors’ own admission, were mostly created in 
a response to the previously mentioned Western war games schematizing Arabs and 
Muslims as enemies. As such they do stress the Muslim and Arab identity of the main 
character, i.e. the virtual representation of the player’s self, and retell the story of a 
conflict from Arab and Muslim perspective. 
 
The game Special Force constructs two basic types of Arab and Muslim heroes.  The 
first is a figure controlled by the player, a fearless warrior winning against the odds, 
despite being outnumbered by Zionist forces.  The second type of hero is that of the 
fallen comrade. Throughout the game these “real fighters of the Hezbollah” are 
consistently referred to as martyrs (al-shuhadā’), and the player character finds their 
photographs at various points throughout the game.  Essentially, the concept of the 
game is not different from Western first-person shooters; it has merely reversed the 
polarities of the narrative and iconographical stereotypes mentioned above by 
substituting the Arab Muslim hero for the American soldier.  The primary difference is 
that instead of stressing camaraderie and brotherhood between the individual members 
of a beleaguered Army platoon, it stresses the soldier’s Muslim identity and higher 
obligations to Hezbollah as a part of a collective spiritual whole. 
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A slightly different approach to the topic of self-representation can be found in the 
Syrian game Tahta al-Ramād (Under Ash, Dar al-Fikr 2002) which deals with the First 
Intifada.  The game is unusually emotional in the way it presents players with a story 
starting with the Palestinians’ conflict with Israeli soldiers at the al-Aqsa Mosque in 
Jerusalem.  The first mission introduces the main hero Ahmad in a demonstration.  The 
Palestinians throw stones at the Israeli soldiers who answer with rifle shots, and the 
scene is full of shouting, shooting and moaning of the wounded.  The task of the player 
is to get out of the demonstration alive; then the story goes on into the classic scheme of 
action games with the hero joining the Palestinian resistance.  Combat is central to the 
game play but killing of civilians is prohibited.  According to the authors, Under Ash is 
a “call for justice and realization of the truth, the prevention against the wrong and 
aggression.”115  Despite its low technical quality more than 50 000 copies were sold in a 
market where most gamers copy and burn video games.116  The players discussing the 
game on the Internet have often esteemed the fact that it presents “their” point of view, 
e.g. 
 
From a gamer’s point of view its one of the worst games I have played. The 
idea behind the game is admirable though. To give Arab youth their identity 
back after it has been lost in the western media. (Xenon 2, Dubai)117 
 
Fadel Abu Hien, although referring to “real” games, made an observation concerning 
the re-playing of skirmishes by Palestinian children 
                                                 
115 Under Ash [online]. [cit. 2006-6-5]. Available online: <http://www.underash.net/emessage.htm>. 
116 Sales figures were received via email from Radwan Kasmiya, May 2007. 
117 Tbreak [online]. [cit. 2007-5-13]. Available online: 
<http://www.tbreak.com/forums/showthread.php?t=37702&page=2>. 
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It’s a way to have some feeling of power in a real-life situation where they 
are powerless.  If a boy can ‘fire’ the same weapon as the occupier, if he 
can imitate the sound of a mortar or rocket which he sees as the Israeli 
source of power, then he ‘owns’ that power too and feels more in 
control.118 
 
From this point of view, Special Force and Under Ash can be considered as the first 
attempts to participate in video games’ construction of Arab and Muslim self-
representation.  Although the first is blatantly ideological and propagandistic, whereas 
the latter pales in technological comparison with similar U.S. and European games, for 
the first time the Arab gamer was offered congruence between his political reality and 
its in-game mimesis.  As Galloway (2005) put it, “If one is to take the definition of 
realism a documentary-like attention to the everyday struggles of the downtrodden, 
leading to a direct criticism of current social policy then Special Force and Under Ash 
are among the first truly realist games in existence.” 
 
The direct sequel to Under Ash is Tahta al-Hisār (Under Siege, Afkar Media 2005).  
Unlike its predecessors the game introduces real events to the virtual world.  It begins 
with a killing in the Mosque of Abraham in Hebron, where in 1994 a radical Jewish 
fundamentalist, Baruch Goldstein, shot 29 Muslims during the Friday prayer.  The 
player controls Ahmad, who has to survive the first minutes of Goldstein’s shooting 
hidden between pillars and in the right moment disarm him.  In a narrative similar to 
                                                 
118 Playing the Game Professionally. Rafah Notes [online]. 19 November 2005 [cit. 2010-11-24]. 
Available online: <http://rafahnotes.blogspot.com/2005/11/playing-game-professionally.html>. 
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Under Ash he is then engaged in a fight with Israeli police and Army.  All the main 
characters in the game are individualized and humanized by a very emotional 
background stories which are presented to the player by cinematic sequences.  Radwan 
Kasmiya, manager of Afkar Media, told me: “It was our aim to show what happens in 
Palestine behind politics, to show people stories and problems.”119  Like its Western 
equivalents, the game fails in its schematization and instrumentalization of enemies 
(Israelis), although it does make an attempt to overcome this problem.  The game world 
is inhabited by civilians (Israelis and Palestinians) whose killing is penalized by an 
automatic “game over.” This constitutes a substantial difference from the majority of 
Western war games, where the Middle Eastern cities are depicted as being without 
inhabitants and the allied war effort is thus shown not to hurt civilians (Leonard 2004).  
Nevertheless, on the level of game play combat remains the only interaction possible 
with the Israelis. 
 
Recently, more distinctive examples of digital resistance appeared on the Arab market.  
For example, Jenin: Road of Heroes, created by Tamir Majed Malas and Ali Fayez 
Ismail in Jordan (n.d.), has a plot based on the famous Battle of Jenin which took place 
in April 2002 in Palestinian refugee camp. According to the authors 
 
The Battle of Jenin summarizes the issue of Palestine.  On one side, a 
heavily armed enemy supported by the Western colonial forces and on the 
                                                 
119  Personal interview with Radwan Kasmiya, Damascus, May 2005.  
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other side, unarmed and isolated people of Palestine fighting with rocks and 
light weapons captured from the enemy or produced locally.120 
 
The game starts with basmala121 followed by a long introductory video about the history 
of Palestine, the Jenin refugee camp, and the Battle of Jenin itself.  The video combines 
real historical footage with digitally produced material in a way which somehow 
resembles pro-Palestinian activist videos or propagandistic movies of Lebanese 
Hezbollah movement.  The Muslim and Palestinian identity of the hero is stressed in the 
training mission by audio and video signifiers, like al-takbīr (call allāhu akbar), 
religious nashīd (hymn) in the background, or Palestinian flags and posters of Al-Aqsa 
Mosque on the walls.  The narrative of Jenin is loosely based on real events, in the 
sense that the player witnesses the initial attack of Israeli helicopters, takes part in 
installing landmines in order to prevent Israeli soldiers to enter the camp, etc.  At the 
same time, as is the case in the Western war games, the reality is depicted in a very 
selective way, reshaping the overall comprehension of the conflict, its reason and 
outcome in favor of one side. 
              
A new game has recently been released by the already mentioned Lebanese Hezbollah 
movement.  The first-person shooter Al-Wa’d al-sādiq (Tale of the Truthful Pledge, 
W3DTEK 2007) is a sequel to the previously mentioned Hezbollah’s game Al-Quwwa 
                                                 
120 Jenin: Road of Heroes, booklet. This statement, perhaps unwillingly, also summarizes the position of 
the Arab video game production itself, while it relies heavily on appropriated Western games or local 
cottage industry. 
121 The phrase bismi-llāhi ar-rahmāni ar-rahīmi (In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful) 
constitutes the first verse of every sūra (chapter) of the Qur‘ān (but one) and is often used as an opening 
phrase in letters, books and public speeches. 
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al-Khāsa (Special Force).  This new game retells a story from 2006 war between Israeli 
defense forces and Hezbollah.  Most of its game play does not differ from the scheme 
typical for the genre, like destroying army trucks, eliminating snipers or retrieving 
confidential documents from the enemy’s military camp.  Nevertheless, some mission 
objectives exhibit an ideological bent, e.g. preventing Israeli soldiers from raising a flag 
in a Lebanese village or shooting katyusha rockets at the Israeli settlement.  The game 
even features virtual collective prayers in cut scenes in between the missions. 
 
By situating the player into immersive simulation of real conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon 
and Iraq these games strengthen his identification with the struggles of Muslim 
communities and contribute to the notion of global Muslim identity.  The focus point is 
the idea of defending Muslim umma against outside aggression, the emphasis on just 
and moral cause of the fight, and the glorification of the Muslim fighters.  By 
schematizing complex and diverse conflicts into single bipolar scheme of good and evil 
these games in fact echo their Western blueprints more than the authors are ready to 
admit; including the collectivization and functionalization of enemies and legitimizing 
authors’ point of view by highly selective references to the real events. 
 
3.6.6   Arab and Muslim Identity in Mainstream Production 
 
In November 2006, BreakAway Games, a US-based developer of video games, 
announced Arabian Lords (Sādat al-sahrā’), a bilingual, PC strategy game inspired by 
the rise of Islam, during the seventh to thirteenth centuries.  Arabian Lords were from 
the beginning intended to ship exclusively to regions in the Arab world.  According to 
the developers maintaining appropriate content, historical accuracy, and cultural 
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sensitivity were crucial for the design of the game.122  Therefore they have collaborated 
with Jordanian company Quirkat. As Mahmoud Khasawneh, CEO of Quirkat, puts it 
 
This is the first time an established player like Breakaway has expanded its 
development effort in partnership with a Middle Eastern studio like Quirkat, 
to bring to the region a unique blend of gaming quality and cultural and 
historical references.123  
 
According to the authors’ statement, their goal was to create a fun, exciting strategy 
game that would appeal to Arab and Muslim gamers  
 
With this product historical accuracy and cultural relevance became 
important guiding factors.  We knew that, on a cultural level, religion 
played a major role during the time span covered in the game, and that it 
still does today.  We wanted to make sure to include this in a way that 
would honor its significance, while being sensitive to all religious and 
cultural concerns.124  
 
The Arabian Lords game enables the player to assume the role of a medieval Muslim 
merchant, and its game play involves building cities, municipal politics, diplomacy, 
                                                 
122 Arabian Lords [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://www.arabianlords.com/Public_News/Nws_PressReleaseDetails.aspx?lang=3&site_id=2&page_id
=3&NewsID=95&Type=P&Path=64>. 
123 Arabian Lords [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://www.arabianlords.com/Public/public_master.aspx?Site_Id=2&Page_Id=922&Path=66>. 
124 Ibid. 
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espionage, etc.  It includes many distinguishing features of early Islamic civilization, 
such as poetry contests, camel markets, etc.  Nevertheless, regarding all levels of the 
game – including narrative, game play, and visual signifiers – designers have paid 
attention to the delicate subject of representing Islam, e.g., in the role of imam in the 
game.  Arabian Lords are available in both English and Arabic, and, according to the 
producers, the game “was an instant success in the Arab world.”125  As a result, Quirkat 
and BreakAway Games are preparing a new project based on Arab mythology, which is 
again designed primarily for Arab markets – a trading-card game called Mythic Palace 
(Qasr al-asātīr).126 
 
Arabian Lords indicate the growing interest among Western game developers in the 
Arab market.  With the prospects of lower piracy rates another major players are 
starting to enter the region. Chris Deering, president of Sony Computer Entertainment 
Europe, has stated as early as in 2003 
 
We are committed to developing and introducing Arabised titles in the 
region. In fact, the first of these is scheduled for release next year. If piracy 
were not such a big issue here we would have introduced Arabised titles 
much earlier.127 
 
                                                 
125 Break Away Games [online]. [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: 
<http://www.breakawaygames.com/entertainment/feature/>. 
126 Mythic Palace Game [online]. [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: 
<http://www.mythicpalacegame.com>. 
127 Gulf News [online]. 26 November 2003 [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: <http://gulfnews.com/>. 
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The cultural and religious sensitivity can thus be perceived as more of a pragmatic step 
aiming to ease the acceptance of the product than a result of a broader cultural mission.  
 
More recently, another mainstream game Abu Hadid (Abū Hadīd, Khayal 2007) has 
been released in Egypt.  It is an action game based on a popular comedy movie Booha 
(Rami Emam 2005), telling a story of a young countryside man who arrives to Cairo in 
order to claim his inheritance.  Both the movie and the game are full of specifically 
Egyptian cultural references and humor, including distinctive colloquial Arabic of 
Upper Egypt.  Nevertheless, the authors of the game are knowingly appropriating and 
subverting concepts dominating the Western video game industry. As they say  
 
Abu Hadid is an Arab 3-D computer game inspired by the Egyptian 
environment. An Arab game means that the hero speaks Arabic and the 
story takes place in Egypt. Moreover, it means that he uses cudgel instead 
of shotgun, drives microbus instead of Porsche, rides donkey instead of 
tank, meets falāhīn (farmers) instead of marines and encounters sa‘āyida 
(Upper Egyptians) instead of aliens.128  
 
References to Egyptian culture are communicated to the player on all the three levels of 
the game’s content.  The visual signifiers realistically copy many details of workaday 
Cairo, from people’s clothes and sha‘bī (popular) cafés to distinctively colored 
scaffolding on the buildings.  Similar references are to be found on the level of game 
play; the hero regains his strength by eating fūl midammis (cooked horse beans; national 
dishes of Egypt), quarrels with butagāzī (street vendor of bottled butane) and takes part 
                                                 
128 Abu Hadid (Khayal 2007), booklet 
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in a ritualized quarterstaff fight.  All the characters in the game speak Egyptian 
colloquial Arabic (ECA) with notable distinctions representing their social status.  This 
constitutes substantial difference from all the above-mentioned games which stick to 
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA).  Given the fact that the latter represents dominant 
mode of communication in issues related to religion and politics in the Arab world, this 
linguistical shift could be also perceived as a kind of proclamation; deliberately drawing 
a line between Abu Hadid and previous educational, political, or religious Islamic and 
Arab games.   Although Abu Hadid is clearly ironic, the emphasis on cultural identity 
and subversion of the concept of what they call an “American superhero” was from the 
beginning an integral part of authors’ motivation.  As Mustafa Ashur, one of the 
designers, says:  “We are proud that Abu Hadid is 100% Egyptian, from technology to 
the content.”129  
 
Unlike the rather pragmatic aims behind Arabian Lords, Abu Hadid stems more from 
the needs of the authors to articulate their Arab and Egyptian identity through the media 
which they see predominantly Western.  Yet, these games signalize the emergence of 
new Arab mainstream game industry.  These recent games seem to be less engaged 
politically and in promoting Islamic faith then their predecessors.  At the same time, 
they are well-designed and technologically advanced.  The articulation of cultural 
identity seems to express the beliefs of the designers as well as response to expectations 
and demands of the audience.   
 
                                                 
129 Interview for Dream TV, 16 December 2006. 
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3.7   Video Blogging for Islam 
 
The use of ICT for education and communication of values within the sphere of popular 
youth culture is not limited only to educational video games or video clips distributed 
on CDs, VCDs, and DVDs.  Recent surveys show that young people in the Middle East 
increasingly utilize the internet for entertainment, research, socializing, and social 
networking (Baune 2005; Hofheinz 2007; Abdulla 2007).  One specific format that 
seems to be popular among Muslim youth is video blogging – posting short video clips 
created by individual users on the internet, mainly through public venues such as You 
Tube or on individual blogs.  Many of these video blogs share the same agenda as the 
games discussed above – i.e., halāl entertainment, education, and the spread of the 
Islamic message; for example, Ummah Films130 or Dawah Works.131  The latter’s 
mission statement is again generic for a broader group of blogs 
 
We at Dawah Works are not professional filmmakers, but we will attempt to 
bring halal entertainment and information to Muslims and non-Muslims. 
With the popularity of other film groups we realized that the medium of 
video blogs can aid us (Inshallah) in promoting Islam. We would like to 
interact with and initiate thought among Muslims & non-Muslims.132 
 
                                                 
130 Ummah Films [online]. [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: 
<http://www.ummahfilms.com/home.html>. 
131 Dawah Works [online]. [cit. 2008-9-21]. Available online: <http://dawahworks.com/>. 
132 Ibid. 
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Most of the clips posted on such video blogs feature the authors expressing their beliefs, 
commenting on various social topics (e.g., wearing hijab, drinking alcohol, smoking, 
dating) and sharing their perspectives on Islam with others.  Often they post materials 
borrowed from satellite channels and other websites they find interesting.  A symbolic 
example of the latter is the series Shaitan: Video Blog from the Devil, originally 
broadcast by the Al-Resalah channel and then posted on You Tube by a user called 
KnowledgeIsLight27.133  The series soon appeared on many other sites and provoked 
heavy comment and discussion by other users. Table 1 shows a transcript of the popular 
Hijab episode. 
 
Table 1. Transcript of Shaitan: Video Blog From the Devil – Hijab episode 
Bedroom. Probably evening. A dim lamp is switched 
on. A girl in a modest plain abaya is adjusting her hijab 
in front of a mirror.  
 
Suddenly she hears the voice of the devil. Devil (in colloquial Arabic): “Are you going out like 
that?”  
The devil (dressed as a young man in black) appears in 
the mirror. 
“What would people say?” 
They both closely inspect the girl’s face in the mirror. “Your face looks so pale…”  
The girl starts to seem uneasy. She touches her face. “… and your eyes are swollen as if you have just got 
out of bed.” 
 “No, no...” 
Close up of girl’s face. She examines herself with 
growing disaffection. 
“You must at least wear some makeup! Just a little, 
no one will notice.” 
The devil teases her. “Are you going to a funeral?” 
He walks around her in pretentious dismay. “Oh my God, what are you wearing?! It makes you 
                                                 
133 Shaitan The Way The Devil Works. You Tube [online]. 27 January 2008 [cit. 2010-11-24]. Available 
online: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUS0ZeGRkEY>. 
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look like a black bag.” 
The devil stands behind the girl and looks directly into 
her eyes in the mirror. 
(in a serious voice) “Do you want your friends to 
make fun of you? What do you want them to say 
about you?” 
 (in an ironic voice) “You couldn’t find anything to 
wear except to wear your mom’s abaya?! You must 
pick a cool abaya that suits you!” 
The girl slowly unties her hijab… The devil has a 
satisfied look on his face. 
“Who told you that you must cover all your hair? 
Loosen it a bit!” 
Cut. The devil hides himself in a wardrobe and closes 
the door behind him. On the other side of the door is a 
mirror. 
“The guys won’t bite you!” 
We can see the girl in this mirror. She has make up on, 
her loose hijab revealing her hair and decorated abaya. 
“Now you look so cool and beautiful and your hijab 
is just the same…” 
Phone rings. The girl answers. Camera slowly moves 
around her body. Fade out. 
Girl: “Yalla, yalla, I’m coming.” (We can hear the 
devil breathing.) 
Cut. The head of another devil appears surrounded by 
darkness. 
Second devil: “Hijab you say, huh?” 
The Quranic verse appears on the screen. Narrator (in MSA): “And say to the believing women 
that they should lower their gaze and guard their 
modesty: that they should not display their beauty 
and armaments except what (ordinarily) appear there 
of.” 
 
The narrative structure of the Shaitan video clips follows the same pattern as the above-
mentioned animated videos for children, although its target audience is considerably 
older.  The actors in the clips face temptations, which they can resist with the help of the 
teachings of Islam, or alternatively they give in to them.  Sometimes viewers see both 
options and their subsequent results. In the end, there is always a reference to the 
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particular rule of law, i.e. Qur‘an or hadith.  The important and novel aspect of video 
blogging is that it effectively creates a space for discussion, exchange of opinions, and 
self-expression, as is demonstrated in many commentaries posted under the video, e.g. 
 
wow! someone actually feels the same as i do?! amazing, ALLAH HAFIZ 
to all muslimahs! (cabwhisperer)134 
 
Thank you KnowledgeIsLight27.  I love your creativity you show thru your 
videos. Very interesting.  I wasnt a religious person (altho i never smoke, 
never drink, never clubbing & partying, etc) but i was very lazy when it 
came to Solat. Sometimes i did, sometimes not.  Thanks to YouTube, i 
regained Hidayah from Allah. Praise to Allah the Most Merciful. He still 
loved me, and He wanted me to change, to be a better person.  I love you, ya 
Allah! Give me more of your Hidayah and Light! (ladynox200)135 
 
Given the global character of the Internet, video blogging in fact effectively creates a 
specific manifestation of what Eickelman and Anderson (2003) call the Muslim 
“transnational public sphere.” The audio-visual character of the medium, as well as the 
chat-like nature of the subsequent commentaries both exemplify the above-mentioned 
Ong’s (1982) concept of second orality, with its participatory, interactive, and 
communal aspects.  At the same time, the non-hierarchical and do-it-yourself character 
of the blogging culture appeals to youth and provides them a space for construction and 
                                                 
134 Ibid. 
135 Shaitan how he makes you not wake up for morning prayer. You Tube [online]. 30 January 2008 [cit. 
2010-11-24]. Available online: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bto0xikkcW4&feature=related>. 
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representation of their individual identities.  The combination of entertainment, youth 
consumer culture, and Islamic piety echoes the above-mentioned examples of video 
games.  By utilizing various mainstream media the video and game producers, in fact, 
transcend confinement to Islamic movements and generally promote a more religious, 
rather than cultural, concept of Muslim identity.  As I have demonstrated in the previous 
chapter this concept has started to be slowly, albeit increasingly, accepted by the 
mainstream media. 
 
3.8   Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I have introduced the concept of neglected media as generally 
understudied media with strong popular appeal and economic relevance.  Consequently, 
I have discussed the ongoing process of cultural appropriation of two specific forms of 
neglected media in the Arab and Muslim world, i.e. video games and video clips, and 
analyzed the ways in which Arab and Muslim identity are articulated in it.  The study of 
neglected media has to be conducted in a broader interdisciplinary framework and has 
to encompass a broad variety of different media, like video clips, comics, music, board 
games, etc.  When related to the Arab world, most of these media in fact constitute a 
new research agenda.  
 
Generally speaking, we can observe all the patterns discussed above in the 
contemporary Arab Muslim popular media production.  In the framework of Islamic 
education it is for example Karīm (Afkar Media, 2006), Syrian rendered animation 
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movies advertised as “funny 3-D clips for youngsters to understand Islam”,136 Egyptian 
Al-Muslim al-saghīr (The Young Muslim, Safeer n.d.) which “increases the knowledge 
about Islam through cute animations and songs”,137 or Qisas al-anbiyā’ (Prophets’ 
Tales, RDI 2001).  Similarly, many digitally rendered movies deal with the ongoing 
conflicts in the former’s framework of “digital resistance,” like Saudi Arabian Shahīd 
al-‘ālam (Martyr of the World) depicting the killing of Muhammad al-Durra, Lebanese 
Hārib al-‘ustūra (W3DTEK 2007) based on Lebanon 2006 war, or Syrian Jidār fī al-
qalb (Wall in my Heart, Afkar Media 2006) which is “a new drama series for teenagers 
about life under occupation in Palestine.”138  Nevertheless, neglected media are not 
confined to digital technologies only.  Especially the production in the latter game’s 
broader context of cultural identity uses more “traditional” media, like the famous 
Egyptian comics Abtāl al-‘arab (Middle East Heroes, AK Comics) which according to 
the authors “creates a new vision for the Middle East and its nations”139 and features the 
Muslim character of Jalila, a superwoman protecting Jerusalem and all its three 
religions against evil, or the board game Mecca to Medina (Muslim Games 2005), “a 
                                                 
136 Karīm [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://afkarmedia.com/index.php?PageTitle=Kareem&Type=movies&Status=Details&ID=1>. 
137 Al-Muslim al-saghīr, booklet 
138 Jidār fī al-qalb [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://afkarmedia.com/index.php?PageTitle=Wall%20In%20My%20Heart&Type=movies&Status=Deta
ils&ID=2>. 
139 Abtāl al-‘arab [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://www.akcomics.com/AbtalAl3arab.wmv>. 
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game of fun that piques the curiosity those who want to learn more about Islamic 
history and Islam itself.”140 
 
Although each form of neglected media requires distinctive methodology, such as the 
descriptive tools for analyzing the nondeterministic structure of videogames, their role 
in the construction of Islamic knowledge and shaping Muslim identities has to be 
interpreted in one broader context.  Today, popular digital media play an important part 
in forming youth culture in the Arab and Muslim world.  At the same time they are 
often perceived as originally Western and their content as thus, inappropriate and non-
Islamic.  Therefore the appropriation of various forms of neglected media in the Arab 
world is from the beginning concerned with the question of religious and cultural 
identity.  This phenomenon is particularly demonstrated in the case of video games; 
most of the up-to-date regional production is socially or politically engaged.  This is to a 
great extent the result of the fact that European and American games are not perceived 
as neutral containers by Arab and Muslim producers, as I have stated above.  
 
At the same time, this political and social engagement does not directly contest 
established local authorities and institutions.  On the contrary, many video games are 
created by such authorities or are at least favor them, like the game Special Force.  This 
is in particular significant when compared with European and American serious games, 
which, besides promotional or training games developed by e.g. the above-mentioned 
America’s Army, largely serve as a vehicle for political activism (September 12th, 
Newsgaming 2003) or social criticism (McDonald’s Video Game, La Molleindustria 
                                                 
140 Muslim Games [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://www.muslimgames.com/reviews.html>. 
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2006) directly attacking established political and economic structures.  The activism and 
engagement of Arab games seems to be more in line with official proclamations, 
serving the promotion of Islamic values or particular causes, like the issue of Palestine 
or Iraq.  The games created by Radwan Kasmiya, which contest the “dictate of 
entertainment” with its schematizing framework itself, constitute rather an exception.  
As I have stated in the Chapter 2, early information and communication technology and 
the Internet have been used extensively for dissemination of dissenting opinions and 
direct political criticism of the status quo in the Arab world.  The reasons why this is not 
the case in video games is still an open question.  The answer lies probably in the 
general perception of games as a leisure time activity, in the higher production costs 
which makes the developers more vulnerable and dependent on the authorities, and in 
the Western influence over the content of video game majorities, which appeal strongly 
to Arab and Muslim designers.  
 
Neglected media address mainly youth generations, and the producers are well aware of 
the fact.  Moreover, as has been said, many of them consider such media an effective 
tool in educational practice.  Although the results of case studies concerned with using 
games in education are to some extent ambiguous, pointing out substantial 
incompatibilities between game-based learning and formal schooling systems (Facer 
2003), the interest of public policy makers, the authorities and developers in the 
persuasive power of video games is obvious.  In the Arab and Muslim world this 
phenomenon can be perceived as an attempt to translate the Islamic message into new 
semiotic language.  A parallel can be found in the new transglobal Muslim rap music 
which Alim (2006) describes as radical form of information transferal and arguably 
some of the most cutting edge conveyors of contemporary Islam.  Blending the teaching 
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of Islam with entertainment aspects also follows a broader pattern in which operate 
many popular preachers addressing young Muslims, e.g. Amr Khaled (Olsson 2007). 
 
When compared with other new media participating in the construction of Islamic 
knowledge, video games and video clips tend to iterate some already observed patterns, 
like the already mentioned contribution to the emerging notion of global Muslim 
identity.  As we have seen, a substantial amount of games express global issues of the 
imaginary Muslim community, like the conflict in Palestine or the war on Iraq.  This 
echoes the growing numbers of cyber fatwas dealing with these global issues or the 
flow of real videos from Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine posted on-line (Bunt 
2009).  The interactivity of video games enables even virtual participation of the players 
in the conflicts, thus arguably increasing their emotional investment and stressing the 
message. As Murphy (2004, p. 235) has noted 
 
The in-game structures that enable the identification of the gamer with the 
onscreen character – perspectival modes, narration, cinematics, audio cues, 
force feedback, densely orchestrated game levels and worlds – all serve to 
deepen the connection between the game world and the real world. 
 
In all these games the Muslim identity of the hero is stressed and communicated to the 
players, strengthening their identification with the struggles of Muslim communities in 
the world.  As I have already mentioned, the high percentage of games dealing with 
these issues actually finds its similarity in the earliest days of the World Wide Web, 
when young Muslims were quick to embrace the new medium to promote a global 
Islamic consciousness, using a similar agenda (Hofheinz 2007, p. 72).  
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New media constitute an important factor in a socialization of the younger generation 
(Wheeler 2005; Abdulla 2007).  Similarly, social networking is an indivisible part of 
gaming culture.  Peer groups of gamers exchange games, discuss their qualities and 
circulate information helping to win particular game.  With spreading of the Internet 
these social networks are manifested by fan sites, blogs and peer to peer servers, 
effectively creating transnational youth communities.  Sharing experience creates 
collective bond which is a fact often exploited by game designers.  For example the 
U.S. Army successfully uses the concept of branding in its promotional campaign 
wisely combining its videogame America’s Army with other PR activities (e.g. military 
exhibitions) and collaborative bulletin boards and forums for the players (Li 2004).  A 
similar concept was adopted by the Lebanese Hezbollah movement; the game Al-Wa‘d 
al-sādiq is presented during military exhibitions and players are encouraged to take part 
in online discussion forums.141  Such peer groups and collaborative networks play an 
important role in the construction of youths’ identity.  As Brown et al. (1994, p. 814) 
have noted, adolescents use media and the cultural insights provided by them to see 
both who they might be and how others have constructed or reconstructed themselves.  
 
Until recently there has not been any mainstream (i.e. not directly engaged, whether 
religiously or politically) video game production in the Arab world to speak about.  The 
fact that games with an agenda preceded mainstream production is probably the most 
noteworthy feature of Arab and Muslim gaming culture.  The emergence of games like 
Abu Hadid or Arabian Lords signalizes that this situation is about to change.  The 
                                                 
141 Special Force 2 [online]. [cit. 2008-4-5]. Available online: 
<http://www.specialforce2.org/forum/index.php>. 
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growing mainstream video game industry would be probably more likely to promote the 
concept of identity based on a cultural basis, i.e. using historical references as is the 
case of Arabian Lords or references to popular culture, as is the case of Abu Hadid, than 
the more straightforward concepts of the engaged Islamic games discussed above. 
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4   Conclusions 
 
 
This dissertation has analyzed the impact of information and communication 
technologies and new digital media on the production of Islamic knowledge and the 
construction of Muslim identity in Muslim communities in the Arab world and Western 
Europe.  At the same time, it aimed to transcend the media-centric logic and to analyze 
the impact of ICT and new media in the light of the emerging ICT and new media 
interdependency and hybridization within broader social, cultural and linguistic context.  
By doing so, it particularly focused on two separate, yet simultaneously entangled, 
phenomena.  First, it discussed fatwas and other normative content issued and/or 
disseminated by various Islamic websites for the Muslim minorities living in non-
Muslim majority countries, particularly in Western Europe.  Second, it analyzed Islamic 
video games and video clips produced in the Arab and Muslim world and discussed the 
ways in which these new media forms articulate Muslim identity and communicate 
Islamic ethical and moral values to the youth.   
 
On an overarching level, this dissertation has argued that the unanticipated assemblages 
formed by ICT and various new media outlets contribute simultaneously to preserving 
traditional cultural norms and religious values while unsettling the existing 
arrangements and promoting new organizational forms; appealing to a local audience 
while addressing transnational communities; and asserting conformity with established 
religious institutions while fueling fragmentation of authority and individualization of 
faith. 
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First, regarding the fragmentation of authority and individualization of faith, I find 
particularly relevant the research on the production of Islamic knowledge on the 
Internet.  The Chapter 2 of this thesis focused on Sunni websites providing normative 
material for Muslim minorities in Europe and explored their fatwas and other forms of 
counseling addressing the specific issues arising from living as a minority in a non-
Muslim majority setting.  As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the underlying logic 
behind the Islamic cyber counseling emphasizes the role of the Self, the privatization of 
faith, and the increasing insistence on religion as a system of values and ethics.  In this 
regard, I have also argued that the growing popularity of Internet preachers and muftis 
converges with the broader transformation of contemporary religiosity, which similarly 
emphasizes the role of the individual.  In other words, such transformation promotes a 
ready-made and easily-accessible set of norms and values that might order daily lives 
and define a practical and visible identity; such as the easily accessible and searchable 
fatwa databases.  Nevertheless, I have also discussed how most of the muftis associated 
with the key Islamic websites are in fact deeply entrenched in traditional and established 
religious structures.  Therefore, the Internet has in the long term in fact reinforced 
culturally dominant social networks and while undoubtedly fueling individualization 
and privatization of faith, it simultaneously asserts conformity and compliance with 
established religious authorities. 
 
Similarly, in the process of construction of Muslim identity in the Arab and Islamic 
video games and video clips, we observe the participation of both the established 
political and religious structures, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and private 
religious entrepreneurs, such as private companies and individuals.  The latter 
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phenomenon needs to be considered, within the broader framework of the above-
mentioned Islamic revival or piety movement, as an ongoing contribution to the above-
mentioned privatization of Islamic knowledge production.  As Haenni (quoted in 
Lindsey 2006) points out 
 
When we speak of Islamic revival, we always focus on politically-
organized groups intent on gaining power.  But “private religious 
entrepreneurs” are just as important a phenomenon.  These entrepreneurs 
target the upper middle class, and focus on personal enlightenment rather 
than political engagement. They’re socially conservative and opposed to 
what they see as the decadence of much of Western culture.  But they want 
to benefit from Western science, education, and progress, and they 
condemn violence and extremism. [...]  They fully use all the means of 
mass culture, [like] chats on the Net, chat shows on TV, Islamic rap in the 
West.  
 
Whereas the producers associated with established political and religious structures 
promote more straightforward and directly engaged notion of the Muslim identity, the 
games produced by private entrepreneurs offer more differentiated concepts of it.  
Where the games produced by the Lebanese Hezbollah Movement immerse the player 
in a virtual recreation of the struggle with Israel, video games and video clips produced 
by private companies strive to promote “positive” or “family” values, deliberately 
distinguishing themselves from “Western” game production, which is labeled as 
“morally corrupt,” “violent,” or simply “not promoting the good values.”  As such, 
these products are marketed to a broader audience, which does not necessarily have to 
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be Muslim.  For example, the animated characters of the Egyptian educational series Al-
Muttahidūn (New Way Group n.d.) are advertised as “the good heroes, who at all times 
strive for justice and promote good and kindness.”  The key underlying message for 
parents is that the product is safe to buy.  This strategy resembles the advertising 
campaigns of the so-called “Barbie non-Barbie dolls,” Razanne and Fulla, which are 
reportedly also being bought by Arab Christian families who are dissatisfied with the 
explicit sexuality of Barbie (Kuppinger 2009).  Finally, there are games, such as 
Quraish produced by Afkar Media, which aim to educate the player about the history of 
Islam and, at the same time, engage in a cultural dialogue with the West.  The identity 
construction in this game is a deliberately open-ended process, forcing the player to 
contemplate on broader social, political and religious consequences of his or her 
actions. 
 
Second, this dissertation has discussed how the unanticipated assemblages formed by 
ICT and new media appeal simultaneously to local audiences while addressing 
transnational communities.  In the domain of the production of Islamic knowledge on 
the Internet, this is particularly relevant in the cases of the web-ring of Fatwa-Online 
and the website of the Islamic Shari’a Council respectively.  While the former provides 
global connectivity to the salafī Muslim community, it simultaneously links this 
community with local students in Mecca and Medina through participation in collective 
rituals, such as badal hajj.  Conversely, the website of Islamic Shari’a Council, although 
originally established in order to solve problems of local Muslim community and 
primarily facilitating face to face appointments, today offers a large and searchable 
fatwa database; reminiscent in a way of those of the above-mentioned global Islamic 
websites.  Where the global sites such as Fatwa-Online or the former IslamOnline (and 
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today’s On Islam) invite the believers in the rebuilding of the imaginary global Muslim 
umma through the Internet, the sites of Islamic Shari’a Council or Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal establish arbitration and reconciliation platforms for local communities; yet 
simultaneously linking these offline institutions with the global Muslim audience.  As I 
have mentioned above, although the Council has launched its English website relatively 
late, it gained substantial traffic and its fatwas are sought by many young people of 
various and multifaceted background.  Therefore, this case in particular exemplifies 
what Anderson (2008) describes as “migration online” of established religious networks 
and institutions, which, at first being slow to adapt and thus preceded by “new Islam’s 
interpreters,” eventually proved adept at deploying the underlying technologies to their 
own ends and re-established their presence and authority online. 
 
Similarly, in the domain of the construction of Muslim identity in new media, we have 
seen that a substantial amount of Arab and Muslim video games express global issues of 
the imaginary Muslim community, like the conflict in Palestine or the war on Iraq.  By 
doing so, these games contribute to the emerging notion of global Muslim identity.  In 
all these games the Muslim identity of the hero is stressed and communicated to the 
players, strengthening their identification with the struggles of Muslim communities in 
the world.  At the same time, there is an emerging local production at the level of 
national Arab game markets referring exclusively to the local conditions and local 
concepts of identity.  In games such as Abu Hadid, the references communicated to the 
player on all the three levels of the game’s content, i.e. the visual signifiers, narrative, 
and game play, link mainly to local, in this case Egyptian, popular culture.  These 
games constitute substantial difference from the above-mentioned global Muslim games 
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and, together with the growing cooperation between Arab and Western game producers, 
indicate the possible future development of the localized Arab video game production. 
 
Third, this dissertation has discussed the ways in which ICT and new media contribute 
simultaneously to preserving traditional cultural norms and religious values while 
unsettling the existing arrangements and promoting new organizational forms.  As both 
chapters of this thesis have demonstrated, the traditional and established Muslim 
authorities are apparently aware that their message in order to be heard has be recast in 
accordance with new cultural and media ecology.  Moreover, many of them proved very 
successful in utilizing the new media technologies.  Regarding the production of Islamic 
knowledge on the Internet, this thesis has demonstrated how the technology enabling 
the communications between individual petitioners and religious scholars favors 
bottom-up approach, since the fatwas issued depend on the petitions the website has 
aggregated.  In this respect, El-Nawawy and Khamis (2009, p. 217) argue that the 
Internet and the various media outlets it enables constitute a new manifestation of a 
Muslim umma that is not based on authority, but on public participation; in a way 
similar to other Internet social networks.  This claim is supported by the fact that it is 
the petitioners, not the muftis, who set the agenda for the issues to be discussed on most 
of the websites that we analyzed.  Nevertheless, as I have argued above, despite the 
agenda being set by the individual petitioners, it is the traditional established authority, 
oftentimes closely linked to existing religious institutions, who issues the fatwa or give 
the advice.  Yet, these authorities, in order to be successful in disseminating their 
message, have to understand and utilize the organizational forms promoted by network 
communication – coalitions, networks, campaigns, and mobilizations (Dean et al. 2006) 
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– and the politics of “reputation management” that trades on knowing how and showing 
up (Anderson 2009). 
 
Similarly, in the chapter 3 I have demonstrated how the developers and designers of 
Arab and Muslim video games aim to translate the Islamic religious and cultural 
message into a new semiotic domain, with which today’s youth generation is naturally 
familiar.  In other words, they strive to meet the needs and expectations of what Prensky 
(2005) calls “digital natives.” Moreover, authors of these games perceive video games 
not only as state-of-the-art environments for learning and instruction, but also 
essentially as persuasive media.  They, albeit to a different degree, share the concern 
about the negative effects Western mainstream video games have on today’s Arab 
youth.  On the one hand, similar to the West these concerns are related to the alleged 
promotion of violent behavior and explicit display of sexuality in many mainstream 
video games; especially of the action genre.  On the other hand, more religiously and 
culturally specific concerns stem from what these authors perceive as misrepresentation 
of Islam and Muslims.  Therefore, as I have argued above, beyond the translation of the 
Islamic message into a new semiotic domain, particularly the Islamic educational games 
constitute safe, halāl alternatives to the mainstream global production.  By no means 
should we consider this phenomenon as specifically Islamic; we have witnessed similar 
“safe” appropriations of video games and toys by many other world’s religions, 
including Judaism and Christianity.  More importantly, when considering the new 
media literacy, we have to understand that gaming constitutes a specific culture with its 
own dynamics and developments.  This gaming culture is to a large degree 
conservative.  Several patterns and game genres have firmly established themselves and 
are regularly being repeated and remixed by software companies over and over again.  
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To win, for example, a real-time strategy game or first-person shooter game requires 
distinctive skills and a substantial understanding of the rule system typical for the genre, 
which in turn doesn’t change a lot.  Therefore, by appropriating mainstream, mainly 
Western video game patterns, the authors of Islamic educational games benefit from the 
existing skill sets with which players are already familiar.  In other words, they utilize 
what Bogost (2007) calls procedural rhetorics pertaining to particular game genres.  For 
example, the game Quraish appropriates the pattern of the real-time strategy game Age 
of Empires, whereas the hajj simulation directly uses the technology of Second Life.  
Therefore, on a symbolic level these games are clearly Islamic, with Muslim heroes and 
values, yet on a structural level they are Western – which in fact clearly corresponds 
with the aims of the developers, who want to deliver their message and at the same time 
reaffirm their belonging to and benefit from the existing global gaming culture. 
 
In this respect, Campbell (2010) has argued that religious groups and users often 
undergo a complex negotiation and decision-making process in their determination 
about whether they will incorporate new media technologies into the life of their 
community.  According to Campbell, this negotiation can lead in one of three 
directions:  acceptance and appropriation; rejection and resistance; or reconstruction and 
innovation – or a combination of these strategies.  In acceptance and appropriation 
media is embraced as a neutral tool to be used for religious purposes or to enhance the 
life of the community.  In rejection and resistance media is approached with caution due 
to problematic features or the results it generates.  So some aspects of the technology 
may be rejected and some uses or outcomes resisted.  In both reconstruction and 
innovation the decision is made to re-shape the technology in some way in order to 
enhance the community.  As I have demonstrated within the phenomena of production 
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of the Islamic knowledge on the Internet and construction of Muslim identity in new 
media, we see a trend toward the acceptance and appropriation of ICT and new media in 
the Arab and Muslim world, as religious narratives and goals are easily projected onto 
various gaming genres and Internet social networks are utilized for dissemination of the 
Islamic message and networking of the Muslim communities.   
 
Finally, when exploring the content of Islamic new media we find inherent continuity 
with many traditional literary genres in the Arab Muslim world similarly blending 
entertainment and education.  For example, the opening scene from the game Quraish is 
based on the Ibn Ishaq’s as-Sira an-Nabawiyya (The Life of the Prophet) and the first 
campaign of the game departs from the Ayyām al-Arab (The Days of the Arabs, i.e. 
stories of the tribal wars); Prophet’s Wars quotes Futūh (stories of the early Islamic 
conquests); games such as al-Muslim as-Saghir and al-Mughamirun appropriate many 
distinctive traits of the adab (medieval anecdotal form of prose designed to be both 
edifying and entertaining); and the hajj simulation in Second Life is in fact a 
technologically updated version of the popular hajj and Umrah illustrated step-by-step 
guides.  Similarly, as I have demonstrated above, many of the fatwa-issuing websites, 
beyond providing normative content in stricto sensu, offer readers counseling, news, 
and stories providing both education and entertainment.   
 
At the same time, the underlying logic behind the production and consumption 
associated with various Islamic websites and video games, which blend instructive 
content with popular entertainment, follows the patterns already manifested in many 
variations and different media outlets in the Arab world, such as the private-owned 
Islamic satellite TV channels that aim to present “excellent television programs and 
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materials that deal with Muslim issues and meet with the Muslim’s spiritual, cultural, 
and social needs” (Tash 2004; see also Bentzin 2003); the “Islamic music videos” which 
have already gained enormous popularity among Arab youth (Pond 2006); or a broad 
scale of market products ranging from Islamic fashion to halāl toys (Kuppinger 2009; 
Bunt 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, as Armbrust (2003, p. 121) suggests, it would be a mistake to think of this 
kind of consumption only as a product of digital-age technology developed over the last 
two decades.  Despite the fundamental changes, which new digital technology promotes 
in the ways of processing information and the production and consumption of 
knowledge, the content of Islamic websites and video games preserves continuity with 
discourses developed over a long period.  In other words, to characterize this emerging 
production solely in terms of reaction to the expansion of global or Western culture or 
as a manifestation of an Islamic revival movement would be ahistorical.  From a 
broader theoretical standpoint, the production of Islamic knowledge on the Internet and 
the construction of Muslim identity in new media can be used as a prism through which 
specific aspects of the transformation that Arab and Muslim societies have undergone in 
the past decades can be studied and better understood.  Given the rapid technological 
development and the growing dissemination of new information and communication 
technologies in the Muslim world, the emerging media outlets described in this thesis 
can easily become the future of what Bunt (2003) calls the “cyber Islamic 
environments;” translating the Islamic message into a new semiotic domain, yet 
maintaining an inherent link with Arab Islamic cultural heritage. 
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